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Abstract  
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the South African National Party’s efforts at winning 
‘hearts and minds’ within the decades of the 1960s’ up to the 1980s’. Thus, the various attempts 
by the NP to control and manipulate the image of the Republic of South Africa as seen from 
within and outside of its borders, is examined. The perspective offered in this study is from the 
point of view from the NP itself, as this is done in order to try to get a clear picture of what the 
apartheid government was struggling for and against.  
The methods employed within the study are, at times, of a historiographical nature and rely on 
various documentary sources. Because of the nature of the topic, subterfuge is to be expected and 
thus the sources are assessed for what they are, and not necessarily what they perhaps pretend to 
be. The phenomenon of subterfuge is thus examined in its own right.  
The study concludes with the suggestion that it might be useful to further research one particular 
aspect as shown in chapter 3, as well as with the idea that further studies of this kind might be 
useful in contributing towards the shift towards a more integrated contemporary South African 
history. 
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Opsomming  
Die doel van hierdie studie was om in die algemeen die Suid-Afrikaanse Nasionale Party se 
poging op die wen harte en gedagtes binne die raamwerk van die 1960's 'tot die 1980's te 
bestudeer. Dus, die verskeie pogings deur die NP om die beeld van die Republiek van Suid-
Afrika te beheer en manipuleer soos gesien beide van binne en buite die land se grense. Die 
perspektief wat in hierdie studie gebruik word, is uit die oogpunt van die NP self, dit is gedoen 
om 'n duidelike beeld van waarvoor die apartheidsregering geveg het, te kry. 
Die metodes wat gebruik word in die studie is by tye van 'n historiografiese aard en berus op 
verskeie literêre bronne. As gevolg van die aard van die onderwerp, word skelmstreke verwag en 
dus moet die bronne geneem vir wat hulle is en nie wat hulle dalk voorgee om te wees. Die 
verskillende voorbeelde van skelmstreke is dus in hul eie reg ondersoek. 
Die studie word afgesluit met die idee dat dit moontlik nuttig kan wees om verdere navorsing oor 
een spesifieke aspek soos in hoofstuk 3 gewys word, te doen. Asook die idee dat ‘n studie van 
hierdie soort nuttig kan wees in die verskuiwing na 'n meer geïntegreerde geskiedenis. 
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Chapter 1 
Prologue: Socio - Political landscape  
'The very term 'Afrikaner' signalled a desire on the parts of the Nationalists to identify as white Africans, 
torch bearers of Christian civilization drawn together by a unique culture and calling. The African tribes 
encountered by the Boers were often hostile and it was only through feats of stubborn fortitude and by the 
grace of God that they overcame constant threats to their existence - as the defeat of the vastly more 
numerous Zulu warriors at Blood River in 1838 so vividly showed... '1 
 
1.1: Introduction 
The subject of apartheid has been studied increasingly since the early 1990s'; arguably, this has 
been done, firstly, to a large extent from the perspective of so-called 'struggle history', and, 
secondly, also to a great extent, has been caught up with a focus on the rise and fall of this 
repressive system which owed its existence to the working of both socio-political forces and 
economic factors.  
 In common or popular usage, Afrikaner nationalism, or the term 'Afrikaner' itself, as mentioned 
in the quote above, gives one an idea of the 19th century sufferings and determination of the 
Afrikaner people. Continuing with this pattern of grief, the Afrikaners also suffered at the hands 
of the British after their trek inland, with the South African War and the later Anglo or Anglo-
Afrikaner domination of South African society in the post war era, with the trademark Afrikaner 
poverty that followed, which in turn created the conditions for nationalist tendencies to rise.   
In the first article of De Burger in 1915, Malan wrote that, "for our Volk this is the darkest hour. 
Once there was a time when we were united, one heart, even if storms raged around us...but our 
hearts are torn and our cultural life has been embittered. We drink the water of Marah."2 
Subsequently, in the same article, he wrote that the task was to "...tie together what should have 
                                                            
1 Saul Dubow, Apartheid, 1948 ‐ 1994 (United Kingdom: Oxford university press, 2014), p. 17 
2 De Burger, 26th  July, 1915, p. 1  
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never been separated." 3 The ideal of unification was clearly in view at the end of the day, and in 
the way that the later Nationalists viewed the new and evolving policy of apartheid, this was 
intended to hold true for both white and black, if on a distinctively different basis and meaning.   
When Daniel François Malan (1874 - 1959) spoke about apartheid in parliament for the first time 
in 1944, he explained that it was meant to be different from what was considered to be the 
negative idea of segregation, and that it would rather be a positive system within which all the 
various ethnic groups in South Africa could uplift themselves within their own cultural 
framework.4  
 Malan maintained that apartheid was a positive and non-repressive system which was based on 
the Afrikaners’ divine calling and even on their historically privileged destiny to convert the 
heathen to Christianity without watering down their national and cultural identity. This policy 
could only be implemented if society remained split along the traditional racial divisions that had 
been practised for 300 years since the origins of European settlement. Its implementation, 
however, acknowledged Malan, would take many years, and that it was an experiment which 
was, at the time, in its initial stages. This, then, was the general way in which the proposed idea 
of apartheid was presented to the public.5 
 Thus, as Saul Dubow states, it was conceived of as 'a more rigorous, methodical, and fair 
application of age-old principles of racial segregation; as the most effective manner of 
guaranteeing the security of white, Christian civilization; and as an ideal to be worked towards 
with benefits accruing to blacks as well as whites.'6  
 The Afrikaner people, who had long seen themselves as inferior, were motivated by the policy 
of apartheid as it gave them purpose and spoke of a moral vision for the country. The adoption of 
this segregationist policy thus signalled the growing collective confidence of the Afrikaner Volk. 
                                                            
3 Saul Dubow, Apartheid, 1948 ‐ 1994 (United Kingdom: Oxford university press, 2014), p. 30 
4 Saul Dubow, Apartheid, 1948 ‐ 1994 (United Kingdom: Oxford university press, 2014), p. 11    
5 Saul Dubow, Apartheid, 1948 ‐ 1994 (United Kingdom: Oxford university press, 2014), p. 13 
6 Saul Dubow, Apartheid, 1948 ‐ 1994 (United Kingdom: Oxford university press, 2014), p. 13 
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The plan at hand was to project the moral and ethical vision of the Volk onto South African 
society, after its own image.7  
On the 28th of May 1948, the headline of the Cape Times read, "Smuts Out: U. P. Loses the 
election" with the sub-heading, "Dr. Malan is certain of a majority”.8 At the time, this was a 
major shock as South Africa had lost, a 'great world statesman', as Winton Churchill described 
the Union’s prime minister when he referred to General Smuts9. The NP had won the election, 
and the implementation of apartheid was to be the order of the day.  
This brief background to the Nationalists’ introduction into the ruling political sphere of South 
Africa serves, firstly, to anchor this study in terms of later information and discussion, and also 
simply to sketch the post-1945 basis of what the political system was that needed to be 
maintained, strengthened and marketed to both South Africa and the international world.  
Later, during the 1960s' and 1970s', the National Party's leadership came to be beleaguered by 
fissures from within and outside of the party itself; it was also further plagued by the scandal 
created by a book about the secretive Broederbond organization, which revealed almost all the 
names of the members as well as their actions in terms of political influence. The NP's leadership 
was then shaken even more by the infamous information scandal of 1978 which caused Prime 
Minister B.J Voster to leave office, and subsequently led to P.W Botha becoming Prime Minister 
after beating Dr. C.P Mulder narrowly in an internal NP caucus.10 
 Moreover, it was becoming increasingly clear to a critical international world that the newly 
coined word, apartheid, was simply segregation in new and harder packaging. The international 
world was split into two sections in the eyes of the NP government, those being friends of South 
Africa, and the other, its enemies. In due course, that part of the world which fell into the latter 
section increased due to growing political unrest and violence within the Republic, and to the 
increasingly draconian nature of the NP party. The reasons for world criticism of the NP 
government will therefore be discussed in this chapter.  
                                                            
7 John Laurence, The seeds of disaster: a guide to the realities, race policies and world‐wide propaganda campaigns 
of the republic of South Africa (London, Victor Glance, 1968), p. 45  
8 Cape Times, 1st May, 1948, p. 1 
9 Cape Times, 1st May, 1948, p. 1 
10 Giliomee, Herman and Bernard Mbenga, Nuwe Geskiedenis van Suid Afrika (Cape Town, Tafelberg uitgewers, 
2007), pp.366 ‐367.  
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Marlene Breytenbach writes that freedom of speech is the life-blood of democracy, as it holds 
the government accountable to its citizens. The South African government claimed repeatedly 
that it had the freest press on the African continent, but South Africa was only a partial 
democracy which was 'achieved through various self-defence policies such as apartheid and the 
creation of the "homelands" where the disenfranchised black citizens could vote at their places of 
origin and not for the white-dominated parliament.'11  
It fell to the censorship apparatus of the Publications and Entertainment Act, and to the 
Department of Information and its management, Eschel Rhoodie and Connie Mulder, to fight the 
intensifying onslaught of negative publicity created by the South African policy of apartheid and 
its apparatus. In that historical context, it is especially important that, 'we need to bear in mind 
not only the liberation that people were fighting for but also the totality of the forces they were 
fighting against.'12 
It becomes necessary, then, to examine the history of the apartheid government’s so-called 
struggle for dominance and maintenance from a balanced perspective, in the spirit of what 
Dubow calls ‘integrated history’, and not to treat the apartheid system merely from a rhetorical 
protagonist and antagonistic perspective.13  
1.2:  Scope of the study 
As will be illustrated below with regard to the socio-political landscape, in the early 1960s’ 
South Africa was in turmoil; the country was now exposing the ugly side of its ‘separate but 
equal’ policy of apartheid to both the domestic arena and to the international world.  
 
Between the years of 1961 and 1966, the changes in the Afrikaner-dominated republic were 
extensive. The shifts had begun during the weeks after the Sharpeville emergency; it had started 
with the declaration of a national emergency and the banning of ‘non-white’ political leaders and 
                                                            
11 Marlene Breytenbach, “The manipulation of public opinion by state censorship of the media in South Africa” 
(D.Phill, Stellenbosch University, 1997), p. V  
12 Saul Dubow, Apartheid, 1948 ‐ 1994 (United Kingdom: Oxford university press, 2014), p. 301 
13 Saul Dubow, Apartheid, 1948 ‐ 1994 (United Kingdom: Oxford university press, 2014), p. 301 
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movements, although a no less real mechanism of change was the boosting of internal and 
external propaganda, alongside the use of political arrest and imprisonment without trial. 14 
 
In this defensive atmosphere, the 'white tribe of Africa', as the writer Martin Meredith deemed 
the white people who found themselves in Southern Africa, as well as the minority-rule country 
they had built for themselves, were now under attack both from within and from outside of its 
borders.15   
 
The key issue then, is to research the nature of the perceived threat to South Africa's white 
minority rule, and to consider how the Afrikaner Nationalists fought against the liberal 
encroachment sweeping the Western world. As the initial approach to this study has thus been of 
a general nature, therefore, a considerable body of secondary literature was consulted from the 
start in order to be familiarized with the overall framework of the topic. After the initial round of 
research, parameters where established in order to answer certain questions that arose.  
 
The key time-frame of this work is from the early 1960s' when the socio-political landscape of 
South Africa began to change, up to the late 1970s', when the actions of the Department of 
Information ended up in a local and an international political scandal. During these years, many 
propaganda activities were launched and maintained, and it becomes clear that for these 
initiatives to have been implemented, a foundation-like structure or basic platform was needed. 
Furthermore, it should also be understood that the term, 'propaganda' encompasses censorship 
and all manner of underhand attempts at concealing or manipulating information.  
 
In that light, three main inquiries then come to the forefront of this topic. The first of these is the 
reasoning behind the South African government's need for a propaganda effort, then what made 
this possible in terms of its underpinning, and how, and to what extent, the Department of 
Information was able to implement its propaganda offensive.  
                                                            
14 John Laurence, The seeds of disaster: a guide to the realities, race policies and world wide propaganda 
campaigns of the republic of South Africa (London, Victor Gollancz, 1968), p. 50 
15 The white tribe of Africa (1988), by Martin Meredith, was a study of South Africa in the post WW2 period which 
was funded by the BBC in order to introduce its viewership and readership to the predominantly Christian group of 
White Europeans who settled in Southern Africa and were now united through both civic and ethnic nationalism as 
South Africans.  
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The stimulus for these questions is for a contribution towards the move towards an integrated 
history of apartheid, as Saul Dubow has recently called it - rather than the continuation of a 
rhetorical and narrow buttressing of apartheid history. Simply put then, the study asks, firstly and 
secondly:  
 
 Why was there a need for propaganda after the National Party took power and on 
what basis was it justified, and then, of equal relevance:  
 
 What methods were employed by the state in order to win ‘hearts and minds’, and 
linked to that, how effective or successful were these methods.  
 
In adddressing these, this is very much a broad study of propaganda in South Africa as employed 
by the National Party between the 1960s' and the 1970s', against the backdrop of the ascent and 
consolidation of Afrikaner Nationalism and the censorship which was associated with that. At 
the same time, a fourth and important question arises in connection with the topic of propaganda 
and censorship, which relates to the theory behind the understanding of these topics.  
 
Accordingly, the theory of propaganda will be examined in the following chapter, so that one 
could place a ‘template’ of propagandist theory of sorts over that of the South African example, 
and perhaps discern a useful pattern. The same section will also discuss the conceptual question 
of nationalism, how it might be viewed in theoretical terms, and how it can be seen as emerging 
within a modern nation-state. The value behind this is the same as that of propaganda theory, in 
that it enables one to assess the workings of censorship and propaganda within the anchoring 
framework of theory. 
 
In the third chapter, then, the National Party’s developing system of censorship will be observed, 
as well as the road to full-blown authoritarian state censorship and control. This will be 
undertaken by using the Cronje Report, as it became popularly known, in order to form a basis 
from which to view the government’s thought process. In keeping with the theme of action and 
reaction, the Cronje Report can be seen as having laid the foundation for what would later 
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become official policy on state censorship. Viewed then, as the foundation for state censorship, 
this gives one some interesting insight into the meticulous nature of the government's policies 
and convictions. Subsequently, the Publications Acts of the 1960s' and 1970s' will also be 
examined in their full context alongside the dissident Afrikaner authors who were seen as having 
rebelled against their own.   
 
Following on from this, the spreading influence of the South African Broadcasting Corporation 
will be explored as a logical, further step in the fight for national as well as international hearts 
and minds. Thus, while chapter 3 deals with literary censorship, this part of the study will also 
deal with certain aspects of audio-visual censorship. This will be done by looking at the initial 
stages and nature of South African radio services, and then at the introduction of television. The 
key aspect of this section is the reasoning behind the eventual acceptance and implementation of 
television, and subsequently how it then came to be utilised.   
 
The culminating chapter of this dissertation will explore the Department of Information and its 
various attempts at persuasion, as well as where the need for such actions came from. This 
section is just as vital to the present work as the theory behind it, as it represents the end of a 
particular era of heightened propaganda action. These actions alone cost the South African tax 
payer approximately $ 75 billion between the years of 1975 and 1977. 16 Accordingly, this study 
will consider some of the programmes, the cost of which amounted to such a massive figure, not 
so much for the sake of retelling the familiar tale of the ‘Information Scandal’, but rather to 
explore the positively stubborn nature of the Nationalists' political beliefs in what they were 
doing.  
 
Whether or not the Afrikaner Nationalist leadership had the moral and ethical high ground which 
it claimed, is irrelevant for the purpose of this study, rather the importance lies with their actions 
- how they reacted to the situation they found themselves in. Thus, the intention of this work is 
not only to examine the full scale of the propaganda war engaged in by government officials 
from within and outside of the Department of Information and the state as a whole, but also, why 
there was a need for such an extensive propaganda effort.   
                                                            
16 Ron Nixon, Selling apartheid: South Africa’s global propaganda war (Jakana media (Pty) Limited, 2015), p.51 
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Historiography and Relevance  
The study of propaganda and the manner in which it is implemented can at times be in danger of 
being unreliable or uncertain due to the tricky nature of sources and the way that they are 
gathered. By this is meant that some of the sources examined were created to be purposefully 
deceitful by men who worked in intelligence, a section of virtually any government which is 
known for being murky. Thus, due to the nature of some of the material covered by this thesis, in 
terms of past clandestine actions by the National Party, along with the subsequent scandals 
surrounding it in the late 1970s', the methodology needs to take due account of this.  
This is considered by examining both primary and secondary sources, and by cross-referencing 
in order to get an idea of what might reasonably be considered to be an accuracy or a ‘truth’. 
This is especially relevant in Chapter 5, where the actions and operations of the Department of 
Information are of central importance. On the other hand, in various other instances, the notion 
of ascertaining what historical ‘truth’ is, is actually not of great significance. Rather, 
understanding of the reason for the source's initial creation and existence is what carries 
meaning.  
A newspaper such as The Citizen, which was established in order to propagate a government-
approved perspective or message, is useful as a primary printed source, although clearly not as a 
bearer of the verifiable ‘truth’. The same cautious consideration would apply to To the Point 
magazine, and to Eschel Rhoodie's self-justificatory book, Die Ware Inligting Skandaal as well 
as to that of Les de Villiers’s, Secret information. Rather, as mentioned above, cross-referencing 
these personal sources with other secondary works might take one closer to the truth, or to a 
reasonable version thereof.  
In terms of secondary literature, perhaps not only the most recent, but also one of the most 
encompassing historico-political works at this point is that of thye journalist, Ron Nixon, entitled 
Selling apartheid, South Africa’s global propaganda war, released in 2015. This book not only 
examines the motives behind the implementation of a (counter) propaganda offensive but also 
addresses the physical implementation of these propagandist actions. Its value as a source of 
information lies in the fact that not many studious works exist which deal with pro-apartheid, or 
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counter-defensive propaganda in the manner that this one does. For the most part, we see works 
that are written from the so-called struggle perspective, and, within this, the ideological motives 
for the NP’s propagandist actions are largely absent, or else their actions are framed in a highly 
judgemental or politically partisan fashion.   
Nixon writes from various perspectives, that is, from the NP government as well as from that of 
its adversaries, in order to offer an all-inclusive perspective. Thus, as the title states, the book 
discusses the various global advertising agencies employed by the apartheid state, the various 
persons who were bribed or were otherwise persuaded to help its cause, and the myriad of 
American and English politicians who saw communism as a worse fate than apartheid, and acted 
accordingly.  
Interestingly, Nixon also focuses on the complicity of certain African-Americans in the 
maintenance of the acceptable image of the Apartheid state, arguing that the South African 
global propaganda campaign or counter-offensive was somewhat more complicated that one 
might think, possibly due to the backdrop of Cold War politics and its influence on Western 
interests. The journalist, Rebecca Davis, for instance, has quoted Nixon in an article for the Daily 
Maverick, emphasising this in pointing out that with the book the author hopes that what it 
‘shows is the complexity of all these movements’, because the situation was ‘not as black and 
white as it seems.’ 17 
Other books which fall into somewhat the same category, although perhaps not as holistic in 
scale – to use such a term, are, for example, The Press and Apartheid: Repression and 
Propaganda in South Africa, by William A Hatchen and Anthony Giffard, which deals 
specifically with the ‘total onslaught’ against the press and the various legal retrictions that could 
land authors in exile or have their literary works banned. The key theme of the book, as stated on 
page vii, is that it is a ‘study of both measures taken by the South African government to control 
                                                            
17 “Selling Apartheid: New book lays bare extent of South Africa’s propaganda war”, Daily	Maverick, Last Modified 
August 28th 2015, http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015‐08‐28‐selling‐apartheid‐new‐book‐lays‐bare‐
extent‐of‐south‐africas‐propaganda‐war/  
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mass media and the efforts of its journalists…to express their views and resist those restrictions.’ 
18 
Furthermore, Hatchen and his co-author suggest that there are two forms of government control 
in the ‘very stange society’ that is South Africa, namely coercive control characterised by 
legislation and intimidation leading to self censorship and, secondly, manipulative control 
typified by covert and overt propaganda.19  This is a valuable source of secondary reading, 
especially when coupled with older works such as Press under Apartheid by Alex Hepple or A 
Culture of Censorship by Christopher Merret in order to gain extensive insight into the aims and 
actions of the NP government.   
The later book seeks to shed light on those publications that were banned by the NP government. 
As stated in its first chapter, ‘the purpose of this book is to consider state-initiated political 
censorship and intellectual repression in South Africa.’.20 This ties in with the above-mentioned 
works to form a cohesive understanding of the government’s repressive stance towards 
independent or critical writers, authors, journalists and academics in general. Equally, these 
works are also beneficial to the study simply due to the previously mentioned relationship 
between free speech and democracy.   
Further works such as The Great White Hoax: South Africa's International Propaganda Machine 
by Julian Burgess also make not only for compelling but also essential reading in order to fully 
understand the scope of the subject at hand. An issue, however, with such studies, is that they do 
not necessarily supply one with a modern or up-to-date understanding of the reasoning from 
within the National Party government, or possibly a non-judgemental perspective from within 
the hindsight of post-apartheid South Africa. That said, there have been scholarly dissertations 
which bring the focus closer to home, for example a PhD thesis by Marlene Breytenbach, 
entitled The manipulation of public opinion by state censorship of the media in South Africa, 
although it still functions for the most part to inform the reader how the government exerted 
censorship controls in both a directly coercive and a more indirectly manipulative manner.  
                                                            
18 Willialm A. Hachten and C. Anthony Giffard, Total	onslaught:	The	South	African	press	under	attack (USA, 
Wisconsin University Press, 1984), p. vii 
19 Willialm A. Hachten and C. Anthony Giffard, Total	onslaught:	The	South	African	press	under	attack (USA, 
Wisconsin University Press, 1984), p.viii  
20 Christopher Merrett, a Culture of censorship: secrecy and intellectual repression in South Africa (South Africa, 
David Phillip Publishing, 1994), p. 5 
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Even a work such as the above-mentioned book by Ron Nixon, Selling Apartheid, which brings 
great illumination to the subject at hand, is still predominantly written with the international 
community in mind.  
Therefore, concerning the relevance of this study, it is worth emphasising that the rationale 
behind it lies not only in the interest associated with the subject matter, but also in the points of 
view of that subject matter. As already mentioned, while initially this study has been conceived 
of as a general inquiry into apartheid-era propaganda and censorship, it has also become clear, in 
recent historiographical shifts, that the point of view of the Afrikaner Nationalists is, at times, 
increasingly overlooked in the course of a growing ‘struggle history’ focus on the ideological 
drives of the liberation or extra-parliamentary opposition movements, such as the ANC in 
particular, or the PAC to a lesser degree.  
This is, though, not intended as a study of the apartheid government’s rhetoric for the sake of 
fairness or balance towards the claims of the conservative wing or the white right; rather, it has 
been undertaken in order to try to provide a framework within which the apartheid government’s 
rhetoric can be better understood in the light of the country’s present status quo. In other words, 
the study approaches its topic from the perspective of it being primarily a 'counter-propaganda 
war', instead of simply a ‘standard’ propaganda operation.  
Secondly, while the topic in question has been studied in great detail in relation specifically to 
the Information Scandal, there has been considerably less concern with an exploration of the 
wider actions employed by state actors over a longer chronological period, and with viewing 
these within the context of an explanatory backdrop provided by theoretical concerns.     
Key figures     
This study encompasses a broad spectrum both in its time period, as well as in the key figures 
who played a role within its examination of the censorship and propaganda campaigns to try to 
secure the interests of Afrikaner nationalism. Some of these influential figures will, accordingly, 
be briefly discussed in this section in order to illuminate their standing as props of later 
information developments.   
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D.F. Malan, as the first editor of De Burger, and the leader of the National Party, played a 
significant role in the background of this study’s focus. Notably, Malan's NP government 
introduced the apartheid system which developed with expertise and advice from fellow-
politicians such as his close confidante, Paul Sauer, who was put in charge of a commission of 
inquiry into the question of South Africa's race relations. Ultimately, the idea of apartheid was 
formulated as a programme, and came to be imposed in order to steer 'non-white' communities 
and peoples into developing according to their own ethnic socio-political needs.21 
Geoffrey Cronje, who wrote extensively on the nature of apartheid and racial segregation under 
the banner of pseudo-scientific and religious convictions, will be discussed in greater detail as 
part of chapter 3. His role in state censorship was exceptionally wide, as he was at the head of 
the Report on the Commission into Undesirable Publications, which would serve as the 
foundation for later censoring apparatus.  
Dr. Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd (1901-1966) has, of course, to be noted in any study falling under 
the wide reach of the history of apartheid. Verwoerd continues to be often termed the so-called 
architect of apartheid, due to his unwavering belief in the apartheid system. For some scholars, 
the reason for his rigorous belief in the apartheid system might have stemmed from his clinical 
academic approach to South African society, having studied and lectured both abroad and 
nationally in the social sciences.22  
Another important – and later - figure in this study is Dr. Eschel Mostert Rhoodie, who was the 
Deputy Minister of Information from 1972 until the Information Scandal in 1977. Rhoodie was 
engaged by Connie Mulder (Minister of Information) when he was just 38 years old, and created 
much controversy due to his young age compared to those within ruling circles who were 
overlooked for the position. Rhoodie was appointed to the position due to his influential ideas as 
portrayed in his book, The Paper Curtain (1969), which attracted the attention of Mulder, a 
Minister who believed Rhoodie to have been like-minded in the combative belief that South 
                                                            
21 Giliomee, Herman and Bernard Mbenga, Nuwe Geskiedenis van Suid Afrika (Cape Town, Tafelberg uitgewers, 
2007), p.309  
22 Giliomee, Herman and Bernard Mbenga, Nuwe Geskiedenis van Suid Afrika (Cape Town, Tafelberg uitgewers, 
2007), p.314 
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Africa needed to use unconventional methods in order to counter the global anti-apartheid 
movement.23   
Rhoodie, of course, later went public after the 1970s scandal broke, and made public some of the 
information that he had had access to in interviews with the BBC and the Dutch magazine, 
Elseviers to name a couple of media outlets, and also threatened to reveal even more damaging 
material if he was not granted amnesty.24 
Dr. Connie Mulder, who had appointed Rhoodie when he was the Minister of Information, was a 
Nationalist politician who, after going on an overseas trip to gauge international opinion of South 
Africa in the early 1970s, reportedly found the international world alarmingly hostile towards 
and fiercely critical of the Republic. Mulder could be seen as a hard-line, yet pragmatic 
Afrikaner ruler, not a front-runner but wanting the best for the interests of the apartheid 
Republic; as was quoted in an article from Die Burger, ‘Mulder se N.P. is agter sy leier’, which 
underlined that P.W. Botha was seen and was accepted as the man for the job, and implied that 
the Republic had the capability to defeat its enemies. 25  Equally, Mulder's Department of 
Information was often criticised for not being sufficiently effective in combating South Africa's 
poor international image. To attempt to change this, he needed to start a major counter-
propaganda offensive which turned to relying on unconventional methods to sway public 
opinion.26 
The two main NP leaders at the wheel during the period covered by this work were, firstly, 
Balthazar Johannes Voster (1915-1983) who became Prime Minister in 1966. His leadership was 
viewed as more pragmatic and relaxed than that of his predecessor, Hendrik Verwoerd. Due to 
his comparative flexibility, his time in office was marked by what is known today as an 'Outward 
- Looking' policy, and partly because of this, his premiership was marked by party controversy 
and by inter - departmental strife.27 
                                                            
23 Ron Nixon, Selling apartheid: South Africa’s global propaganda war (Jakana media (Pty) Limited, 2015), p.61 
24 Ron Nixon, Selling apartheid: South Africa’s global propaganda war (Jakana media (Pty) Limited, 2015), p.51 
25 Die Burger, 2nd  October, 1978, p. 3  
26 Ron Nixon, Selling apartheid: South Africa’s global propaganda war (Jakana media (Pty) Limited, 2015), pp. 57 ‐ 
58 
27 Roger Pfister, Apartheid South Africa and African States; from pariah to middle power (Taurus academic studies, 
New York City, 2005), pp. 11 ‐ 12 
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After the Information Scandal in which Voster was damagingly implicated, P.W Botha replaced 
him as Prime Minister after an internal NP caucus. Botha was an experienced campaigner, 
especially in domestic and foreign policy. His leadership was marked by an increase in military 
strength and in the domestic security establishment, and by the intensified use of state power in 
the interest of apartheid national ideals. Botha retired in 1989 due to illness and amid allegations 
of inconsistent behaviour. 28 Notably, when Botha retired, it was not as Prime Minister but 
instead as State President. The previous symbolic position of president was abolished, and thus 
after 1984 the executive leader of South Africa was referred to only as the State President.  
1.3: Socio-Political landscape of the 1960s 
On the 3rd of February 1960, the then prime minister of Britain, Harold Macmillan (1894-1986) 
famously stated that “The wind of change is blowing through this continent and whether we like 
it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact. We must all accept it as a fact, 
and our national policies must take account of it”29  This excerpt from the influential ‘winds of 
change’ speech in Cape Town is perhaps most fitting for the first chapter of this study. Before 
examining the theory of propaganda and persuasion, one first needs to take a look at the socio-
political landscape of the years before the 1970s. The necessity of this is that it shows the 
difficult landscape in which the NP found itself, as well as the specific hostility against which the 
government felt that it needed to protect itself and its citizens.  
In other words, this chapter will briefly examine the prologue to the 1970s by looking at some of 
the defining features of the 1960s that made the NP consider it necessary to implement strict 
control over the media in the Republic, both literary and visual, in the form of strict censorship 
and increasingly overt propaganda. The 1960s' was, of course, the formative era when the 
National Party very single-mindedly began to lay the groundwork for the propaganda ‘machine’ 
which would go on to be implemented up to the late 1980s', with mixed levels of effectiveness 
and success. 
                                                            
28 Roger Pfister, Apartheid South Africa and African States; from pariah to middle power (Taurus academic studies, 
New York City, 2005), p. 12 
29 “Apartheid in South Africa”, BBC, Last modified November 6th 2014, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/archive/apartheid/7203.shtml  
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By evaluating these years, it is possible to identify a kind of ‘propaganda foundation’ for the 
period to follow, and within it the growth of the subsequent phenomenon that became what could 
be termed the South African ‘propaganda machine’. What matters especially are those critical 
events that become, either purposefully or otherwise, foundation stones of the apartheid system. 
In other words, it is those actions or episodes that set the stage for the propaganda machine to 
launch into operation that one needs to take into proper account.   
The stage was set, of course, historically by the policy of apartheid as implemented in the 
aftermath of the 1948 election – this was, by then, looming large in the background of South 
Africa’s political storyline. But during the 1960s there were, too, other significant events and 
endeavours that led up to the charged status quo of the 1970s, as well as in the years following 
those.  
Prologue to socio-political landscape  
Whenever government propaganda is the subject of scrutiny, one has not only to examine the 
national realm, but also the international dimension. Therefore, this section will look first at the 
national political landscape of 1960s South Africa, and then at the international political 
landscape in terms of those elements that were in defence of the National Party, as projected by 
the various propaganda initiatives of the Pretoria government. Of course, the 1960s were marked 
by many events, apart from those on which this section focuses, such as South Africa becoming a 
republic in 1961 or the fatal stabbing of H.F. Verwoerd in 1966. For the scope of this work and 
this particular chapter, only certain episodes have been highlighted that have significance -  not 
necessarily in terms of the fortunes of Afrikaner nationalism, but because of being marked by a 
reactive characteristic in terms of defensive ‘national’ propaganda, or to the build-up to 
defensive propaganda.   
Sharpeville  
John Laurence suggested in The Seeds of Disaster (1968) that “there have been two great 
watersheds in South African affairs since World War II”30. These were the defeat of the Smuts 
                                                            
30 John Laurence, The seeds of disaster: a guide to the realities, race policies and world wide propaganda 
campaigns of the republic of South Africa (London, Victor Gollancz, 1968), p. 60 
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government in the 1948 election and the subsequent assumption of power by the Afrikaner 
Nationalists, with the second being the Sharpeville crisis and its aftermath31.  
Today, the event referred to only as ‘Sharpeville’ proved to be one of the events that forever 
altered the political face of South Africa. But, for present purposes, the history of the Sharpeville 
massacre is not as important as the aftermath. Hendrik Verwoerd, then prime minister, was 
quoted by Laurence as saying that the authorities would have a problem on their hands after the 
events at Sharpeville.32 It was not exactly an understatement.    
The actual events at Sharpeville have, of course, been well documented and studied over the 
subsequent years. What is most important here was the response, not only nationally but also 
internationally. Those foreign agencies and interests such as the British Boycott movement, or 
the Anti Apartheid Movememnt (AAM) which had taken up opposition to the apartheid system 
were outraged by the shooting and exploited this episode to their political advantage. Back home 
in South Africa, law-abiding people became scared as violence broke out, and white civilians 
began to arm themselves in order to fight off a supposed 'swart gevaar’ onslaught. The 
apprehension that loomed in the back of many white minds could now, it seemed, very easily 
become a frightening reality.  
On the 21st of March 1960, the police had shot 69 black South Africans and wounded close to 
180 who had been protesting against the country’s pass law system. As news reports of the 
shooting spread, the publicity was accompanied by protests, disturbances and instances of rioting 
in Soweto, Cape Town, Durban and Port Elizabeth.33 
The Sharpeville crisis, unsurprisingly, immediately dominated the front pages of the national 
press. As the Rand Daily Mail read, ‘54 dead, 191 hurt in riots; Army called out in Cape 
outburst’.34 Similarly, the Pretoria News of the 22nd of March, 1960 recorded, ‘Riot Townships 
Quiet but Saracens Patrol; Casualties: 56 dead, 220 injured but more likely to die’.35  
                                                            
31 John Laurence, The seeds of disaster: a guide to the realities, race policies and world wide propaganda 
campaigns of the republic of South Africa (London, Victor Gollancz, 1968), p. 61 
32 Herman Gilliomee, Die laaste Afrikaner leiers: ‘n opperste toets van mag (Cape Town, Tafelberg, 2012), p.75  
33 Anthea Jeffery, People’s war: New light on the struggle for South Africa (Jonathan Ball, 2009), p.1 
34 Rand Daily Mail, 22nd March, 1960, p. 1  
35 The Pretoria News, 22nd March, 1960, p. 1 
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These types of headlines echoed throughout virtually all of the newspapers in South Africa. 
Beneath such headlines, as the Pretoria News reported, ‘Rush to buy weapons; Towns become 
armed camps’. Nationally, scores of white people were depicted rushing to buy weapons in order 
to arm themselves against an anticipated black uprising.36  
On the 30th of March the government announced a state of emergency and, in the following 
weeks, there was a massive wave of detentions. Then, on the 8th of April of 1960, the Pan 
African Congress (PAC) as well as well as the African National Congress (ANC) was banned37. 
A whole generation of anti-apartheid political spokesmen and leaders were now to be exiled, 
imprisoned, and otherwise silenced38.  
The events at Sharpeville and at Langa in Cape Town went on to make the international news. 
As the Pretoria News advised its readers, ‘Riots are big news overseas’. Its short article pointed 
out that The New York Times as well as even Britain’s conservative The Daily Express had 
opinion coverage of the terrible injustice of apartheid. Such sentiment was mirrored elsewhere by 
the initial actions of groups overseas to the events at Sharpeville. Thus, the British Boycott 
Movement Committee mounted a picketing offensive outside South Africa House in London in 
March 1960. Moreover, apartheid as a relatively unknown, far away concept, became a more 
widely known topic of ordinary conversation, and some of those who had been unsure about the 
issue of boycotts against South Africa now became convinced that it might be the right thing to 
do.39  
Today, this event is dealt with in most history textbooks as a watershed moment in South Africa, 
not because it ignited supposedly revolutionary actions, but more because it was the first major 
incident that made known to the rest of the world the harshness of the apartheid order. In a way, 
it could be compared to domestic and world reaction to the notorious My Lai massacre during 
the Vietnam War. There, too, its significance lay in the reaction to the brutal killing of civilians, 
and what it exposed of the nature of the war which America was prosecuting in Vietnam.   
                                                            
36 The Pretoria News, 22nd March, 1960, p. 1 
37 Herman Gilliomee, Die laaste Afrikaner leiers: ‘n opperste toets van mag (Cape Town, Tafelberg, 2012), p.472 
38 John Laurence, The seeds of disaster: a guide to the realities, race policies and world wide propaganda 
campaigns of the republic of South Africa (London, Victor Gollancz, 1968), pp 75‐76 
39 Roger Fieldhouse, Anti‐Apartheid, a history of the movement in Britain: a study in pressure group politics 
(London, Merlin Press, 2005), p. 20 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
26 
 
Through Sharpeville, it had become ever clearer to a critical Western world that in an era of 
African decolonisation and general liberalism, South Africa was moving in the opposite 
direction.  
The Armed Struggle  
As a prologue to the 1970s, the 1960s were also marked by the transition to what has become 
characterised as the liberation movement strategy of armed struggle. Principally, the military 
wing of the ANC, Umkhonto we Sizwe or the MK (‘The Spear of the Nation’) was established in 
November, 1961, and this marked a shift from the ANC’s policy of non-violence to one of an 
armed struggle. Among other participants as well as later scholars, Joe Slovo, a member of the 
South African Communist Party’s Central Committee, has claimed that the SACP played a large 
role in propelling this shift40.  
The MK formally started its sabotage campaign on the 16th of December 1961 when it bombed 
the Department of Bantu Education offices in Durban, followed by an explosion at the 
Department of Bantu Affairs in Johannesburg. Following these, there were 200 more attacks on 
government infrastructure and on policemen or informants during the following 18 months41.  
Inspired by the ideology of the SACP, by 1962 new MK recruits were being taught to view white 
South Africa as an imperialist nation and black South Africa as a colonised country, forming the 
exploitative basis upon which the wealth of white South Africans was derived from the political, 
economic and social disenfranchisement of black South Africans42. Meanwhile, the series of 
low-key acts of sabotage and bomb attacks continued for a while, on an intermittent basis. 
Although the power of the state was never seriously threatened, for the NP government the 
menace of the swart gevaar was brought into focus as a threat to the security and stability of the 
political order.  
In response, Pretoria’s police and army generals drew on the experiences of the French in 
Algeria and America in Vietnam, and began to re-fashion and re-train the security forces. The 
security forces made increasing use of surveillance and were aided by new legislation, such as 
                                                            
40 Anthea Jefferey, People’s war: New light on the struggle for South Africa (Jonathan Ball, 2009), p. 4 
41 Anthea Jefferey, People’s war: New light on the struggle for South Africa (Jonathan Ball, 2009), p. 4                                                          
42 Anthea Jefferey, People’s war: New light on the struggle for South Africa (Jonathan Ball, 2009), pp.4‐5 
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the new law which allowed them to detain people for up to 90 days without trial, under which 
prisoners could be held in isolation, with abuse and torture being condoned by the authorities.43     
These developments naturally undermined the earlier positive and peaceable picture of apartheid 
that the NP had been wanting to project to the rest of the world, and the government of South 
Africa was now having to come to terms with increasingly adverse opinion from many fronts – 
there was an emerging battle that needed to be fought and won, so that the outside world would 
again view the country as a place of order and peaceful harmony.  
State Reactions 
The obvious measure to mention at this point is the 1963 Sabotage Act which extended the 
powers of the already stringent security legislation. Drafted in a deliberately vague way, it made 
provision for a range of actions that could be defined as being against the nation, while being 
widened to encompass acts of terrorism and treason under the umbrella-banner of sabotage44.  
Secondly, the penalties for breaches of the Security Act were severe, from statutory minimum 
terms of imprisonment up to the death penalty, along with lesser penalties of house arrest or 
banning for political offences45. Under subsequent legislation, offenders could be detained for up 
to 180 days and in 1967 indefinite detention was introduced under the Terrorism Act. 46 
Prior to this, there had been an international outcry over the arraignment on treason charges and 
conviction of Nelson Mandela and other leaders in the Rivonia trials, in which proceedings 
received considerable world press coverage. In Britain, to cite one example, there were 28 
demonstrations in various parts of the country on the day of the verdict. Apart from this, there 
were various marches to, and picketing protests outside, the South African embassy in London.47  
 
International projection of propaganda in support of apartheid.   
 
                                                            
43 Anthea Jefferey, People’s war: New light on the struggle for South Africa (Jonathan Ball, 2009), p. 5 
44 David Welsh, The rise and fall of apartheid (Jeppestown, Jonathan Ball publishers, 2009), p. 76 
45 David Welsh, The rise and fall of apartheid (Jeppestown, Jonathan Ball publishers, 2009), p. 76 
46 David Welsh, The rise and fall of apartheid (Jeppestown, Jonathan Ball publishers, 2009), p. 78 
47 Roger Fieldhouse, Anti‐Apartheid, a history of the movement in Britain: a study in pressure group politics 
(London, Merlin Press, 2005), p. 53 
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On an international level, the South African Foundation (SAF) was established and developed 
after Sharpeville in 1960 to market a positive image of South Africa, and to advance and protect 
its interests. According to Eschel Rhoodie, who became secretary of the Department of 
Information in July 1972, the SAF was trying to accomplish on a private basis, what the 
Department of Information was trying to accomplish on an official basis48. Chapter 5 will 
elaborate further on the activities of Dr. Rhoodie and the South African Foundation, but for 
initial purposes, a brief description is needed here.   
In principle, the SAF claimed that it did not necessarily endorse the views of any particular 
political party or entity, but instead stood for a patriotic defence of the status quo of the day on 
the international front. Its ideological purpose was to show that the system of apartheid worked 
for the benefit of all races, and while in doing so, it took efforts to try to minimise damaging 
incidents of petty apartheid in the hope of dampening the international anti-apartheid critique.                   
49   
There were never any official ties between the SAF and the Department of Information, 
according to the Minister of Information, Dr. Connie Mulder, but they always worked together in 
co-operation on the basis of shared interests and informal ties50. Later, however, a substantive 
link between the private business organisation and the government would be uncovered.   
Internationally, the SAF worked with like-minded and sympathetic organisations to help to 
promote South Africa’s image. In Britain, the SAF worked along with the United Kingdom –
South Africa Foundation (UKSATA). In West Germany, the Foundation had strong ties with the 
Deutsch-Sudafrikanische Gesellschaft (DSAG), and it appears that this organisation was partially 
funded by both the SAF as well as the Department of Information. In Holland, the SAF worked 
closely with the Jan van Riebeeck Stichting, which also received funds from the Foundation. In 
                                                            
48 Julian Burgess et al ., The white hoax: South Africa’s international propaganda machine (London, Africa Bureau, 
1977), p. 24 
49 Julian Burgess et al ., The white hoax: South Africa’s international propaganda machine (London, Africa Bureau, 
1977), p.24‐25 
50 Julian Burgess et al ., The white hoax: South Africa’s international propaganda machine (London, Africa Bureau, 
1977), p. 24 
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France, the Foundation worked alongside the Comite France-Afrique du Sud, and in Switzerland, 
the SAF was associated with the Swiss-South Africa Association51.  
This shows something of the extent of Pretoria’s gathering efforts to counter international 
criticism. The reach of the SAF was also further extended by the production and distribution of 
various complimentary publications, such as the monthly magazine, South Africa international, 
which was sent to over 9000 people judged to be influential and favourable towards the 
Republic. The Foundation also distributed The South African Foundation News to all of its 
members, as well as to academic institutions, politicians and journalists52 . 
The development of an organisation such as the South African Foundation, and the existence of 
its foreign subsidiaries or associations, serves as confirmation that the global climate of the 
1960s and afterwards was increasingly unfavourable for the National Party’s ideologies and 
policies. In that defensive context, it also became increasingly clear that the SAF was a 
propaganda apparatus, designed not simply to spread overt propaganda, but also to conceal 
unpleasant realities, so that the projection of South Africa as a country rested on what could be 
called ‘lies of omission’.  
The following chapters will build on this introductory political landscape in order to try to 
facilitate a more complete picture of the various propaganda enterprises. First, however, some 
examination of the theory behind this study is required, and we turn to this in the following 
chapter.  
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
                                                            
51 Julian Burgess et al., The white hoax: South Africa’s international propaganda machine (London, Africa Bureau, 
1977), p. 24. 
52 Julian Burgess et al ., The white hoax: South Africa’s international propaganda machine (London, Africa Bureau, 
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Theoretical Patterns  
‘Nationalism arises under the iniquity of foreign oppression and exploitation, and provides a powerful 
instrument for the demolition of existing imperial structures. From the point of view of political 
evolution, it can be regarded as a negative factor only if large political units are held to be essential to the 
stability of the international order...it is a positive factor inasmuch as it may provide the brick and mortar 
necessary for the construction of new and stable political units’.53 
 
2.1: Introduction  
The introductory chapter gave some insight into those events of the 1960s that shaped the 
decade, and became the watershed moments in South African history which opened up the 
Republic to sustained criticism from outside. The following discussion will aim at grounding this 
study in theoretical terms.  
Two main conceptual elements which inform this thesis are, firstly, the notion of a maturing 
nationalist movement as well as the theory of broader nationalism and, secondly, the theory of 
propaganda and the manipulation of ‘hearts and minds’.   
A first consideration is the nature and theory of nationalism, and how it functions practically in a 
society. Secondly, the history, theory and patterns of propaganda come into focus, and need to be 
explored, as well as the modernization of propaganda. Lastly, the uses of modern mass media 
will be discussed as a sub-category of the dissemination of propaganda.  
In order to understand the historical essence of National Party politics and its government 
propaganda, it can be illuminating for an examination such as this to consider whether the 
patterns exhibited by the case of apartheid-ruled South Africa can be viewed as having been 
similar to, or different from, other movements, seen broadly.  
 
 
                                                            
53 Konstantin Symmons‐Symonolewicz, Nationalist Movements:  a comparative view (Meadville, PA, Maplewood 
Press, 1970),  p. 74 
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The theory and pattern of nationalism 
This section will examine the theory and pattern of nationalism, especially those elements 
relevant to the Afrikaner people in South Africa. While mindful of the need to avoid what at 
times is a common confusion of nationalism with general patriotism, what is of importance here 
is to consider the nature of nationalism within the context of ‘constructed’ or ‘imagined’ new 
communities in the modern historical era.  
Of most analytical relevance is the idea of a people’s 'awakening', due to certain external stimuli 
which create favourable circumstances for nationalist movements to emerge. Equally, ideas 
about the maintenance and protection of nationalism, or of the defence of specific nationalist 
movements, are particularly pertinent to any study of the so-called struggle of the Afrikaner 
people.   
Definition and nature  
Before continuing, one must first have a short-hand understanding of what is meant by the notion 
of ‘nation’ or ‘state’, as this is the concept around which nationalism is created. While the 
definition of nationalism is varying in nature, for the sake of this work the following definition is 
apt:  
'Nationalism is the active solidarity of a larger human collectivity which shares a 
common culture, or a common fund of significant experiences and interests, conceives 
of itself as a nation and strives for political unity and self-government'. 54 
Thus, by nationalism one could point to those modern ‘national- patriotic’ movements born from 
both the First and the Second World Wars, which ignited and spread nationalism around the 
globe. In Africa and Asia, the various forms of nationalist movements were a reaction to a 
disturbance in the way of life of societies.55 Historically, nationalism is imbued with two of the 
great ideas that have changed the modern world, according to Barbara Ward. The first of these is 
the idea that humankind was able to be propelled into the modern political era without the 
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daunting challenge of going slowly from an agricultural society towards a technologically 
advanced society. The second idea is that nationalism made democracy possible by means of the 
creation of a sense of a shared national community.56 
On the other hand, the three negative features of nationalism are:  
 It is not quite capable of assuring cohesion inside the state, if the state contains 
minorities; 
 
 It is not able to confront creatively the modern world in which various states must 
exist in inescapable proximity and economic interdependence;  
 
 It is not able to function as the ‘master’ institution of a new economic universe. 
Clearly, then, nationalism as a movement which looks inward, only at those who are central 
to its constituency, cannot be expected to be free of limitations and weaknesses. This is 
especially the case in the modern political world, where interdependence and the integrating 
force of the capitalist world economy dominate all existence.    
At the same time, the insular force of nationalism cannot be discounted, given the depth of its 
historical development through being awakened and fostered by a positive, although more often,  
a negative pressure. In general terms, Symmons (1970), considers this to be a ‘positive and 
creative response to the shattering impact of culture contact and conflict, to the threat of cultural 
annihilation.'57 Examples of this can be found in South Africa, where the denigration associated 
with white domination of black people led to the emergence of a wide-reaching black 
consciousness movement, and in the power which the British exerted over the Afrikaner people; 
coupled to a history marked by resentment of imperial domination and the violence of war, these 
pressures helped to fuel the rise of Afrikaner nationalism.     
Patterns of nationalism  
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The psychology or mentalite of nationalism can be seen as being comprised of ambiguous 
elements, with the more serious, abrupt and intolerable the change to a people’s way of life, the 
more radical their nationalist protest is likely to be.58 This is illuminated well in the following 
extract:  
'Nationalist movements originate and develop when something that is dear to a given 
people - their language or customs - is forcibly taken away from them, or when they 
suddenly realise the immense cruelty and injustice of some such past expropriation. 
Modern nationalism...is often critical of the weakness of its own native heritage and 
thus tends to be reformist in its goals...but the fundamental belief is that its own way of 
life is as good as any other and deserves to persist and flourish.'59  
When a nationalist movement begins to blossom, power, education and a shared cultural history 
will shape the material available to nationalist makers or entrepreneurs in the task of 
mobilisation. If the project is successful, and the subsequent circumstances favourable, the 
ascending new group might set up a new state in its own image or identity, or reinvent an 
existing nation-state as its own. The resulting state has major advantages for the interests of the 
so-called awakers, and in due course to many of those who are able to become bearers of the 
new presiding culture. The path of those who are not a part of the new imagined socio-cultural 
state face certain options, including assimilation, emigration, the status of an excluded or a 
downtrodden minority, or even, in extreme circumstances, of being eradicated completely 60.  
This ‘typology’ conforms well to the three - stage pattern of nationalist development laid out by 
classic writers such as Rupert Emerson. Firstly, it can encompass a xenophobic defence of the 
existing order. Secondly, it can entail a period of uncritical self - humiliation and the acceptance 
of an existing order. Lastly, it can involve the germination of a nationalist synthesis. Although 
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press, 1970),  p. 5  
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this is clearly not applicable to all nationalist movements, it is of some use in the case of 
examining nationalist movements which represent a reaction to conquest.61 
The collective ‘awakening’ of a group is seen as the first phase of a nationalist movement, tied to 
the idea that the subordinated group is reacting to an oppressive stimulus and, subsequently, falls 
back on its heritage and culture to provide the fuel that it needs to rediscover or to reinvent a past 
and a culture. For scholars such as Symmons, the so-called awakening occurs through two linked 
collective activities which are both undertaken by intellectuals. Historically, it is almost 
invariably the intellectual middle classes who provide influential nationalist leadership. 62 
Through the utilisation of historical truths, half-truths, over-exaggerations and inventions, 
national myths serve to foster a sense of nationhood, the idea of citizenship, and of a specific 
people’s exclusive ethnic history.  
The limitations of nationalism in the modernising world  
As is implicit from the preceding discussion, history shows that the impact of nationalism is 
marked by contradictions and limitations. Scholars of the theory of nationalism have pointed to 
three problematic factors. The first of these is ethnic nationalism’s lack of ability to guarantee 
stability in a country or nation-state in which an identifiable minority or distinctive minorities are 
excluded.63 Nationalist exclusion and alienation of a section of society creates an opposition. In 
the case of South Africa, it was, of course, a question of a nationalist racial minority leaving a 
subordinated majority outside.  
The second flaw is the difficulty that nationalism confronts in the modern world where one state 
has to exist in proximity to another on the basis of economic interdependence.64 Strongly inward-
looking nationalism can lead to problems in relying on, and sharing with, other nation states. 
Lastly, then, extreme nationalism does not function well as the primary force of countries which 
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constitute the modern world’s economic system.65 Whatever the insistence on, or claims of, civic 
or ethnic nationalism, the realities of the contemporary 'world economy' goes against any notion 
of every country for itself, for (outside of the odd extreme case of nationalist self-isolation) 
nation-states can only sustain themselves on the basis of economic interdependence and other 
relations of mutual exchange. In the case of an apartheid nationalist South Africa, its years of 
defensive struggles, all the way up to 1994, were endured on the basis of the maintenance of a 
white nationalism, under which virttually all morally and ethically discriminatory actions of the 
government could be justified.   
2.3: Theory of Propaganda 
While propaganda can be defined in many different ways, in one classic book definition of 
propaganda as the planned formation of ‘man’s attitudes’, the author concludes that it is, “the 
expressions of opinions or actions carried out deliberately by individuals or groups with the view 
to influencing the opinions and actions of other individuals or groups for predetermined ends and 
through psychological manipulations”66. This implies a stealthy or even a sinister-sounding 
phenomenon, although  propaganda did not always carry a perceived negative connotation, as in 
earlier centuries in early modern Catholic Europe, when a Congregation of Propaganda served 
simply to ‘propagate’ the mission of Christian enlightenment through the planting of fresh shoots 
or believers.        
This study rests on an understanding of the underlying theory of its subject matter to assist in 
contextualising it. First, briefly, a few words on its history before the modernisation and practical 
uses of propaganda will be examined.  
History and description 
On the most basic level, the act of human communication is the attempt to convey meaning or 
information through symbolic interaction67. Thus, communication is a process of exchange and 
people engage in it when they attempt to understand the world in which they find themselves.  
What might be termed informative communication is a transaction which can transcend doubt 
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and scepticism due to the limited language being used to convey the information. It is a process 
of communication that seeks to create mutual understanding about data that is seen by recipients 
as accurate and indisputable68. In other words, these types of communication purport to be about 
‘simple’ facts and figures, without any suspicion of their having an alternative meaning, or some 
hidden agenda.  
Propaganda employs informative communication in a similar fashion, but with one important 
difference. The propagandistically-driven user of informative communication seeks to move past 
mutually agreed understanding to promote a partisan or counter-cause that serves the calculated 
interest of the purveyor. In this duplicitous scenario, the receiver may believe that the 
communication is simply informative in nature, whereas it is, of course, deliberately 
manipulative propaganda69.   
Once propaganda came to be used systematically as a political tool in times of war, it acquired an 
explicitly underhand or even sinister connotation, due to the fact that warring political elites 
use[d] lies, atrocity stories and subterfuge in an ideological offensive to try to influence the final 
outcome70. The next section will consider how the modern producers of propaganda focus on the 
vulnerable aspects of their opponents during wartime or in periods of political unrest.   
Modernisation of propaganda  
Although the institutionalisation of propaganda was linked most heavily to war, the mechanisms 
through which it came to be a popular, genuinely mass medium, go back to the later 19th and 
early 20th centuries, an era marked by a great propagandising expansion. Technological advances 
now made it possible to reach ever wider audiences, and was soon being used not only to convey 
information informatively, but also very persuasively.  
While European newspapers and commercial news sheets enjoyed only a limited circulation in 
the earlier 19th century, later progress in education and literacy, and improvements in transport 
and distribution, eased the flow of information between geographically distant areas, and made it 
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possible for controlled mass message communication to take hold71. Alongside this, two new 
historical phenomena emerged, the new audience and the emergence of mass society.  
For the first time, it was possible to reach large, heterogeneous groups of people and to 
disseminate information reasonably rapidly to a growing audience of working- and middle-class 
readers who had the means to afford daily newspapers on a daily basis – they, of course, made up 
the so-called ‘new’ audience72. With local news and entertainment alongside politics and socio-
economic information, the press played a role in creating a sense of social commonality, in 
which its audience was aware that they were a part of a distinctive community with shared values 
and opinions. The emergence of this kind of shared audience experience facilitated the working 
of explicit propaganda to function effectively, being targeted at a specific level, at a specific 
group.73   
Practical uses of propaganda  
Naturally, political propaganda involves techniques of influence being employed by a 
government, political party, an administration, or a pressure group within a state or in general 
society. The range of methods employed are methodical and calculated, and the anticipated goals 
are clearly distinguishable and precise74. Along with the specific targeting of the right audience 
for the right message, the mode of propaganda is critical. Jacques Ellul suggests that each 
method has its own merits and drawbacks. Films and human contact or other direct connections 
are best for messages of a sociological scope in periods of slow, all-encompassing change. By 
contrast, public meetings, art, pamphlets and posters are some of the most effective ways of 
communicating shock and intensity, although the impact fades quickly75.  
Effective propaganda campaigns generally originate from within a strong, centralised, decision-
making authority that also produces a consistent message throughout an organisation.  Its 
organisational head and campaign leader would, then, also be a strong, authoritative figure76. The 
                                                            
71 Magedah E. Shabo, Techniques of propaganda and persuasion (USA, Prestwick house, 2008), p. 11 
72 Garth S Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell, eds, Propaganda & persuasion (London, Sage publications, 2012), p. 98 
73 Garth S Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell, eds, Propaganda & persuasion (London, Sage publications, 2012), p. 98 
74 Jacques Ellul, Propaganda: the formation of men’s attitude (USA, Vintage Books, 1973), p. 62 
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leader or the organization would, in due course, also choose a target audience which is perceived 
to be susceptible to its message or dialogue77.   
In essence, propaganda can be split up into four broad areas. The first of these is psychological 
action, where the propagandist seeks to modify opinions and actions by purely psychological 
means, and through also addressing audiences in a purportedly ‘educative manner’. Secondly, 
when constructed as psychological warfare, the propagandist’s opponent is a foreign adversary 
whose beliefs and opinions are targeted to be devalued or destroyed by means of psychological 
methods78.  
Thirdly, re-education and brainwashing is where previous adversaries are turned into allies. The 
last area of propaganda is public and human relations, where agencies and departments strive to 
try to create conformity and to try to adapt the individual to a society or to a certain pre-approved 
living or working standard79. 
The important thing for the propaganda makers or exponents is that all messages or approaches 
need to be used in combination with one other, filling in gaps and thus encircling the recipient 
from all angles. In that sense, propaganda seeks to engulf a society in all of its life experience, to 
impose a prepared brand of ‘intuitive’ knowledge about the world and the surroundings in which 
inhabitants find themselves. The generation of ideas and myths to make up ‘commonplace’ or 
‘everyday’ meanings for people who are influenced and governed for periods of time, are usually 
free of seriously divergent and multiple opinions80. This is especially true of phases of war or 
extreme crisis when multiple ideas within a society open up fissures that may be exploited by an 
enemy or an ideological opponent.  
2.4: Mass media in the nation or state  
This section will briefly discuss the role and function that the mass media performs in a society, 
an issue of obvious importance as it represents the modern medium of the propaganda enterprise 
– newspapers, magazines, television services, and so on. The question for the influence exercised 
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by mass media is that of the appearance of an assumed ‘authenticity’ in terms of trustworthiness, 
in the sense of providing a basis for the working of strategic or practical propaganda.  
Consequently, there are four main ‘functional’ categories of mass media or mass communication. 
The first is to supply the news, or to report on the environment in a tone of constructed 
neutrality. Secondly, there is the supply of commentaries or opinions on prominent events or 
issues which take the form of editorials or columnist perspectives. Thirdly, there is the notion of 
education, whether in a formal or informal context and, lastly, the purveying of pure, 
unadulterated entertainment.81   
The following elaboration from Mass Communication Theory by Dennis McQuail is particularly 
significant for the study of South African National Party propaganda for the protection of the 
Afrikaner Nationalist state. McQuail defines a co-called 'Authoritarian theory' as a condition in 
which the media is subordinate to the state's authority, where journalists do not have complete 
freedom, and where they may be forced into conformity by the authorities. These circumstances 
either rationalise self-censorship, or lead to punishment for deviations from the rules which 
prescribe the limits of coverage.   
The propositions of this theory are five-fold, the first of which is that the state’s authority ought 
not to be undermined, and indeed, secondly, that the content of communications ought to be 
subordinate to the state's authority. Then, it should not give any offence to the popularly 
prescribed or dominant political and moral values of the wider state, while fourthly, censorship is 
justified on the basis of conserving the established order. Lastly, any offence against the state’s 
principles or deviations from its official policies on media conduct should amount to a criminal 
offence.82   
While there are other models and theories on the state-media link, for the purposes of this study, 
this reading can be applied to the example of ruling South African politics and the media during 
the 1960s and the later 1970s.  
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2.5: Concluding remarks:  
A few key points arise from the preceding discussion which have a specific bearing on the 
subject of this study. The first is a theoretical interpretation of nationalism, which can be 
summarised as: 'the active solidarity of a larger human collective which shares a common 
culture, or a common fund of significant experiences and interests, conceives of itself as a nation 
and strives for political unity and self-governance.'83 
This definition is historically appropriate for the modern Afrikaner people and their nationalistic 
rise to power. Two of the important deductions that arise from the general definition and 
application of nationalist theory can be linked, firstly, to the idea that great oppression or 
injustice on a political or economic level against a socio - ethnic group causes nationalist 
movements. Secondly, there is the notion that for the resultant nationalist movements', ‘their 
...own way of life is as good as any other and deserves to flourish.'84 
Put simply, the Afrikaner people who were dominated by the British, socially and politically as 
well as economically, were stimulated into resisting, pushing for self-determination, and into 
‘nationalising’ their culture. It is, equally, the case that Afrikaner nationalism was, after the 
initial historical stimuli, hammered into dominance by various social and economic structures. 
Thus, through nationalism, a new culture characterised by Calvinist, Christian morals and ethics, 
needed to be maintained. The maintenance of nationalism from the outset required various 
ideological tools, such as censorship, manipulation of information, and general propaganda. 
This, then, brings one to the second theoretical aspect which is, of course, the conceptualisation 
of propaganda. Theoretically, propaganda can be defined as: 
'The expressions of opinions or actions carried out deliberately by individuals or groups 
with the view to influence the opinions and actions of other individuals or group for 
predetermined ends and through psychological manipulations.'85 
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Within this description, the important facets are the idea of influencing the opinions and actions 
of others in an organised fashion. This can be done in one of two ways, one being strategic, and 
the other, tactical. The first method, the strategic mode, is used to establish a more general, 
difficult and long term manipulation campaign, the second method is to achieve easier and more 
immediate results. 86 
Major propaganda processes are usually more prevalent in those countries with strong, 
centralised and authoritarian governments, and subsequently the messages being circulated 
thoughout the population are also both constant and similar throughout the various power 
structures of the state. The other important point to emerge from this theoretical discussion is that 
of the notion of an understanding of the use of media within a nation or a state. Within this 
model, the government seeks either to influence and steer, or to control, the press, other media, 
and various other forms of public information. There, the proclaimed ideological basis is not for 
the simple sake of control per se, but rather for the alleged protection of a nation's moral, ethnic 
and cultural values. Thus, this emphasises self-censorship for the sake of the ‘welfare’ of the 
nation as a whole.87  
This specific theory, as defined by Denis McQuail, has specific relevance for the South African 
case study of propaganda and persuasion, to borrow the title from a book edited by Gareth S. 
Jowett88. The following chapter, concerned with censorship, will seek to illustrate its relevance, 
particularly when taking into account the manner in which South Africa’s ruling party sought to 
preserve its vision of what constituted the moral integrity of the nation.  
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Chapter 3 
Safeguarding Afrikaner principles 
'From the early 1960s until about 1980, the Republic of South Africa operated one of the most 
comprehensive censorship systems in the world. Called in official parlance not censorship but 
"publications control" (censorship was a word that it preferred to censor from public discourse about 
itself), it sought to control the dissemination of signs in whatever form'89 
 
3.1: Introduction  
In order to engineer what for South African society was perceived to be feasible and acceptable, 
a large and elaborate propaganda machine needed to be built and, at its foundation, lay the 
processes of censorship. Propaganda was not just about changing the headlines, or transforming 
a story, it was also about what was left out of the public eye, and thus it could also be seen as a 
contrived lie of omission.  The above quote from the world-renowned South African author, J.M 
Coetzee, very clearly depicts the basis of the censorship system that the Republic of South Africa 
had at its disposal. This chapter aims to examine this system against the backdrop of Afrikaner 
nationalism as sketched briefly in the previous sections, in order to provide a picture of the 
government’s perspective on what its ‘machine’ was protecting the public against.  
Christopher Merrett has emphasised that one of the characteristics of censorship in post-World 
War II South Africa is its longevity, from the early 1950s with the Suppression of Communism 
Act, all the way through to F.W. de Klerk's famous opening address to parliament in 1990.90 In 
other words, censorship could be seen as a backbone for the constant maintenance of NP values 
throughout the history of the apartheid government.    
In a white minority-dominated society, there were three reasons to employ censorship. The most 
important and overarching of these was the suppression of information about the repressive 
tactics employed to maintain and strengthen the politico-economic status quo in South Africa.91 
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The accompanying other two reasons, which had similar socio - political dimensions, will also be 
considered in relation to some of the banned and censored literary works as examples of 
undesirable or subversive influences.  
In this approach, not only the reasoning for the censorship system will be explored, but also the 
mechanisms employed by the state in order to to try to achieve a national goal of contrived 
omission. Finally, the effects of censorship not only on the people of South Africa, but more 
specifically on those Afrikaans authors who helped to build the Afrikaner culture and language, 
will be viewed against the backdrop of spreading international modernity, and efforts to deal 
with consequent  fissures in the pressurised nationalist ‘laager’.   
3.2: Censorship and Publishing  
The rise of Afrikaner print media and allied publishers was central to the process of censorship, 
and to the impact and workings of the 1957 Cronje Report which formed its crucial foundation. 
The importance of modern Afrikaner media has its obvious roots in the rise of the Afrikaner 
‘people’s movement as an independent political entity, and in the subsequent use of political 
power to control the limits of a ‘free’ mass media. Before moving to the Cronje Report, the basis 
of state censorship in South Africa, a very brief background history of the Afrikaner press 
requires some discussion, as it was part of a structure erected to mould and to maintain the 
interests of a Boerevolk.  
The history of Die Burger and other related Afrikaans newspapers, as well as of those involved 
with these enterprises, shows that the lines between private companies and government influence 
was conveniently blurred under the rule of the National Party. When the Cronje report (to be 
discussed later) was commissioned, there was already a substantial foundation of Afrikaner 
media to help with its suggested changes, and to serve on the terms set out by its proposed 
policies.  
Afrikaner newspapers  
The Afrikaner nationalists were in the fortunate position that they had been dominating 
Afrikaans - language news publishers for decades before the Cronje Report came out. Typically, 
the Nasionale Pers founded De Burger (changed to Die Burger in 1922), as a paper intended to 
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be a mouthpiece of the National Party for in the Cape, with D.F Malan as its editor. 92 Malan 
would, of course, later become a leading champion of Afrikaner nationalism and the prime 
minister of South Africa, but he was already at the time a leading nationalist thinker and 
activist.93  
During the First World War (1914 – 1918) De Burger had to be wary of provoking the 
authorities as the country was under martial law and the newspaper was suspected of having pro-
German leanings. That aside, De Burger was a nationalist propaganda tool from the start, with 
Malan using the newspaper to the party’s advantage and working to make it, 'the shield and 
sword of Afrikanerdom.'94   
As an early forerunner of the later Department of Information's propaganda magazines and 
sponsored newspapers, the Burger’s approach to news coverage was suggestive of an aspect of 
the history of what would subsequently become state-approved press enterprise. Initially, as a 
newspaper with partisan political views it did not serve as a medium of imposed censorship, but 
of course, by deliberately overlooking certain news matters within the Union, or political affairs 
that were antithetical to its nationalistic goals, the paper could be seen as conducting itself on the 
basis of a highly selective form of what constituted news coverage.  
There are a number of examples of Boer/Afrikaner newspapers in earlier history, which have 
made use of the same type of ‘internal’ or ‘self’ censorship as mentioned above; during the 1899-
1902 South African War, the Transvaal’s De Volkstem is one example among others.95 
As mentioned previously, Malan broke away from the Hertzog-Smuts bloc to create the 
Gesuiwerde Nasionale Party, with one consequence being that the the Hertzog party no longer 
had the support of the Nasionale Pers, although it still had the support of the Afrikaanse Pers in 
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the Transvaal96. At the same time, Malan's National Party needed its own regional mouthpiece 
and this led to the creation of Voortrekker Pers in 1936, and subsequently to the emergence of 
the daily paper, Die Transvaler.  
H.F. Verwoerd was made its editor and, much like Malan, he used his press voice to promote the 
National Party, making the paper a strident supporter of segregation and propagating the idea of 
a Boer Republic, not only to separate Afrikaners from the black population, but also from the 
English population.97 Then, in 1965, nationalists in the Cape created the Sunday paper, Die Beeld 
in the Transvaal, despite competitive opposition from local nationalists in that province. After 
this, in an attempt to unify the varied nationalist ventures, Die Beeld, Dagbreek and Landstem 
merged to form the Sunday paper, Die Rapport in 197098.  
The significance of this is that the various echelons of Afrikaner nationalists and sympathisers 
established themselves as a dominant presence in the South African news publishing industry.  
Dr. Verwoerd was the editor of the Transvaler, earlier, D.F Malan had been the editor of De 
Burger, Afrikaans Pers was controlled or owned by figures such as Verwoerd, Jan de Klerk (the 
father of ex-president F.W. de Klerk) and Dr. Ben Havenga. Although all these figures did not 
necessarily see eye to eye on all political matters, for the most part Afrikaner newspapers were 
established for nationalist purposes of various degrees and levels of intensity. As Hachten and 
Giffard have put it in relation to the Afrikaans press:   
"The Afrikaans press was a creation of Afrikaner political aspirations, established by 
the National Party to spread its message and strengthen its power base...not a single 
Nationalist paper began as a commercial venture. They were intended to sell not so 
much as a party line...the press was subservient to the needs of the party."99  
Malan and his National Party won the 1948 election following a fierce battle between Anglo-
centred newspapers and those in the hands of the nationalists; while the outcome of this electoral 
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contest was naturally decided by certain political events and a range of political factors, in the 
popular mobilisation of the electorate, one of the major contributors to the National Party victory   
was through the backing of a 'dedicated press and some brilliant cartoonists that they won the 
propaganda battle.'100 
In effect, the task embarked on by the post-1948 Cronje Report in the ensuing discussion would 
be made somewhat easier as the ruling party already had the power of a large section of the press 
at its disposal. The foundation of authoritarian control as created by early Afrikaner, pro - 
National Party newspapers streamlined attempts at later state censorship and publication control. 
In this, the dissemination of information, or disinformation in the case of censorship, was 
facilitated by channels which lay at hand. Discussion now turns to the so - called Cronje Report 
which was to become the blueprint for the Publication Acts of both 1963 and later in 1974.  
The Cronje Report: The foundation of censorship in South Africa  
The writer, J.M. Coetzee, has drawn a comparative link between the Soviet Union which 
supposedly had 70 000 bureaucrats for every 7000 authors within Russia’s state censorship 
programme, and South Africa which, he asserted, had a ratio of at least ten to each author.101 In 
this context, the first question is to establish the origins of the censorship programme, or, by its 
approved name, the Publications and Entertainment Act, and what its functions were. 
In 1954, a commission of inquiry into 'Undesirable Publications' was launched by the Nationalist 
government under the leadership of D.F. Malan. The inquiry was a reaction into an earlier 1954 
court case concerning a publication about prostitution in not one, but two Afrikaans magazines. 
In South Africa of the 1950s, this was, naturally, not the kind of subject that could be left to go 
unchecked. The inquiry was also designed to address continuing concerns about pornography 
that had been expressed by various church groups during the 1930s and 1940s.  
Historically, the church was a major element of the culture of the Afrikaner Volk. Ever since the 
Battle of Blood River of 1838, and the creation of the blood covenant and other nationalist 
mythologies, including the notion that the Afrikaner people were God’s chosen people on the 
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African continent, the vast majority of Afrikaners had been governing their life according to the 
precepts of the Church. The social engineering politics of the National Party fitted smoothly into 
this arena of institutional life. Malan himself, was, of course, a former cleric of the Nederduits 
Gereformeerde Kerk (NGK) and was attentive to the church’s pleas. It also made for a good 
political platform on which to campaign, helping to further cement the clear link between the 
mainstream Afrikaner church and Nationalist politics in South Africa. 102  
This foundation effectively laid the groundwork for what would later become the apartheid 
government’s censorship system or, in other words, the blueprint for both the Publications and 
Entertainment Act of 1963, and the subsequently amended version of 1974. When the 
commission’s deliberations were subsequently published, they surprised many even within the 
government, let alone civil society, with their draconian tone, and further action was shelved for 
three years until 1960.103  
In 1960, there was a move towards a Publications and Entertainment Act in order to facilitate 
more stringent censorship, but it was shelved by the Minister of the Interior. After some more 
back and forth between lobbyists for state censorship, the modified 1963 Publications and 
Entertainment Act (No. 26 of 1963) was finally voted in.104 The above-mentioned Publications 
Commission’s task was to review and to regulate both local and international literature; this 
could also be viewed as a structure which supported the Nationalist government’s larger 
ideological aims at the time105.  
Geoffrey Cronje  
The commission was led by Geoffrey Cronje (1907 – 1992) who was at the time a professor of 
Sociology at the University of Pretoria. Cronje had studied at the University of Stellenbosch, like 
many of the apartheid-era Afrikaner leaders, and had then furthered his studies abroad in the 
Netherlands and Germany106. By taking a brief biographical look at the person who would 
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oversee the blueprint for the censorship system of South Africa, one can better contextualise and 
understand the work of the commission that followed.   
As touched on earlier in the introduction, the scholarly work of Geoffrey Cronje was 
instrumental in informing some of the theoretical aspects of apartheid - in fact, many of the titles 
of his first works contained the word apartheid, and in their thematic scope addressed what 
Cronje saw as the problems which South Africa was facing with regard to its complex race 
relations.107 
An avid member of the Afrikaner Broederbond, Cronje was viewed as one of the leading 
apartheid ideologues of the 1940s and onwards, with Hermann Giliomee concluding that he was 
one of the most nationalistic academics of his time. This, then, equipped him well to function as 
a ideologue of the Nationalist government’s larger intellectual programme for South Africa108. 
His extreme racial nationalist beliefs were scarcely surprising. Having been born into a post-
South African War country, opportunities for educated Afrikaner advancement were dominated 
by the church and by expanding state service. For the academically-inclined like Cronje, the 
logical avenue of interest and expertise became the questions of ethnicity and of Afrikaner 
Nationalism as a concept 109.  
Cronje's first book, titled 'n Tuiste vir die Nageslag (1945), was dedicated to his wife and all 
other women depicted as Afrikanermoeders. The Volksmoeder or Afrikanermoeder as Cronje 
termed them, was constructed as the matriarchal protector of the Afrikaner nation. The 
Afrikanermoeder functioned mythically as the figure who would strive to keep the Afrikaner 
nation’s bloodline pure through maintaining an exclusive culture, and would thus never consent 
to any mixing of ethnic bloodlines. In its theme of the need to guard against mixing, the book 
attempted to address what Cronje saw as two of the problems of modern South Africa, those 
being the problem of the position of the ‘native’ or the naturel, and that of the ‘Coloured’ or the 
Kleurling. 110 
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Basically, Cronje argued that these groups, especially the latter, were the most dangerous to the 
Boerevolk as they posed the peril of a mixing of the bloodlines and this would have meant the 
general collapse of a ‘pure’ Afrikaner society. Blatant, pseudo-scientific racism aside, what one 
needs to consider is that the man who took the lead in the Report of the Commission of Enquiry 
in Regard to Undesirable Publications not only held such strong feelings, but also had a strong 
following. This Commission reported on its deliberations before 1960, before going on to form 
the foundations of the later censorship efforts by the NP government.  
Structure and aim of the commission  
Cronje published its report on ‘undesirable publications’, or what became known known more 
popularly as the Cronje Report, in September 1957. 111  This comprised investigative work 
gathered over the course of two years by various interest groups such as librarians, literary 
experts, lawyers, magazine editors, and clerics.  
The report consisted of 22 chapters of undeniably exhaustive, although, severely partisan 
research on its topic, based on both quantitative and qualitative investigation. It was constructed 
and launched as an urgent and educative report, aimed at enlightening the government as well as 
its electorate about the alarming scale of the moral and cultural perils which the Union was 
alleged to be confronting:  
"It is not merely the moral and social values that are being threatened, however; 
civilization and culture itself are also being seriously jeopardized... Undesirable 
publications are also a cultural problem because their purpose is to drag through the 
gutter everything that is beautiful and good and noble... And this is a matter which most 
assuredly also concerns the Union in the highest degree." 112 
The Cronje commission argued that if more rigorous statutory censorship were not imposed on 
society, the spread of such evils as pornography would ultimately bring about national political 
and cultural degeneration, once ‘European’ leadership became contaminated and weakened by 
‘undesirable’ influences:  
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"As the torch-bearer in the vanguard of the Western civilization in South Africa, the 
European must be and remain the leader, the guiding light, in the spiritual and cultural 
field, otherwise he will inevitably go under. The undesirable book can and must be 
drastically combated because it is obviously a spiritual poison."113 
The report concluded with a few key recommendations, namely the desirability of pre-
publication censorship, and the creation of a national enforcement agency for the regulation of 
both imported and local books unambiguously ‘called the Publications Control Board”114. The 
report also recommended that the envisaged Board should be based in Pretoria, that Board 
members should be South African, and that all excluded, prohibited or unwanted publications 
which had made their way into the Union should be destroyed under the supervision of the police 
commissioner.115  
The Church 
Within the context of the Cronje Report and Afrikaner Nationalism and apartheid, the position of 
the church was crucial, as the implications for organised Christian religion were far-reaching.  
Drawing on the strong presence of religion in South Africa, Cronje asserted that because "South 
African churches [has] a comparatively larger percentage of the population as members than 
those of most other countries" the clergy, therefore, had a special responsibility to the 
community116.  
The report recommended that the church and approved booksellers and publishers ought to work 
more closely together to promote "wholesome reading matter" as part of a larger effort to educate 
their witnesses.117 These ‘witnesses’, as the report named them to invoke the sound of Biblical 
authority, were confirmed as having been all of the same opinion that the church ought to be 
more vigorously involved in what the society was reading. Only a small percentage was said to 
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have been of the opinion that the church should limit itself only to matters of non - secular 
literature. This assumption reflected a reasonable confidence that the majority of the 
contemporary Afrikaner population was wholly accepting of the Cronje Report’s proposals, in 
that little distinction was drawn between church, state and morality. Many of the churches were 
themselves already taking part in the ‘secular’ education of the Commission’s chosen witnesses.  
The Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerke (Dutch Reformed Churches) had their own bookselling 
establishments, magazines and publishing sections such as the N.G Kerkuitgewers (D.R.C. 
Publishers) in Cape Town, and the Sondagskoolboekehandel (Sunday School Bookshop) in 
Bloemfontein. These bodies also had regular exhibitions of their newer issues and ensured that 
their various religious magazines were made easily available.118 Emerging from under such 
influences, virtually all of the witnesses interviewed formed a homogenous group, and were in 
effect united in their understanding of the topic of the relationship between church, state and 
morality.  
Accordingly, the recommendations that the report made towards the church were conspicuously 
general and bland, phrased in terms of furthering a notion of human goodness. For example, the 
first recommendation was that the church "keeps up the good work which is already being done 
in order to promote good literature"119. In carrying on, it declared that the church should make its 
contribution directly and indirectly in and around the home, "purposefully propagating and 
making available what is good."120 Naturally, the interpretation of the notion of 'good' depended 
on the prevailing view of the role of conformist clergy during the apartheid era. A pertinent 
question then becomes that of wondering whether the church was willingly helping the National 
Party with its instrumental political aspirations, or whether it whole-heartedly believed that it 
was taking the right moral action in educating the masses by means of the protection provided by 
censorship, and by becoming a more assertive presence in the national world of Christian faith, 
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by making its "admonitory voice heard in the broader Christian community"121. Regardless of the 
answer to that question, it can still be concluded that the church was already doing the moral 
bidding of the NP government, as its influence worked so closely in tandem with the secular set 
of political values being upheld by the cultural ideal of the Afrikaner Volk.   
Newspapers and Advertisements  
Given the prior history of the mainstream Afrikaans press, it is no surprise that in the period 
under consideration, its newspapers hardly ever swayed significantly from the National Party’s 
main ideals. Predictably, too, the Cronje Report was full of praise for what it considered to be its 
high standards. Reportedly having made use of 20 years’ worth of newspaper articles from 
various newspapers within South Africa, it took care to ‘point out that, in the issues of 
newspapers examined, no undesirable stories or articles or other undesirable contributions were 
found." 122   
At the same time, however, not everything was viewed as satisfactory. For the same could not be 
said for the illustrations in some of the newspapers, as well as in magazines. Some of the 
newspapers were evidently publishing photographs of scantily-clad women in suggestive poses 
as part of advertising copy, or to entice readers in efforts to sell more papers. This trend was 
apparently on the rise, a commercial factor which was alarming to those responsible for the 
Cronje Report. The Report was particularly alarmed over the receptiveness of the ‘Non-
European’, and worried over the reading material available to the ‘Bantu’ population in South 
Africa. A lack of policing meant that too much was available generally, and to the wrong readers 
or viewers. The Report emphasised that the literature available to the ‘European’ was also all too 
easily available to the ‘Non-European’, leaving "the non-European…therefore also exposed to 
the undesirability".123  
As declared proof of this dangerously unwanted exposure, the Report claimed that in 30 percent 
of ‘Bantu homes’, undesirable representations or photographs of European women were to be 
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found, with ominous implications for the upholding of racial boundaries in sexuality. 
Furthermore, there was concern over other material which was considered to be inflammatory, 
with the Report declaring that newspapers for ‘the non-European’ had a high frequency of 
articles that furthered friction and feelings of hostility between "European and non-European 
population groups in the Union of South Africa." 124 
It became very clear, in the light of the Cronje Report, that the Commission of Inquiry was 
interested not merely in the ‘moral’ tone of newspapers directed at the country’s ‘Europeans’, 
but that it was those available to its ‘Non-European’ population which particularly excited a 
censorious focus. A press taken up with material rooted in ‘hostility’ was, naturally, viewed as an 
undesirable phenomenon for a state concerned with peace and order as it pursued a path which 
sought to justify separate social and economic development and an unequal, minority rule, basis 
of political representation.   
In essence then, the history of censorship in post-World War II South Africa was rooted in the 
rise of the Afrikaner Nationalist government and its wide-ranging conservatism, of which the 
appointment of Geoffrey Cronje and his commission into undesirable publications was an 
influential offshoot. The role that censorship and its stringent enforcement would go on to play 
can be seen clearly if one examines the elements which went into shaping the Publications Act of 
1963, as well as the subsequent Publications Act of the following year.   
The proposed Publications Board 
Cronje’s Report enquired into the possibility of setting up a regulatory publications board which 
would have absolute power over what was published within the borders of the Union of South 
Africa as well as all literature being imported into the country. The suggestion of establishing 
such a board, with sweeping legal and political functions, was apparently endorsed by all those 
who were asked or who were involved internally with the actual Cronje report125.   
On the terms upon which it was envisaged, the board should be created under the Governor-
General, given that it would be of national importance; if this suggestion was acted upon when it 
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was made, the individual in charge of its selection would have been Governor - General Ernest 
George Jansen (1881-1959). The Board would, first and foremost, have the decisive power of 
authority either to prohibit or to permit any piece of literature that fell under its jurisdiction. 
Constitutionally, the board would be serving as an advisory council to the Governor General, as 
well as undertaking any other proscriptive activities entrusted to it.126   
The board would, on the other hand, have the power to grant certain scholarly libraries the 
permission to import or to acquire designated items which were prohibited or classified as being 
of a "communistic nature", as long as they were used solely for study and research. Such 
sensitive publications had to be kept in a separate facility that was accessible only to the librarian 
and to those to whom he had given official permission.127 
The chairman of the board should be someone with judicial experience, ideally a judge or a 
magistrate. On paper, the official should be a "capable and experienced chairman who can 
inspire confidence through his impartial and disinterested guidance." 128 The board itself should 
also be made up of no more than 11 or no fewer than 7 other members who would not 
necessarily be affiliated to any branch of government, excluding those from a judicial or an 
educational background. These individuals would be expected to approach the regulation 
problem from a wide perspective, including what was assumed, peculiarly, to be a ‘female’ point 
of view, in other words, the "literary, the religious, the educational, the theological, the legal and 
the sociological point of view...also that of a woman in the community".129  
In addition to such recommendations, no person other than a South African citizen could be 
appointed to the board, and it should compile and submit a yearly list of its annual activities to 
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the government. The board’s office would be in Pretoria so as to be close to all other government 
offices with which it would be working.130 
If the following consideration of the various Publications Acts is examined within the framework 
of the boards that governed them, it is evident that what the Report was suggesting was close to 
what the actual Publications Acts’ were in fact created to do. Furthermore, while the eligibility of 
those appointed on the board may well have excluded those in government service (excluding the 
magistracy or education), nonetheless those nominated for positions for approval by the 
Governor- General and the head of the board were to have ‘theological’, ‘religious’, 
‘educational’, and other criteria, indicating a clear sectional bias. It is hard to envisage that such 
individuals would not have been committed Afrikaner nationalists and members of the National 
Party. The 271-page Cronje Report provided the foundation stone for the party to implement its 
systematic controls through the Publications Acts which were now to follow.    
3.3: The Publications Act(s); the mechanism of censorship in South Africa  
As suggested in the opening chapter, the early 1960s’ set the stage for events later in the decade 
and in the one following, as the effects of the Sharpeville crisis and the growth of more liberal, 
reform-minded attitudes stimulated in part by the penetration of outside influences, were 
responded to, and countered in part by the NP government’s re-modelling of censorship and of 
publication controls within what was soon to become the Republic of South Africa.  
In 1963, the Publications and Entertainment Act was introduced and promoted by a prominent 
Nationalist MP, Dr. Abraham Jonker (father of the dissident Afrikaans poet, Ingrid Jonker), and 
in the following decade a further, amended, publications act was passed by the Nationalist-
dominated parliament.131 As already seen, the pioneering Publications Act had its roots in the 
previous decade’s ‘undesirable publications’ investigation. What now emerged was one of the 
cornerstones of the NP government’s 'hearts and minds' political trajectory.   
1963 Publications and Entertainment Act 
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Under the 1963 Publications and Entertainment Act, all material which was deemed offensive or 
classified as being harmful to the Republic of South Africa could be put up for review and could 
easily be banned. 132  The promotion of national and international works that were deemed 
undesirable was seen as a statutory offence. Such works that were potentially undesirable could 
be submitted not only by government officials such as police or customs officers, but also by 
members of the public who could also submit material for review of their choosing. Works that 
were banned could be taken to Court for judicial appeal, but, due to the high costs of a court 
case, this was not often a practical avenue of resistance.133 Just as measures such as the 1953 
Bantu Education Act were a cornerstone of daily educational apartheid, McDonald has suggested 
that the 1963 Publications and Entertainment act was another ‘cornerstone’ of the overall 
order.134 
The Publications and Entertainment act worked on the basis of six categories which 
automatically deemed it "undesirable if it or any part of it" contained one or more of the 
following characteristics, while the Board had the power to remove an item from the banned or 
undesirable list if it had what it considered to be sufficient reason to do so. 
 These characteristics were as follows:  
 
a) is indecent or obscene or offensive or harmful to public morals; 
b) is blasphemous or is offensive to the religious convictions or feelings of any section 
of the inhabitants of the Republic; 
c) brings any section of the inhabitants of the Republic into ridicule or contempt; 
d) is harmful to the relations between any inhabitants of the Republic' 
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e) is prejudicial to the safety of the state, the general welfare or the peace and good 
order; 
f) discloses with any reference to any judicial proceedings  -  
 i. any matter which is indecent or obscene or is offensive or harmful to public 
morals; 
 ii. Any indecent or obscene medical, surgical or physiological details the disclosure 
of which is likely to be offensive or harmful to public morals (Section 26 (2) of the 
Act of 1963 in Statutes of the Republic of South Africa) 135. 
As far as the issue of censorship and propaganda went, the Act’s different clauses were framed in 
distinctively neutral or even anodyne terms. In terms of the scope of the 1963 Act and all that it 
encompassed, the language employed projected legislation as representing a kind of ‘universal 
good’, not a political programme of the ruling government, but rather the common welfare of the 
inhabitants of the country itself. In its generalising discourse, it even bordered on the patriotic136. 
The Act did not, for instance, distinguish between the race and culture of authors, so in principle 
it did not appear to be selective, partial, or otherwise discriminatory. Thus, clause B did not cite 
any specific religion, and clause D seemed to be in the interest of fostering positive social, 
cultural and racial relations. The backdrop to this benign image was, of course, the workings of a 
minority government in upholding the apartheid status quo.  
 
1974 Publications and Entertainment Act  
With the Act in place, it was ready to function as the heart of a web that would be spreading out 
into a well-formed mesh of censorship. Then, in 1974, the NP passed a new law, the Publications 
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Act, under which the categories of so-called ‘undesirability’ stayed the same, but the review 
procedures changed significantly.137 This Act came into effect in May of the following year.  
One of the major differences was that that the appeal process changed. Instead of appealing to a 
court of law, any review was now placed in the hands of the Publications Appeal Board (PAB), 
which meant the effective elimination of the judicial scrutiny of the censorship decision 
procedure.138 The irritation of a statutory legal check upon the reach of censoring authority was 
now removed. Members of the PAB were appointed directly by the State President who was, 
inevitably, a customary Afrikaner nationalist appointee from 1948.139  
The structure of the censorship machine also changed. The Minister of Home Affairs had the 
power to appoint the members of the Directorate. These serving appointees were charged with 
the authority to scrutinize literary works. He also had the power to designate a larger pool of 
people from which the Directorate could create committees to help to preserve what was 
expressed as the Republic’s set of civilised moral and ethical codes.140  
In 1978, the 1974 Publications Act was amended following a dispute between the legislators, the 
publishers, and the dissident Afrikaans author, Etienne Le Roux over his novel, Magersfontein, 
O Magersfontein!. 141  An Anglo-Boer War parody, it was considered to be yet another 
unwholesome or ‘dirty’ satirical work by the author, and was banned. The banning was highly 
controversial and produced an outcry, leading to a complex legal wrangle. This Le Roux dispute 
would go on to later become known as one of the largest controversies in the saga of the 
country’s Publications Act. One of the issues brought to prominence was the murky relationship 
between ruling Afrikaans political interests and publishing. As Gabriel J. Botma has noted, 
during the later 1970s Nasionale Pers (later, Naspers) appointed very senior members of the NP 
to its directorial board, and this frequently became a source of controversy and tension over the 
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issue of publishing independence or freedom.142 This, in all probability, would have played a part 
in the handling of the Magersfontein dispute and in the subsequent legal modification of the 
censorship controls.   
In order to try to avoid damaging inter-Afrikaner clashes between a well-established Afrikaans 
literary establishment, the government, and the Nasionale Pers board, two additional elements 
were introduced to the process of scrutinising and justifying works that fell under censorship 
suspicion. The first was the formulation of a committee of chosen experts or specialists, who 
would consider the literary or aesthetic merit of a work. Secondly, consideration would be paid 
to the special conditions of publishing and distribution, instead of resorting immediately to a full 
or outright ban.143 The introduction of what seemed to be an element of flexibility was a sign of    
the refinement of the whole system of censorship and its appeal process, in the interest of 
improving its overall strength and, importantly, its claim upon legitimacy.   
As already noted, the sweeping nature of controls meant that ‘publications’ were defined widely, 
so that films, music, visual works, and various other forms of public entertainment could be 
banned and made illegal to own or to reproduce. The government also banned certain individuals 
who were producing and disseminating ‘unacceptable’ artistic works as part of its wider attempt 
to control the republic’s cultural sphere. Some of these 1970s banning orders stemmed from an 
amendment to the 1950 Suppression of Communism Act, the Internal Security Act of 1976144.  
For writers identified as having links to suspect organisations or bodies, the amendment specified 
that "all persons are prohibited from being office bearers, officers, members or active supporters 
of an organization which in any way prepares, publishes or distributes any publication".145 
Banning orders also applied not only to the authors of the various works, as others were also 
liable to be banned for quoting from works upon which a banning order had been placed.  
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Along with the censoring of authors, newspapers were also subject to scrutiny, and increasingly 
so in the wake of the Publications and Entertainment Act 42 of 1974, in which the censorship 
board’s powers were increased far beyond that of any administrative state body subject to 
democratic standards.146 Newspapers could be shut down for various political infringements, 
such as the World and Weekend World in 1977, in the aftermath of the crisis produced by the 
Soweto rebellion. Other papers attempted to avoid, to negotiate around, or to contest the punitive 
powers of the censorship act by acting as part of an industry, represented by membership of 
South Africa’s Newspaper Press Union. Lower down, though, at individual levels, journalists 
could be faced with detention and even banning orders if their reporting or opinion writings did 
not fall within the requirements of the Censorship Board.147 In reflecting on the increasingly 
charged atmosphere of the later-1970s, Breytenbach and Coetzee are just two of the noted 
writers who have stressed how much the censorship laws can be seen as having been an 
expression of the ‘total onslaught’ mentality of the apartheid state order.148  
3.4 Censored and Banned Literary Works 
This section will consider a small sample of the works that were banned under the two Acts 
previously discussed, as well as exploring why those works were banned. In a way, the deletion 
or censoring of these pieces from public circulation offers as much insight into the NP 
government’s thinking as the propaganda productions that it produced itself. Among the general 
run of literary censorship and bannings that took place in the Republic during this period, the 
position of those authors designated as Die Sestigers, were of special significance. For their 
existence pointed to fissures within the defensive ‘laager’ mentality itself. That was of 
importance to the organising idea that the government had ideological enemies against which it 
had to fight, as some of those literary enemies came from within ‘Afrikanerdom’ itself.   
In the initial years of the Publications and Entertainment Act, An Act of Immorality was the first 
book to be banned under the 1963 legislation. Written by Des Troye, the work provided an 
account of an interracial love affair which indirectly spoke out against the Immorality Act. Other 
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examples of books falling foul of censorship included the 1969 2nd volume of The Oxford 
History of South Africa which carried a chapter consisting of 52 blank pages in the edition sold 
in the Republic. The pages left blank were the chapter on African nationalism which, as the 
book’s editors announced in their Foreword, had been excluded by the publishers, Oxford 
University Press, as it quoted banned individuals which would have got the whole volume 
banned under South Africa’s publications law. Even popular best-sellers, like Wilbur Smith's 
When the Lion Feeds, were subject to the scrutiny of the Publications Board, if not for their 
political material then for their sexual explicitness.149   
Indeed, as early as April 1973, the Minister of the Interior confirmed that more than 12 000 
publications and a further 44 other ‘objects’ were on a prohibited list, a lengthy count which 
included both foreign and domestic publications in the form of issues of newspapers and 
periodicals.150  Some of the early international works to have been banned included:  
 A 1968 issue of Time magazine which featured an article about the black civil rights 
leader, Martin Luther King. 
 In 1970, Britain’s The Times of 26 October was prohibited as it contained advertisements 
for the International Defence and Aid Fund, the Anti-Apartheid Movement as well as 
Amnesty International.151 
Nationally, there were, of course, a vast range of prohibitions, as will be discussed more fully in 
due course, but, for present purposes, some of these ‘morality’ issues included:  
 In 1968, the Cape Town newspaper, The Telegraph, was muzzled on three separate 
occasions between July and September for carrying material defined as being of a 
morally undesirable nature.  
 In 1970, two editions of the magazine, Scope, were banned because they contained 
images and articles which could damage the morals and ethical well-being of the 
population.  
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 A March 1973 issue of the Afrikaans magazine, Brandwag, was banned due to its 
carrying of a nude female profile on its cover page.152  
A clear type of publication headed for inclusion on the board’s undesirable list included anything 
containing material which was highly salacious or which was related – however vaguely - to 
pornography, and then, of course, any publication with political material judged as likely to stir 
up ‘population’ hostilities, or feelings of ‘hatred’ across the colour – line.  
Later in the 1970s, the works of certain Afrikaans authors also started to come under scrutiny for 
potential infringements of the Publications and Entertainment Act. The relationship between the 
Afrikaans language and Afrikaner Nationalist politics had, naturally, traditionally been close as 
language and politics worked to create those national myths and symbols needed to continue to 
foster a sense of national pride and identity. It was important that authors remained within an 
acceptable arena of literary expression. While Afrikaans authors certainly had no immediate 
reason to be wary of the impact of the Publications Act upon them, this position soon changed 
when some of their works started to deviate from the expected path approved of by the NP.  
The ‘Sestigers’ 
Before turning to the Republic’s laws on censorship and how Afrikaner writers reacted to these, 
some particular attention should be paid to Die Sestigers. This was a progressive group of ‘1960s 
generation’ writers, poets and playwrights which began to challenge the dominant Nationalist 
way of thinking that had become such an integral part of white Afrikaner experience in South 
Africa by the 1960s. If one accepts Coetzee’s view that the local system of censorship was 
suggestive of the Soviet censorship apparatus, it in turn makes the Sestigers writers roughly 
reminiscent of those Soviet authors who opposed the rigid Communist Party prescriptions of 
their own governing body of what constituted the acceptable ‘national’ expression of literature 
and culture.  
The further importance of these writers in the context of this study is that they were of the same 
ethnicity as that of the authoritarian political ruling class and were rebelling against the 
Nationalist status quo. Open to the free and often avant-garde modernizing cultural influences of 
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especially the continental European world outside of the Republic, what such openness generated 
was some increasingly overt criticism by literary figures of their own government. Internal 
fissures and fractures within the educated Afrikaner cultural elite over the injustices of apartheid 
undoubtedly signalled urges for change, and notably these emerged in a historically repressive 
period, characterised by general conformity. Oppositional writers included leading creative 
figures such as Etienne Le Roux, Andre P. Brink, Breyten Breytenbach and Delene Matthee.153 
Their works depicted a different ‘type’ of Afrikaner, one which struggled against the rigid world 
that the National Party had created around them. The characters which they created often 
struggled explicitly against apartheid era laws, or grappled with personal feelings, sexual and 
otherwise, that went against the stern spirit of Calvinist nationalism. A number of these authors 
were educated not only in South Africa, but also in continental Europe, an experience which 
helped to widen their scope of artistic vision and encouraged aesthetic experimentalism. The 
works of Sestiger authors were largely removed from the conventional pastoral realism of the 
local Afrikaner plaasroman, and had more in common with European existentialism and 
surrealism in order to break away and to challenge the conventions of the status quo.154  
As already emphasised, the Sestigers’ use of modern techniques in their writings to explore and 
describe imagined secular life, sexual freedom, racial tolerance, and political freedom in the 
context of South Africa, represented a literary striving which annoyed the cultural watchdogs of 
the Nationalist government. Even more, and no less significantly, the alienating drift of these 
unconventional writers and cultural commentators caused, as Giliomee has argued, a rift within 
Afrikaner society.155  
Examples of friction between Afrikaner writers and the government will be examined in more 
detail in the course of ensuing discussion, but at this point it is worth noting that it was during 
this phase of polarization that the Nationalist Verligte and Verkrampte split was emerging to 
become a feature of governing Afrikaner politics.156 Against this backdrop, it is again pertinent 
to note that works which sometimes came came under the censorship scrutiny of the Publications 
Act were not necesssarily explicitly critical of the ruling order, but were simply pieces which 
                                                            
153 Herman Giliomee, Die Afrikaners: ‘n Biografie (Cape Town, Tafelberg, 2004), p. 505 
154 Saul Dubow, Apartheid, 1948 ‐ 1994 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 120 
155 Herman Giliomee, Die Afrikaners: ‘n Biografie (Cape Town, Tafelberg, 2004), p. 505 
156 South African Democracy Education Trust, The road to democracy in South Africa: Volume 2 (Pretoria, Unisa 
Press, 2006), P. 48  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
64 
 
explored Afrikaner culture and history in a creatively critical – and, at times, satirical - manner. 
Examples of such works will be considered below, as well as pieces of literature which could be 
seen as having been overtly critical of the NP government.  
Afrikaner writers and Censorship  
Initially, the government was clearly reluctant to censor or to ban works by Afrikaans authors as 
this would have highlighted the existence of dissent within the dominant Afrikaner ruling 
minority. Thus, the governing party used other, indirect, ways to try to keep Afrikaner writers in 
check, such as pressures through their publisher, as in the case of Ingrid Jonker and her poem 
'Die kind wat doodgeskiet is deur soldate by Nyanga' which was changed to 'Die Kind', and 
which was further relegated from prominence within the poetry collection, Rook en Oker 
(1965).157 The resort to pressure or to the cajoling of literary artists to stay within approved 
boundaries, drove writers like Etienne Le Roux, who had been once been a supporter of the 
National Party, to write in the Sunday Rapport that, "It seems to me as if the state with its 
elaborate legislation on the subject of the arts tries to force writers into a certain mould." 158 This 
situation was not helped by the fact that it was difficult for Afrikaans-language authors to publish 
their literary works in a commercially independent way during the 1960s’, as their local 
publishing houses invariably had National Party ties.      
Once books began to fall foul of officialdom, some other Afrikaans writers joined Le Roux in 
sentiment. The first literary work that was banned outright under the Publications and 
Entertainment Act was Kennis van die Aand by Andre Brink in 1973. This marked a change in 
the ruling party’s relationship with those authors who were helping to maintain Afrikaans and to 
elevate its linguistic power and cultural standing. Saul Dubow has suggested that it was 
essentially in the imposition of censorship, the banning of his literature, and related harassment 
by the security branch of the police, which propelled Brink into an active anti-apartheid 
position.159 
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This goverrnment action made it clear to the Afrikaner community of writers that they, too, 
would not be exempt from censorship if any of their works transgressed acceptable boundaries. 
In due course, following the case of Brink, other prominent authors, such as Pieter Dirk Uys and 
Bartho Smith, also found their publications being banned. 160   
The basis for the banning of Kennis van die Aand was quite clear from the contentiousness of its 
subject matter, which related the story of a black character named Joseph Malan awaiting the 
death sentence for the murder of his white lover.161 Parallel to the theme of multiracial love in 
the plot, the protagonist, Joseph, wants to form a theatre group to mount an artistic challenge 
against the government, but his dream is shattered by the repression of the Publications Board.162 
Revealing light on official thinking came from Censorship in South Africa, published in 1987, 
and written by J.W.C van Rooyen, who was the Chairman of the Publications Appeal Board, to 
offer insight into its evaluations and decisions. The book was produced, according to van 
Rooyen, because a 'need arose for a comprehensive book to be written on the Publications 
Act.’163 It was, in effect, a justification of the regime of censorship and banning. On the topic of 
Kennis van die Aand, Van Rooyen declared that the reason for its banning was due to its 
offensive religious attitudes and its handling of religious matter:  
'In his novel...Andre Brink draws a parallel between the suffering of a coloured man,     
Joseph Malan, and the suffering of Jesus...Joseph falls in love with a white girl, Jessica - 
a relationship forbidden by the law at the time - ultimately murdering her... Joseph 
blames the Afrikaner for having caused him to become a non-believer.'164 
Moreover, the overall text was found guilty of being laden with offensive imagery of religion 
and sex based on poems from St. John of the Cross, rendering Brink’s novel objectionable due to 
its crude depictions of sex and religion.165 Appeals against the ban on it were fruitless. In 1974, 
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the lawyer for the Publications Board, described the main theme of the novel in the October issue 
of Die Transvaler as 'the portrayal of the white section of the of the population as the ruling class 
which is sterile, destructive, spiritually dead against a virile, strong, creative non - white 
group'.166 This, in its way, reflected the emphasis in reviews of the novel, where little mention 
was made of the religious aspects of the story which were considered a very minor element by 
critics.167 
Afrikaner authors under actual or potential censure did not take things like the Brink decision 
lying down. The lack of any effective juridicial voice to counter the Board’s draconian edicts on 
literature was a particular source of resentment, with some writers arguing that they were not 
being treated as responsible citizens and mature adults. That point of view was expressed very 
neatly by the highly-regarded poet, D.J. Opperman, in an article in Die Burger:  
"They (the National Party) have achieved the power they have thanks to our language 
movement and Afrikaans literature. And as a sign of gratitude we are not even allowed 
to appeal to a court of justice...they make laws that reduce us to a toddler literature."168 
As the formerly easy relationship between the state and some Afrikaans writers began to unravel, 
other authors found themselves in agreement with Opperman.   
One of those was the author of Magersfontein, O Magersfontein! Etienne Le Roux’s novel was 
centred on the story of a film crew going to Magersfontein to recreate the famous Anglo-Boer 
War battle that had taken place there in October 1899. It went on to comment satirically on 
apartheid, on the South African War, and on leading Boer and other wartime figures such as De 
la Rey, Methuen and Cronje.169 Le Roux had devised a creatively innovative way of looking at 
Afrikaners and their culture, but his sentiments and the unorthodox character of his work did not 
appeal to all. Many of the more conservative members of the Afrikaner establishment were 
enraged, as in their perception Magersfontein’s mocking of the earlier years of noble Afrikaner 
history and struggle was intolerable. On the othjer hand, for critics of the censoring of this work, 
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167 Margreet de Lange, The muzzled Muse: Literature and censorship in South Africa (Amsterdam, John Benjamins 
Publishing Co.),  p.47 
168 Die	Burger, 30 July, 1974 
169 www.goodreads.com/book/show/1165821.Magersfontein_O_Magersfontein_ 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
67 
 
the action represented a government attempt to repress the free interpretation of national 
memory. As Andre Brink put it, the episode evoked the Greek word, alatheia, which meant truth 
or, more literally, could be translated to 'that which is remembered', which was what was being 
suppressed by the apartheid regime in its censoring of Etienne le Roux’s novel.170  
The background to the action against Magersfontein was in itself interesting, for it reflected the 
moral pressure that could be exerted by right-wing pressure groups within Afrikaner society.   As 
a 1977 Huisgenoot article noted, 'Ernstige skrywers het nou 'n probleem' (‘Serious writers now 
have a problem’) in its reporting of the public drama behind the banning of the novel.171 The 
book’s publication had in fact been tolerated initially, but a Christian group of moral and ethical 
vigilantes led by an Eddie van Zyl, called the Aksie Morele Standaarde (Action for Moral 
Values), had mobilised and launched a campaign to have the volume banned. The call for action 
against the work was that its satirical nature contained references to sex and immoral behaviour, 
as well as crude language which was offensive towards the general public. This outraged 
contribution to the debates surrounding Le Roux's work added further controversy, especially 
when Magersfontein was awarded its prestigious literary prize by the Afrikaanse Akademie vir 
Wetenskap en Kuns.172 
Reportedly, Van Zyl had to read the book three times before being able to come to terms with its 
subject matter, but was apparently able to understand enough to enable him to draw up a list of 
inflammatory words that he considered to be immoral or blasphemous. This incriminating list 
was then sent to conservative supporters, mostly farmers, housewives, and church ministers, with 
a request that they lobby the Minister of Home Affairs, Petrus Cornelius ‘Connie’ Mulder (1925-
1988).173 This ‘Action for Moral Values’ lobbying proved to be an effective tactic for, to the 
delight of Eddie van Zyl and his group of supporters, in 1977 Connie Mulder asked the Board to 
reconsider Magersfontein for banning.174  
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The Board then ruled the work undesirable on moral and religious grounds because it "[was] 
indecent or obscene or offensive or harmful to public morals [and] is blasphemous or is offensive 
to the religious convictions or feelings of any section of the inhabitants of the Republic"175  
Interestingly, writers such as Margareet de Lange have pointed out that while the 1974 
Publications Act provided a platform upon which there were many different ways in which to 
ban literary works, proscription on religious grounds was particularly adept. As in the example of 
Le Roux’s novel, it enabled the censorship authorities to gloss over the issue of political content 
which may have been the real factor in motivating suppression.176 Accordingly, it could certainly 
be argued that although the reasoning behind the undesirable classification of some books was 
ostensibly for religious, ‘moral’ or ‘ethical’ considerations, at a more fundamental, underlying 
level, the calculation was political. Or, when much was made of works which offended on 
religious grounds, it was invariably some combination of religion and politics.     
Le Roux’s reaction to the muzzling of his novel was, naturally, that of shock, a feeling shared by 
many others in South African society. This was a case of a literary work of great national merit 
being suppressed because of isolated words and phrases. Sections of a previously quiescent 
Afrikaans press now began to sound less quiescent, as censorship’s regulatory system itself came 
under question. As a Beeld editorial declared on the the day following the banning order:  
"When a brilliant novel by what may be our geatest writer...is summarily banned, our 
censorship system has become a monster; a threat to the creative artist, our intellectual 
life and the Afrikaans press."177 
In the aftermath of the Magersfontein furore, one creative project to come out of the freedom of 
expression clash with the Publications Act and the Nationalist government was the emergence of 
Taurus Press. Taurus was founded by a group of Afrikaans writers and critics such as Ampie 
Coetzee, Ernst Lindenburg and John Miles.178 Its aim was to publish books that might otherwise 
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not have been able to appear publicly because of the likelihood of their falling foul of censorship. 
Cleverly, Taurus publishing exploited the legal protection provided by the rights of personal 
privacy and ownership. It made use of personal mail subscription lists to bypass the censorship 
board, and to get books distributed only to those subscribing as closed members.179  
Other ways in which writers tried to skirt around the scrutiny of the censorship system included 
the use of ‘dislocation’ in the construction of setting and location, placing controversial South 
African issues and themes in parallel or similar non-South African contexts. Karel Schoeman's 
historical novel, for example, By Fakkellig (1966) was set in Ireland, with a narrative which 
revolved around the socio-political struggles of the Irish against the English. Louis Kruger's Die 
Skerpskutter (1981) was also based in Ireland, and thus authors such as these were able to write 
powerfully – and implicitly comparatively - about political and social issues relevant to the 
Republic by making their central plots ‘foreign’, and therefore unlikely to attract the attention of 
the censorship authorities.180  
Slowly, but increasingly more evidently, the emerging situation was becoming one in which 
some major, highly reputable, Afrikaner authors were coming into direct conflict with those in 
charge of the censorship apparatus. On the face of things, a few well-written literary works were 
seemingly threatening to unravel the orderly power structure of National Party rule.181 In this 
difficult context, the Republic’s nationalist censorship powers could be turned against non-
nationalist literature.    
Thoughts on authoritarian censoring 
Clearly, problems between the South African state and the country’s authors arose principally 
because of the intrusive powers of the censorship regulations – here, one useful way of 
understanding the relationship between author and state is to see the circumstances of this period 
through the eyes of J.M Coetzee.  
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For Coetzee, the Republic’s state censorship was in certain respects comparable to that of the 
Soviet Union. Making use of two examples, one from the Soviet Union and one from the 
Republic, Coetzee seeks to exhibit not merely the repressive nature of the censoring apparatus, 
but even more the feelings of anguish, hatred and hopelessness that affected how authors felt 
towards their own state.  
In one illustration, he recalls the story of the Russian author, Osip Mandelstam, who in 1933 
composed a poem about a tyrannical leader who orders executions at his every whim and even 
relishes the deaths 'of his victims like a Georgian munching raspberries.'182 In the following year, 
Joseph Stalin's secret police ransacked Mandelstam's home in search of the offending poem. The 
poem, however, had never been written down, but had rather been recited by Mandelstam over 
and over to friends. The poet was arrested and, while imprisoned, one of his friends received a 
call from Stalin, asking whether Mandelstam was a master, or whether he was disposable. In 
other words, was he an asset or a threat?183 His friend replied that he was, in fact, a master, and 
as a consequence Mandelstam was banished to the city of Voronezh where he was compelled to 
write a poem in honour of Stalin.  
A parallel episode of a different kind, but with similar echoes, occurred in South Africa during 
the leadership of B.J. Vorster. In 1977, the eminent author, Breyten Breytenbach, published a 
poem, 'Letter to the Butcher from Foreign Parts' which was addressed to Prime Minister Vorster. 
At the end of the piece, the names of men who had died at the hands of the security police were 
listed. It was at the core of the poem that forceful lines were addressed to Vorster, asking what it 
was like for him to fondle his wife's intimate areas with his fingers, stained with blood. 184 
“Does the heart also tighten in your throat 
when you paw its slippery limbs; 
with the very hands that will caress the secrets of your wife?” 185 
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Unsurprisingly, this personal attack was not ignored by Vorster. Two years after the poem was 
published, Breytenbach was charged and was subsequently forced to apologize to the National 
Party leader, and to accept that the tone of his own work was 'crass and insulting'.186 The point 
for Coetzee is that an authoritarian state will attempt to break an author whom it judges to be 
thinking and acting independently, and in too challenging and radical a manner. The theory 
behind authoritarian rule and its relation to literary censorship and propaganda would support 
that supposition. No less interesting is the irony of South Africa as a political entity which 
condemned the Soviet Union and its policies as the enemy of freedom and human rights, ending 
up in an authoritarian position itself when it could be compared to the dictatorial U.S.S.R.  
3.4: Concluding Remarks   
As this chapter has set out to show, state censorship played a large role within the broad 
propaganda and manipulation machinery of the NP government. Aside from contentious works 
of literature that came from abroad, the apartheid state was facing perceived domestic threats to 
its prevailing ‘world view’. The fact that some of this internal criticism emanated from within its 
own traditional Afrikaner constituency had to be taken particularly seriously, for it demanded a 
particularly firm response. 
To cultivate and maintain the various spheres of Afrikaner Nationalism’s ruling cultural 
authority and political power, the Publicity and Entertainment Acts of 1963 and 1974 were 
created. These stipulated, according to the influential Cronje Commission, that the white 
community in South Africa should be the cultural and spiritual torch bearer of civilization, and 
for the preservation and sustaining of that standard it would require the backing of a Publications 
Board.  
This Board had the responsibility of imposing permissible limits on material, and of trying to 
control what the public was able to view, acting in a manner which resembled the creation of an 
‘authoritarian state’ in a governmental approach to an independent mass media. It was an 
important link in the chain of developments leading up to the major apartheid nationalist 
propaganda efforts of the 1970s. 
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The Publishing and Entertainment Act of 1974 was the cornerstone of later and intensifying 
censorship in the Republic, and could be viewed as a form of covert propaganda intervention.  
Censorship worked as a lie of omission, feeding the continuing official misrepresentation of 
South Africa during the 1970s and beyond. The next chapter will explore further the question of 
the interpretation of the country’s state of affairs by its ruling party in its efforts to keep up the 
appearances of normality.    
Equally, Afrikaner nationalist culture and power could not, however, avoid stimulating awkward 
contradictions. Division and opposition centred on a dissenting group of writers popularly known 
as the Sestigers. These authors were producing a universally ‘modernized’ body of literature 
which was far out of line with traditionalist nationalist Afrikaner values. Its significance was that 
it represented a new ideological fracture within Afrikaner society, adding a further layer to 
internal and external criticism of apartheid society and the increasingly authoritarian style of its 
NP rulers. Part of that style was the calculating construction of what might be termed a ‘culture 
of misrepresentation’ or of omission and distortion. It was within this context that the South 
African Broadcasting Commission and the Department of Information mounted their information 
empires in defence of the National Party Republic, as will be considered in the ensuing two 
chapters.  
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Chapter 4 
Propaganda and the South African Broadcasting Commission 
“Since 1948 the world has witnessed some 140 wars, coup de etat, civil wars, border clashes, revolutions, 
civil strife and economic collapse. In each instance more than 150 people have died with hundreds more 
injured. In more than fifty percent the death toll exceeded 500. Not one of these events occurred in South 
Africa”187 
 
4.1: Introduction  
As we have seen in preceding discussion, the ruling National Party was able to exploit  
censorship widely as it was able to use its controlling or dominating influence over Afrikaans 
publishing and its judicial powers to deal with nonconformity and to punish those who violated 
its imposed criteria of acceptability. This section will consider a more covert form of National 
Party government propaganda in the form of the manipulation and censorship of audio and visual 
media. It will try to show that propaganda manifests in various forms and as mentioned, 
censorship, half truths and omisions in reporting can be seen as an example of the classic ‘lie of 
omission’.   
First, the history of the South African Broadcasting Commission requires some brief discussion. 
The role of the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) and the eventual decision to 
create a national television service was another exemplification of the processes through which 
the National Party authorities laid another – or further embedded the - foundation for the 
dissemination of sustained and serious political propaganda. It is widely acknowledged today 
that the SABC served as a mouthpiece of NP rule and that, after radio, television became a 
primary means of conveying and shaping information: 
'The SABC is seen as a defender of the apartheid state and propagator of its separate 
development strategies...The SABC programming became increasingly characterized by 
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anti-communist propaganda, the promotion of Afrikaner nationalism, and the concept of 
separate development.'188  
Television made a valuable channel through which approved information and, perhaps more 
importantly, opinions, could be imparted to an increasingly wide viewing audience. This was, 
arguably, especially so if one takes into account the exceptional lateness of its introduction into 
South Africa, three decades after the end of the Second World War. By the time that the 
television service was introduced, the National Party had already accomplished some extensive 
socio-political apartheid engineering. Then there was also the simple fact that it would be a novel 
new medium, and therefore its impact on a fresh audience could be potentially enormous. If 
power over the print media was necessary, then even more direct control of the SABC was a 
logical development for the NP in the underpinning of its power and the pursuit of its policies.  
4.2: SABC and the Broederbond  
The original declared purpose of the country’s national broadcasting corporation, established in 
1936, was to encourage the growth of both the English and the Afrikaner community’s culture 
and language; in the terms noted by Horwitz (2001), ‘broadcasting, is an important site for the 
production of culture, identity and nation building’. This section will first sketch a summary 
history of the SABC, and then the involvement in it of the Afrikaner Broederbond as well as its 
scope of interest and influence. For, from its early formation, personnel of the SABC had links 
with the secretive Broederbond, assisting this nationalist body to expand its influence into the 
broadcasting sphere in South Africa.  
 
Short history of the SABC  
Before the SABC created a television service, it had merely been a wireless radio service, with 
an institutional history located in white conflict and accommodation between the Afrikaners and 
the English, with language use and language rights always a critical issue. By the interwar years, 
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the Afrikaner people’s language and culture had become more secure, and in those strengthened 
circumstances there was a campaign for equal language broadcasting. 189 
The SABC was established in 1936, based on the ‘public broadcaster’ model of the British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), as a bilingual service to foster and advance the English-
speaking and Afrikaans-speaking cultures of the dominant white minority. Under the Union’s 
1936 Broadcasting Act, the Governor-General appointed the SABC’s Board of Control, which 
was to compromise nine Afrikaans- and English-speaking members. After the 1948 election, the 
Nationalists began to move Broederbond members into key positions at the SABC in order to 
further their goals. Gradually, after 1948, information programmes by non-Nationalist presenters 
were replaced by documentary broadcasts that were sympathetic to the NP, and particularly its 
apartheid policies.  
Still, the mutually supportive ties between the NP government and the SABC were not as close 
in the earlier years as they would become later. The reason was the Corporation’s head, the   
former Springbok rugby captain, Gideon Roos, who believed in a notion, however narrow, of 
impartiality in public service provision. This did nothing to endear him to the highly partisan 
politics of the advancing Broederbond. Often clashing with an extreme-Nationalist- dominated 
Board, Roos was once quoted famously as having said that the SABC provided 'a service to the 
public and is therefore a servant of the public, not the government.' He was eventually forced out 
in the 1960s and replaced by Piet Meyer. 190  
After this, the relationship between the NP and the SABC became very much closer. Meyer 
would prove to be the man for the present as well as the coming job, which would be facilitating 
the link between NP - Broederbond politics and the control of a new television service. Under 
Meyer, the SABC could now become a handmaiden of the Broederbond and its nationalist 
propaganda ideals. Predictably, this was undertaken initially by surrounding himself with fellow 
Broederbond members, and by placing them in key positions. Crucially, Meyer would later also 
be responsible for the investigative Inquiry into All matters Relating to Television, when the 
question of a television service emerged with a more serious intent in the country.  
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By the 1960s, the SABC had become a vigorous defender of the NP’s apartheid state, evident, 
for example, in the way that Meyer used the critical national and hostile international reactions to 
the events around Sharpeville to emphasise that what the Republic needed was not reform nor a 
change in the manner in which it was being governed, but stronger protection against its enemies 
abroad and its enemies at home. The slanted nature of radio programming ensured regular 
airtime for productions that were anti-communist as well as sympathetic to the policies of the 
NP. 
The racial segmentation of public radio services meant the ever more systematic splitting of 
audiences. Radio-programming for the African population (overseen by an all-white Bantu 
Programme Advisory Board) was characterized by a mix of ethnically-directed productions 
designed not only to maintain ‘traditional’ values, but also to instil a sense of the ‘re-birth’ of 
‘tribal’ identities and traditional values that could only be lived in the rural Homelands of 
apartheid South Africa. By comparison, on white radio channels, programming was increasingly 
Americanised in style and tone, and kept staunchly Christian and conservative. 191 
The structure of African language radio also reflected apartheid ideology strongly in other ways, 
as all African languages had distinctively separate programming, an approach which attempted 
to deflect African nationalism by reinforcing ethno-linguistic divisions between various groups 
of Black South Africans. This fitted into the explicit Verwoerdian doctrine that the various 
peoples of South Africa could only develop to full maturity if their languages and cultures were 
separated and cultivated as separate ‘nationhoods’.192  
Bantu Radio was broadcast on high frequencies that could be picked up on inexpensive FM 
transistor radios which were more accessible to the poor African majority, enabling the average 
black South African to listen to SABC productions tailored to ethnically-differentiated 
audiences, while independent longer-range radio broadcasts remained out of reach as they 
required more expensive short wave equipment to be picked up.193  
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In the view of the 1967 SABC Annual Report, Radio Bantu had helped black African peoples   
to appreciate that separate development was positive self-development in their own languages.194 
This, in effect, was the ‘educational’ purpose of radio services for black South Africans, and it 
could be concluded that, given the absence of a dedicated television service, and a limited press 
readership, radio was a major tool in disseminating a government-approved picture of life and 
how it ought to be lived by the inhabitants of South Africa.  
SABC and the Broederbond  
As already noted in prior discussion, a key aspect of the SABC's formative history was the 
involvement and influence of the Broederbond, which had been established as a male ‘club’ in 
1918 to advance the nationalist ideals and aspirations of the Afrikaner Volk and their Calvinist 
morals and ethics. Initially, not clandestine and secretive (as it would later become), by the end 
of the 1920s the society had achieved a breakthrough with the establishment of the Federasie vir 
Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge (FAK), the aim of which was to elevate and affirm the Afrikaans 
language and Afrikaner culture.  
The Broederbond’s aims were, firstly, the maintaining of a separate, white Afrikaner Volk, 
secondly, the achievement of Afrikaner-dominated rule in South Africa, thirdly, the 
‘Afrikanerization’ of assimilable English-speaking white South Africans and, finally, 
consolidating its strategic position as the political foundation of the Volk. The fact that Piet 
Meyer, for instance was not only Chairman of the Broederbond but also chairman of the SABC 
was, of course, a very happy and useful coincidence. So was the fact that any consideration of 
Broederbond membership was also, by implication, a consideration of the leaders of the National 
Party and some of its selected leading backers and influential followers.195 In the period covered 
by this study, notable members included former prime ministers, D.F Malan and Dr. H.F 
Verwoerd, as well as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pik Botha. Others included the billionaire 
businessman, Anton Rupert.   
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One of the more striking aspects of the SABC and its role as a purveyor of National Party ideals, 
is exactly how television came to be an acceptable medium in South Africa. Very late in 
comparison with much of the rest of the world, it was only in 1976 that South Africa eventually 
launched a television service and approved the local sale of television sets. For the National 
Party government had waited longer, and had debated more fiercely the positives and negatives 
of television, than virtually any other industrialized country before adopting a service. 
Almost instinctively, the government viewed television as negative and undesirable for the 
health of Afrikaner nationalism in terms of the perceived potential threat it posed to cultural 
independence. Nationalist elites were already wary of the popular influences of ‘English’ and 
‘American’ ways of life that were seeping into the country through press, radio and cinema.196 A 
fear was that the effects of television and what accompanied it would break down an idealised 
cultural and religious way of life that had been so laboriously created. 197  There was also 
particular concern that imported programming might depict racial mixing and colour contact in 
liberal ways that would undermine the strict goals of the apartheid order.   
Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd, who reportedly once likened television to something as noxious as 
poison gas or as dangerous as the atom bomb, stalled for as long as he lasted as prime minister.   
He stuck to the convenient notion that the introduction of a television service and the importation 
of any material and devices should be delayed until such time as South Africa could learn lessons 
from the example of other countries that had already accumulated television experience. This 
was just a matter of blocking any introduction of television. Ultimately, it was the first moon-
landing in 1969 that finally forced the beginnings of a government re-consideration. One of the 
effects of the American space project was that it brought home to South Africans that they 
inhabited one of the very few countries in which inhabitants were unable to witness such live 
historical events. Curiosity and interest was overwhelming. For instance, the screening of film 
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footage drew six thousand people to a five-hundred-seat theatre in Johannesburg, creating a 
public scramble in which eager viewers had to be dispersed by the police.198  
By the end of the decade, it had become clear that something needed to be done to avoid the 
Republic being perceived as non-modern or anti-modern. People in South Africa, notably those 
who made up its white electorate and citizenry, were increasingly aware not only of the fact that 
they were not on the same media level as other countries, but were discontented with the lack of 
technological movement into the modern era.199 Both within and outside the government, there 
was an awareness of falling behind nationally in a global technological environment. Leading on 
from this, we will turn next to some consideration of the post-1970 Report of the Commission of 
Inquiry into Matters relating to Television. This commission would, as its title indicated, 
examine whether there was a need for a television service, if so, how it ought to be planned and 
implemented, and what its role and impact would be in national life.  
The move towards television and the Meyer Commission.  
Despite television emerging as a classic visual information tool in the modernization of 
propaganda and in political manipulation strategies, the Broederbond and various echelons of the 
National Party were, as noted, initially against its use, only relenting in the course of the early 
1970s.  
In customary fashion, the National Party mounted a commission of inquiry, culminating in the 
1971 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Matters relating to Television. The individual in 
charge, Piet Meyer, was in fact one of the NP members who were ideologically opposed to a 
television service.200 The ensuing report would form the foundation of the Republic of South 
Africa's television services, as part of the continued refining and separation of broadcasting 
services on the basis of apartheid. Starting with its fledgling years in the mid- to late-1970s, 
television would in due course become a new medium through which to reflect the ideals of an 
apartheid racial order, and to foster the desirability of a separate development South Africa.  
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Interestingly, from as early as 1952 the debate surrounding the possible introduction of television 
had been engaging the House of Assembly, with Minister J.F Naude stating that television was a 
project for the future owing to various reasons such as economic consequences, insisting that it 
would be too costly to reach all of the Union on the basis of costly quality programming. Other 
arguments included that of the capacity of geographic coverage. 201 In 1954, Naude stated that 
‘there would be a great dissatisfaction if we provided this service to the Rand only…I sincerely 
hope that it will not be undertaken unless it is provided on a Union-wide basis.’202  
Later in the 1950s, the charge against the implementation of a television service changed to the 
problems of skilled manpower or that of quickly-changing technology. Minister J.J Serfontein, 
Naude’s successor, for instance proclaimed that ‘we do not know what science may discover 
tomorrow.’203 As we will see below, however, the most prominent argument against television 
was that it could lead to the moral and ethical corruption of the then Republic, alongside the 
opposing idea that television would unite a country which was living in conditions of apartheid. 
This, as has been argued, was in effect actually a defence mechanism, in which the value of 
television was that it could be used as a shield against an unwelcome modernity.204 
Controlled television was at last seen as an acceptable development, and as a managed move into 
a media modernity, This was thusly made possible during a time of reformist versus right-wing 
or Verligte versus Verkrampte splits within the National Party, with the creation of the Herstigte 
Nasionale Party following the exclusion of the ultra-conservative Albert Hertzog from the 
Cabinet in 1969.  
Albert Hertzog, as the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs from 1958 had been bitterly opposed to 
the idea of a television service; indeed, in his view this specific invention would be the ruin of 
South African society. For Hertzog, the television was no more than an ‘evil black box’ that 
would lead to ‘dangerous liberalistic tendencies’.205 
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Under the portfolio of Posts and Telegraphs, the creation of a television service would clearly 
have fallen under his jurisdiction. Thus, when Hertzog was removed by Vorster in 1968, the idea 
of television now became a feasible reality.206 His ministerial replacement, Matthys ‘Basie’ van 
Rensburg, was the individual who appointed Piet Meyer to the crucial television commission of 
inquiry in December 1969.    
Naturally, there could be no question of authorising and licensing an independent and 
commercial television operation in the Republic. Moreover, by the later-1970s, one of the 
problems that the NP had with any such service was that with advanced technology readily 
available to the middle classes, not least a well-off Afrikaner population, ‘any South African who 
could afford to purchase a satellite dish and television set would soon have access to the wonders 
and debauchery of television', with this being a possibility whether or not the state had its own 
television service.207  
For, as early as 1975-1976, expanding global television capacity was stretching to the 
introduction of satellite viewing. In response, the government needed to get out in front to 
control these circumstances, because South Africans could, hypothetically, end up having access 
to content which had not been approved for official viewing by the Republic’s authorities.208 
Hertzog was, then, perhaps the classic mouthpiece for the National Party’s old fears of ‘foreign’ 
imperialism, and its potential to weaken the status quo. As Rob Nixon has suggested recently: 
‘the Afrikaner nationalist association of TV with foreign domination can only be 
understood in terms of a longer history of inter-colonial rivalry for control over black 
territory, labour power, and economic resources…it has to be seen, too, in terms of rival 
white imaginings about how the inception of TV in South Africa would change the 
balance of power.’ 209 
Thus, there was increasing concern that the impact of foreign visual media influences could 
endanger the painstaking work of the conservative Nationalists.  
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The caution of conservatism was a notion that Verwoerd emphasised when speaking about 
television in the House of Assembly. In 1960, drawing on analogies, he declared that simply 
because something was modern and wonderful, it did not mean that it was good for a nation 
without at least first probing into the matter, ‘That applies to poison gas, for example; it applies 
to the atom bomb for example…however wonderful and modern the invention may be, the 
physical danger attached to it makes it perfectly clear that you cannot us it.’210 That call for an 
investigation to weigh up the consequences of using a modern technological medium would 
manifest itself a decade later as the Meyer Commision in 1971.  
In due course, with the commencement of the Meyer Commission, the so-called verkrampte, 
anti-television troika fell. As the American scholar, Ron Krabil, has pointed out, Prime Minister 
Verwoerd, Minister Albert Hertzog and Broederbond chairman, Piet Meyer, had formed an ultra- 
conservative troika which was wholly opposed to television.211 It is thus interesting that Meyer 
himself would go on to head a commission into the feasibility of television, and would 
subsequently come to a pro-television conclusion.  
The Meyer commission as the facilitator for adaptation signalled a radical communications 
change, a shift that could be largely attributed to three factors. The first was that of political 
fissures within the ruling party, secondly, there was the threat posed by access to satellite 
television, and, lastly, there was the troubling issue of citizens’ continuing dissatisfaction with 
their exclusion from the internation media and their country’s apparent inability to embrace a 
world of modernity. 212 
The introduction of the the Meyer Commision promised – as it conceived a new viewing age - to 
bring South Africa’s two worlds into existence on local screens, one experienced by the white 
population, the other the nature of life as experienced by other races within the Republic’s 
borders.  
4.3:  The commission of inquiry into all matters relating to television 
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A few months after the moon landing in 1969 the government appointed the commission of 
inquiry into ‘all matters relating to television’, in order to delve into the desirability, nature and 
feasibility of television within the Republic. Saul Dubow, revealingly, suggests that governments 
often appoint commissions to postpone decisions or to ‘buy time’ even though the prognosis of 
such a commission might already be anticipated or even known.213 This would be distinctly 
reminiscent of the commission created by the Botha regime in the 1980s, chaired by De Klerk, in 
order to make recommendations concerning the so-called Bantu-question. 
The Meyer Commission paved the way for South Africa to move into the modern technological 
era with mass media technology. This Inquiry can be viewed as having provided the definitive 
official justification for the use of the medium to try to influence and mould the perceptions, 
ideas and sentiments of the South African public under the banner of a social and cultural 
education for its various ‘communities’:  
'This television service should form a supplementary and an integral part of the 
country’s  pattern of education and should be founded on such principles as will ensure 
the Christian system of values of the country, the national identity, and that the social 
structure of its various communities will be respected, strengthened and enriched.' 214 
Given that the Commission’s figurehead was a prominent member of the ruling political elite, a 
member of the Broederbond and the head of the SABC, the direction taken by the report was 
bound to be coloured by a number of established convictions. The Inquiry laid heavy emphasis 
on a benign-sounding notion of education and on the sharing of information to help to foster and 
to protect the Republic and what it was considered to represent. The other aspect that the 
Commission focused on, was control. When it came to recommending where oversight and 
authority ought to lie, it was principally with the SABC. The report thus stated that: 
‘this television service should be subject to proper control to ensure that the service will 
at all times meet the requirements set forth in the commission’s terms of reference and 
the requirements contained in the preceding chapters of this report, and that the 
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necessary control should be exercised by the SABC, the viewer community itself and 
ultimately Parliament.'215  
As can be seen, control was crucial to Meyer, and in reality served as the justification of a state- 
owned and controlled television service. This will now be considered in more detail, as well as 
how the educative function of a television service in South African society was envisaged, 
particularly the ends which it would be serving.     
Underlying theory 
The Report was written in an academic style, firstly discussing underlying theories and 
comparative international examples, before getting to the South African question. Not restricted 
in readership, it was also printed and made public and could be purchased, although at a 
relatively costly price. 
The Commission focused on various aspects of life in a society with a television service, but, for 
present purposes, only some of the more important facets will be touched on. These were, firstly, 
its theoretical component. Secondly, there was the Commission’s heavy emphasis on two main 
aspects of a possible television service, those being control and purpose.  
The only body proposed by the commission to control the television service was to be the SABC, 
and the supposed purpose was to be an educative. The word 'education' or 'informative' was often 
used in an anodyne style, in a sense using education and information as a euphemistic 
terminology to camouflage a project which could be interpreted as a further fostering of NP 
goals and ideals.  
Before South Africa was discussed, television in the international community was probed in 
order to address any possible management difficulties that might arise. One of the major 
questions was the obvious one of control:  
'Undoubtedly the fundamental question of control of the medium retarded its 
development in many countries. By 1950 about 30 countries were wrestling with the 
problems of television, and practically without exception it was this, i.e. the question of 
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how the medium should be controlled, that was one of the basic problems to which 
solutions were being sought.' 216 
The above observation made it clear that the commission was attempting, first, to deal with 
potential blocks and difficulties, and also to establish what it considered to be the best form of 
‘governance’ for a new television service. It further stated that only a handful of the countries 
that were studied used complete government control, while the remainder made use of semi-
controlled or private institutions. In a country such as South Africa, given the context of its 
socio-political landscape, the control of such a communication medium was an immensely 
important consideration.  
Continuing with its ‘abstract’ tone, the report analysed the nature of television, and how it 
generally influenced community life. In simple terms, it summed up the notion that society could 
be shaped by television or the dominant media to which it subscribed, while emphasising 
strongly that any such impact should be moulded by the values of the society in question: 
'The direct effect of television on the morals and morale of a particular society depends 
primarily on the system of values and beliefs of that society. If a society were to allow 
television to function outside and above this system, it would be exposing its moral 
fibre and its morale to forces over which it has no control. Probably this would happen 
only if the moral strength and the morale of the community was on the decline.' 217 
In other words, television could build or break down a society’s social and cultural foundation, 
but only if the community allowed it to do so. However, if a community was made from a strong 
moral fibre and could hold its own against the impact of a new form of mass communication, 
such as television, the positives of reinforcing existing beliefs and values could definitely 
outweigh the negatives: 
'As a positive growth factor television can have a powerful influence and effect on 
community life in so far as it upholds the accepted norms, values and standards of the 
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community in its program policy and is positive in reflecting and strengthening these 
things in its programmes.'218 
Clearly then, the NP government would be interested in such a system if it was implemented in 
the correct manner. Many important facets of the implementation of a television service were 
still to be discussed, chiefly those of education and control. Satisfaction over these would then 
prove to be the justifying rationale behind the Meyer report’s pro-television recommendation.   
Education and authoritarian control  
Education and control were the chief topics of the Meyer Report. The report listed various 
reasons why strict control would be needed. Before anything could be controlled, however, the 
decision to actually introduce a television service had to be justified.  
Beyond the rhetoric of television poisoning the Calvinistic minds of society and exposing the 
Afrikaner community to all kinds of unwelcome foreign ideas, the question within the report 
moved away from whether a television service was needed and rather focused on the justification 
behind the proposed decision. 
The question was phrased in another manner, ‘does South Africa need an additional medium of 
communication?’219 One logical argument was that the longer the Republic of South Africa 
waited for this medium, the longer the Republic would be struck in stagnation. South Africa was 
expected to resemble a modern, technologically advanced country which would be able to stand 
alongside the likes of the United States or Britain – that standing mattered, especially if one 
considered the positive outward image that the NP was attempting to project.   
Such considerations aside, the commission came to the conclusion that the Republic should 
finally accept the desirability of creating a television service specifically for the sake of 
education, for the furthering of ‘national’ goals, and additionally for the encouragement of the 
growth of the various cultures within the country. The manner in which it should be implemented 
and, more importantly, managed or controlled, was the question that then loomed large.  
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Raising the flag of responsible, ethical socio-economic management, the view of the Meyer 
inquiry was that the service would have to remain the responsibility of the SABC as it could be 
vested in the untrustworthy hands of any private corporation. The reasoning was that a private 
enterprise might show material of a sensational, provocative and misleading nature for the sake 
of profit.220 This could lead to others attempting the same thing on the principle of free market 
capitalism, and this could in turn lead to the unravelling of the Republic.  
Taking another account of the role of the market, a further aspect on which the report put 
emphasis was that no annual government grants would be made to a television service because it 
would, firstly, impose a heavy indirect burden on tax payers and, secondly, because it might 
encourage the growth of competition based on advertising and other avenues of profiteering.221  
One of the other recognised problems with the introduction of television in a fledgling country 
such as South Africa was that the daily newspaper press might suffer from a new mass mode of 
propagating information.222 It would have also have to be carefully controlled in order to protect 
the position of print and radio media. Although the proposed television service was not being 
created for as a source of financial revenue, certain other restrictive measures were considered in 
the report in order to prevent harmful effects on the press.223  
It is worth bearing in mind that many of the Afrikaans newspapers in circulation were controlled 
by the same individuals who were attending Broederbond meetings and who were exercising an 
influential managerial presence within the SABC. Thus the natural assumption was that if one 
had two modes through which to circulate news and information, the educative national message 
could be made more effective.  
The Meyer commission’s report concluded that television could be used effectively as a tool to 
further the education of South African society and to uphold its system of Christian morals and 
ethics. This could be achieved by:  
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 a:Providing wholesome and edifying entertainment; 
b: by supplying reliable, objective and balanced information;  
c: by reflecting and projecting the cultural assets of each community;  
d: by stimulating indigenous creative talent; and above all, 
e: by constantly striving to foster good relations between all the people of the county.224 
 
Much emphasis throughout the report was placed upon the idea of using television as an 
educational tool in South Africa, a country "where knowledge is a prerequisite for survival".225 
In theory, it could serve as an aid to formal education and to tertiary education institutions, and it 
could be made to be ‘multi-cultural’ so as to empower the various groups within the Republic, 
within their own communities. Thus, television could be harnessed to the service of creating and 
fostering multiple ethnic nationalisms, along the premise of innate cultural differences, within 
the fabric of broader civil nationalisms in South Africa.  
As noted, the commission’s recommendation was that the television service be controlled by the 
SABC in a statutory fashion. This control should be exercised by the officials of the SABC, its 
viewers, and would be overseen ultimately by parliament as a state entity. It was also suggested 
that a local advisory committee be appointed to advise the government on television matters for 
cycles of three years. This board would consist of people from various fields of expertise, such as  
the areas of Christian religion, culture and education. 226 
This advisory board was reminiscent of the one suggested in the Commission of Inquiry into 
Undesirable Publications, taking into account the credentials of those who were likely to 
volunteer for such a position.227 By and large, selected individuals were likely to be adherents of  
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National Party dogma and would hardly have been representative of all the Republic’s 
inhabitants.  
The report recommended that from the outset programming appropriate to the advancement of   
South African society should be made available for white schools, even though this would be 
faced with some logistical and technical problems. Programming should also be made in the 
form of courses in association with universities and colleges. This could be shaped to supplement 
education provision in fields with critical shortages of skilled labour. 228 
Proposed implementation  
Television would be implemented in two phases, the first of which would consist of the planning 
and approval of programming for the various population groups. For the white population there 
would be one bi-lingual channel in which Afrikaans and English would both be given equal 
representation. This would be undertaken by erecting technical services in Cape Town and 
Johannesburg, as well as mobile units for live programme actuality. 229 
For the so-called ‘Bantu service’, a single channel would be created for a television service in 
Zulu and Sotho only for the Witwatersrand. The reasoning behind this was partly due to the cost 
involved in reaching all of the "various Bantu areas...and afterwards extending to the respective 
urban areas", as well as to uncertainty over whether a sufficient segment of the black population 
would actually be able to afford television sets.230  
For the second phase, the commission recommended that at soon as it was possible to do so, 
separate channels for English and Afrikaans should be created for whites. For the Bantu service, 
the commission recommended that the service be extended to Durban and into the Eastern Cape 
region.231 
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As envisaged, television would be introduced over time with gradual effect in order to cater to 
the differential needs of all the people of the country. There would be a service for whites in both 
languages on only one channel for a number of years. The service "intended for the Bantu will 
initially be limited to the Witwatersrand."232 Importantly, the proposed television service should 
also place emphasis on reading newspapers, books and periodicals, not only to encourage 
literacy but also to counter any losses the press might feel from the advent of television.  
4.5: South African television service in practice  
The television service that was established “could be described as bland, innocuous and safe, 
clearly designed to be unoffensive to the moral and religious values of the Calvinistic 
Afrikaners.”233  
This is how Hachen and Giffard have described the character of the initial television service. In 
this section we simply examine the difference between what the commission appeared to be 
suggesting and what was subsequently put into effect.   
The idea that television could be exploited as a political tool is quite evident in the ties between 
the SABC and the NP, especially if one examines the parliamentary elections which were held 
every five years. The SABC’s monopoly ensured that National Party candidates and policy 
positions received proportionately more mention in relation to those of their opposition. 
Television entered the realm of media on the 1st of January 1976 as a powerful new agency of 
political and electoral campaigning and the NP used this to the best of its ability. 
As soon as the board of trustees, as advised by the establishing commission of inquiry, was 
chosen, the Broederbond inserted its interest into the new communication proceedings and then 
started to canvass for opinions about what type of programming would be best suited for the 
advancement of South Africa and its perceived national needs. Significantly, at this level SABC-
TV news often included no overseas news and the service only had only one representative 
overseas in its early years.  
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News programmes invariably featured Nationalist spokesmen or politicians who had been 
thoroughly briefed on the various questions and points of the coming interview. Those from 
opposing positions did not receive such latitude and independent critical voices from the black 
population enjoyed no airtime at all. Unsurprisingly, a notable study by the Department of 
Journalism at Rhodes University found that 80 per cent of its political coverage was devoted to 
government or National Party viewpoints.234   
When it came to censorship, television broadcasting was governed not only by political demands 
but also by the dictates of Calvinist sexual morality. An example of the latter can be found in the 
case of the popular American television soap opera series, 'Dallas'. There, a ‘Dallas’ episode 
featuring homosexuality was not shown, just as news coverage of the 1976 Soweto riots was 
restricted in what it showed of the reality of violence and the death toll in black townships.   
The programming offered was not only censored, but it also conveyed a completely different 
picture of South Africa from what the great majority of its inhabitants would have considered to 
be its everyday realities. For the most part it conveyed the image of a white and western republic, 
a bastion of modernity within the African continent with a contented population of so-called non-
whites. 
In the morning newspaper, The Citizen (to be discussed in the following chapter) an interview 
was conducted with some of the heads of department within the SABC such as Pieter de Bruin, 
Hennie Human and Robin Knox-Grant to consider the question of 'Blacks on T.V?'.235 
The interview started off by asking whether it was the policy of the SABC to reflect the South 
African way of life. One of the examples that was used in the discussion was that of The 
Villagers. This was one of the first English television drama series produced by the SABC, about 
life in small mining community on the Rand. This question was answered by a counter question 
by Pieter de Bruin, 'what do you think is the South African way of life?’ 236 
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The Villagers, according to an article in Die Burger, was quickly becoming one of the SABC's 
most popular programmes amongst South African audiences.237 The basis of this was a study 
undertaken by interviewing a sample group which consisted of white South Africans who owned 
television sets.  
On the face of it, had the study been a credible representation of the country’s television 
watching habits, the black population would also have been included. That said, the African 
majority could not have been included in any inclusive screen portrayal of the ‘South African 
way of life’, due to the technical-legal provision that they were not recognised citizens of the 
Republic but rather citizens of their own homelands. In that sense, De Bruin’s response displayed 
a kind of strictly technical validity – clever, in however narrow a way 
The interview concluded that although African or coloured people may not have been 
represented in the programming offered on English and Afrikaans channels, it was merely 
because their presence was not relevant to any of the specific programmes.  
As De Bruin underlined further, the television brief was simple in scope, in that 'we have a 
service in English and Afrikaans, primarily for the English and Afrikaans sections. There is in 
the making a second channel, chiefly for Black people and that is the status quo at the moment. 
238 
If the television service functioned in a propagandistic way, it is important to note the manner or 
style of communication. Rather than providing a viewing diet of obviously outright lies and 
crude misinformation, much of what appeared on television tended to reinforce – in an indirect 
or even ‘embedded’ manner, commonplace or everyday portrayals of an apartheid society under 
white domination, a ‘natural’ world governed by NP policies which should be taken for granted. 
In other words, a white television production such as Die Avonture van Kuifie was not 
necessarily a hardline, crudely racist or politically propagandistic programme, but served rather 
to reinforce the approved attitudes and behaviour of the apartheid Republic. 
During 1976 and 1977 programming was divided in such a way that both the Afrikaans- 
speaking population as well as the English- speaking population received roughly a quarter of the 
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allotted programming time. In comparison, the Black population received only 2. 0 to 2. 1 
percent of the available programming allocation. The rest of the programming time was used for 
programmes about nature or other activities where specific racial groups could not be targeted.239 
This is quite evident if one simply examines what actually featured on television at the time. For 
example, in September 1978 a day’s programming featured the likes of The Hardy Boys, The 
Villagers, and news in both Afrikaans and English separately. Other programming thoughout that 
week featured programming such as Eight is Enough, Sport in Afrikaans, The Money Game and 
Die Avonture van Kuifie.240 These Afrikaans and English programmes varied in content and 
quality, and catered appropriately to a fledgling viewing audience, in the general view of press 
reviewers.  
The question that some questioning writers asked, whether the programming reflected the totality 
of the Republic, was a matter of judging whether exclusiveness was more valid than 
inclusiveness, a matter that lay at the very heart of Afrikaner nationalism.241 
That notion – raised, interestingly, by a writer in Die Huisgenoot in 1978, made sense if one took 
into account that the white population made up the largest segment of the 'television-population', 
constituting almost 90 percent of viewership between 1967 and 1977. 242  That virtual 
exclusiveness aside, it was, however, also noted at the same time that the local news represented 
a broader available programming, justifying an appeal to a more ‘inclusive’ viewing audience.243 
Criticism of the manner in which television was being implemented was often opposed by 
nationalist press opinion, in articles such as that found in Die Burger of October 1978, ‘TV geen 
problem vir bruin leeraar’.244  Drawing on a form of apartheid logic, it briefly described a 
coloured pastor as having no issue with the way in which television was being organised, as he 
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would have been the first person of colour hosting a religious programme church service aimed 
at the black community.  
The observation has been made that SABC television services imported many shows as at the 
start it was cheaper than establishing production facilities for the creation of local works. 
Nonetheless, early programmes such as The Villagers were local if also limited in the range of 
life that they depicted. Only in the second series of the programme was there slightly more 
recognition of, and emphasis on, the life of black workers in the mining industry.245 And in that 
respect, the brief representation of life for the black mining community was conveyed as an 
immensely positive experience – an implausible depiction.  
One can then see that early television was firstly aimed at a very specific audience, that being 
Afrikaans and English speaking white South Africans, and the nature of the programming 
revealed that heavily propagandistic ‘documentary’ television was not necessarily a standard 
feature.  Rather, when it came to coverage of what might be termed the spectrum of national life, 
manipulation that did take place was at the level of misrepresentation or omission.   
4.5: Concluding Remarks        
When discussing conventional propaganda and manipulation in the modern era, the use of 
television would make up a large part of any discussion. Since its introduction, it has made the 
process through which a particular political entity distributes its ideas easier and simpler. Today, 
public life is packed with overt and covert ‘propagandising’ of ideologies and value systems in 
the form of advertisements, government-supporting news programmes, documentaries and other 
broadcast material.   
What holds true for the previous chapter on censorship and literature is also true for this chapter, 
in terms of the so-called authoritarian theory of mass media. A strong and centralised 
government instinctively makes use of programming that is beneficial to its notion of the well-
being of a designated national culture. In effect, this meant that the approved depiction of the 
nation internally had the effect of making many within the Republic as well as in the outside 
world critically aware of the nature of apartheid policy.  
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In the case of South Africa, as we have seen, the foremost decision was not whether television 
should be used for such goals, but rather whether it should be made available at all.  
The second important point stemmed from the nature of the programming at the inception of the 
service in the 1970s, which reflected the recommendations set forth by the Meyer Commission in 
most of its suggestions. The programming was to be supportive of Afrikaans and English white 
culture, and was at the same time not to be offensive towards anyone or other groups in the 
country. 
In practice, what was being attempted was the underwriting of a dominant white minority’s 
consolidation of a position of ‘European’ superiority and power. Seen at its simplest, 
programmes such as The Villagers, Die Avonture van Kuifie and The Hardy Boys sustained the 
image of a white and Western way of life, to the exclusion of any meaningful sense of the 
surrounding presence of an African, or more multi-cultural socio-political landscape. Arguably, 
the narrowness of television coverage aided in the fostering of the idea of a white South Africa, a 
‘hermit – kingdom’ for its ruling minority.  
Ultimately, apartheid South Africa was little different from other modern authoritarian or 
authoritarian-minded states which established state broadcasting monopolies. The operation and 
programming of both major radio and ‘public’ television was the responsibility of the SABC 
which conveyed the Nationalist interests of the ruling party.246 
This chapter seeks to complement the previous chapter in considering the close relationship 
between media and the government, from newspaper and magazine interests through to radio and 
television. At the same time, given the growing pressures on the country’s apartheid order, for 
the authorities there was an increasing need for a more vigorous and, possibly, unconventional 
approach to try to improve the picture of South Africa both internally and externally. This, then, 
brings one to the following and final chapter which examines the role of the Department of 
Information and its role in attempting to shape national and international public opinion about 
South Africa’s political circumstances.  
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'The late Dr. Verwoerd once said that South Africa was involved in a war on two fronts: on the one 
against hostility abroad which has often been deliberately created, for reasons which will be set forth in 
this book; on the other against subversion and communism in South Africa.'247 
 
5. 1:  Introduction  
The above quote is from the book, The Paper Curtain, written by Eschel Rhoodie in 1969 and it 
gives one a clear indication of the thought pattern of those in power at the time. Rhoodie’s book 
will be used throughout this chapter to demonstrate the sense of confidence that certain members 
of the National Party government had in their convictions.  
Rhoodie’s views exemplified not only the stance of the National Party towards mounting 
political criticism from abroad, but they also capture quite well the defensive rhetoric of certain 
NP leaders in justifying their actions as a political party as well as confronting foreign criticism 
from outside the so-called laager. In that respect, the Paper Curtain might almost be seen as a  
sort of personal blueprint for broad pro-apartheid propaganda activities, while also serving as a 
justification for later, irregular actions.  
At the centre of this phase of the ‘hearts and minds’ NP struggle were, clearly, some of the early 
programmes, actions and ideas of the Department of Information. The Paper Curtain, Eschel 
Rhoodie’s testament, will then be examined as forming part of the background to the Department 
of Information's activities with regard to foreign movements and interventions.   
Leading on from this, the Department’s activities under the Rhoodie administration will be 
considered, in addition to an examination of the activities of the Club of Ten, a London-based 
pro-South Africa lobbying organisation, the creation of To the Point magazine, the founding of 
the newspaper, The Citizen and the attempted takeover of the Washington Star.  
It should be mentioned at this point that although exposure of the so-called ‘Muldergate’ secret 
government propaganda campaign scandal sent shockwaves through the country in the late 
1970s, the purpose of this chapter is not to revisit the information scandal again in its popular 
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Muldergate or Rhoodiegate manifestations. It is more to explore the Department of Information 
‘hearts and minds’ actions which landed them in the courts in the first place.  
That event was the culmination of a brief era of breakthrough government propaganda efforts to 
try to condition local and foreign public opinion. For a window on the manner in which this was 
undertaken, use is made of Eschel Rhoodie's other book, Die Ware Inligting Skandaal (1984),  as 
well as his 1969 The Paper Curtain, recent Wikileaks reports and the proceedings of the Erasmus 
Commission. One fairly obvious consideration with sources is the question of the reliability or 
trustworthiness of records in a world of study marked by subterfuge, lies, and half-truths, 
depending on individual motivation.  
Early beginnings  
The Sharpeville massacre as it is known today has been studied in great detail by many leading 
historians, recently by the likes of Tom Lodge and Sarah Harris. One wider reaching impact of 
the shooting crisis lay far beyond the immediate law and order rhetoric of the NP and  the 
authoritarian nature of the police. For if it was a turning point for the anti-apartheid struggle 
movements, at the same time it also signalled a shift in NP reactions to opposition actions after 
March 1960. What the government faced was an unprecedented level of critical media coverage 
of events at Sharpeville and other disturbed townships, like Langa in the Western Cape. Foreign 
criticism came from a wide range range of quarters, including the Christian voices of American  
civil rights leaders such as Martin Luther King Jnr., and the usually conservative evangelist, 
Billy Graham. Both spoke out angrily against the South African government. 248   
This section will survey several of the more substantial ‘opinion moulding’ operations that the 
Department of Information launched with the sympathetic assistance of both national and 
international interests. Among the first of these were the overtures towards American public 
opinion through the medium of literature and film.  
Initially, the Foreign Minister from the later 1950s, Erik Louw, travelled to the US to personally 
help to try to polish the image of South Africa. One avenue involved employing the Hamilton 
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Wright Organization, a public relations firm which had also assisted in trying to improve 
Communist China's image in the recent past. 249  
The Hamilton Wright Organization utilised photographic essays in popular magazines such as 
National Geographic and Life, as well as various information articles which were distributed 
amongst various newspaper groups.  
Thousands of these ‘inserts’ were distributed within and beyond the borders of the continental 
USA. The contracted local firm also produced newsreels and short films of high technical quality 
to show the natural beauty of South Africa and to display the general friendliness of its 
inhabitants. Africa. The ‘touristic’ short films and newsreels were distributed to American movie 
theatres and were released through cinemas associated with major Hollywood production 
companies such as 20th Century Fox, MGM, Paramount and Warner Brothers. They were also 
distributed internationally in Germany, Spain and France and other overseas countries.250 
The funding behind this activity came from the government’s information division and its role 
was kept discreet. As a form of low impact conditioning of foreign public opinion, it avoided any 
explicit apartheid stance or attempt to justify the policy, in favour of focusing on a healthy, 
positive depiction of the stable and secure Republic and its natural and human assets  
While these actions came to represent what could be seen as some of the lower scale propaganda 
endeavours of the nationalist government’s foreign ‘hearts and minds’ crusade of the 1960s, it 
was during the 1970s that the apartheid propaganda machine really got its stride - both locally 
and abroad. The scope of the NP propaganda effort and how far reaching this endeavour actually 
was, is considered below. An obvious start to understanding this aspect of the ‘hearts and minds’ 
picture is Eschel Rhoodie’s The Paper Curtain.   
 
5.2: South Africa's Paper Curtain  
Before working as the Secretary of the Department of Information (1972-1977), Eschel Mostert 
Rhoodie wrote and published The Paper Curtain at the end of the 1960s. It has been 
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characterised as the “basis and blueprint of South Africa’s world-wide secret propaganda 
war”251.   
This depiction has been backed very recently by the New York Times journalist, Ron Nixon, who 
has likened Eschel Rhoodie to the Joseph Goebbels of the apartheid government and The Paper 
Curtain as the Mein Kampf of the NP propaganda machine.252 This may be an extreme example 
of hyperbole, although this polemical comparison does provide some idea of the impact of 
Rhoodie's book on the policies and programmes of the Department of Information in the eyes of 
American anti-apartheid observers.   
The title of the book referred to the ‘paper curtain’ being drawn across South Africa by foreign 
countries in the form of negative, critical press and and other literature. As Rhoodie stated in the 
prologue: 
'The Prime Minister, Mr. Vorster, has appealed to all South Africans to help combat the 
hostility against South Africa abroad. In fact, the Prime Minister went so far as to 
observe that the Government considers the threat to South Africa from abroad greater 
than any threat it currently faces from within... If we are to counter world hostility and 
ignorance about South Africa then let us know about our enemies.'253 
In his book, Rhoodie was adamant that the international world’s foreign policies were being 
unfair and overly critical towards South African politics at the time, the political landscape of the 
1960s, commencing with Sharpeville, the turn to the armed struggle by the ANC and the PAC, 
the death of H.F. Verwoerd and other convulsions. As the National Party state grew increasingly 
more repressive in its responses to acts of resistance, Rhoodie sought to reassure his readers that 
the international world, especially countries such as the United States of America and Great 
Britain had faults of their own and had no reason to interfere with South African domestic 
policies.   
For instance, turning to the example of Sharpeville, he observed:  
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“the Sharpeville shootings in 1960 receive[d] more prominence in the British press than the 
death of 33 members of the ‘freedom movement’ in Manila…during the week of May 
1967…compare the plight of the small police force of Sharpeville…with that of the 500 
police in Manila who stood ready.” 254  
This was just one example of the defensive rhetoric to be found in his book, an argument that the 
NP-ruled South Africa was being singled out unfairly for hostile criticism, whereas questionable 
conduct in many other states was either receiving minimal attention or was being glossed over.     
Little serious account was taken of the prevailing political realities of a 1960s Western world 
dominated by ideas of freedom and equality, boosted by civil rights campaigns and anti-colonial 
movements. Not surprisingly, in this period of social change critical eyes were directed towards 
the actions of South Africa, which was seen to be violating the Western world’s general liberal 
norms.  
In this difficult climate, Rhoodie sought to change the manner in which the international and 
domestic community viewed criticism of the Republic. Importantly, he stressed that it was 
according to world opinion, a subjective factor, that the path that the Republic was following, 
was wrong. For it was ‘a myth just like the "international community" is a myth and more and 
more people are beginning to admit this freely.' 255 In this oddly optimistic equation, if those who 
were criticising did not exist, there might in fact not be real criticism.  
The argument for the position and rights of whites in South Africa was made along several lines 
of reasoning. Firstly, the white population was far from being ‘settlers’ and their history in the 
country was rooted so deeply that – in the case of the Afrikaner white majority – a native 
language had been born from it which was not spoken outside South Africa. Secondly, there was 
the notion that these inhabitants had greater moral, legal and historical rights to the country than 
the colonists of North America. Then there was the claim that there were several ethnically 
distinct Black nations within the borders of the Republic who were discrete from one another and 
who were following paths to separate nationhoods, with their own citizenship, distinct from that 
of South Africa. Lastly, Rhoodie pointed out that some Africans had risen to become judges, 
professors and cabinet ministers, serving their own peoples in their home states, thanks to the 
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development made possible under the apartheid policy. 256  The models for this were the 
independent homelands, such as Bophutatswana and the Ciskei, which were held up as some of 
the Crown jewels in defence of the apartheid system.  
These were positive developments that critical world powers were refusing to accept or to 
understand. Instead, the Republic’s experience was unfairness, and that, in Rhoodie’s terms, of 
being ‘picked on’.  
There was great concern with what was considered to be a lack of balance in the international 
approach to South Africa’s affairs. The BBC, for instance, had purportedly covered political 
news in South Africa more thoroughly than any other country in the 1950s. Its newsreels and 
short film and other documentary footage all displayed a negative approach towards the system 
of apartheid. In fact, 31 varied BBC programmes about the Union were produced and broadcast 
between 1948 and 1953.257  
Against this, The Paper Curtain’s perspective was that within South Africa, things were nowhere 
near as terrible as a hostile United Nations would have people believe during the 1960s. Even 
Sharpeville wasn cited as an example of this. As  Rhoodie observed, there was little reason for  
South Africans to be fearful after what had been a relatively minor disturbance, as after all, “the 
action at Sharpeville….[does] not even begin to compare  with the turmoil which was underway 
in dozens of other African, Latin American and Asian countries.”258 Thus public political life in 
South Africa was comparatively far more stable and far more peaceful than in many parts of the 
developing Third World.   
For Rhoodie, it was essential for South Africa to coordinate efforts in a national attempt to “tear 
down th[e] curtain [and] possibly pull it aside sufficiently to allow those who are sincerely 
interested in South Africa…to find out what it’s really like.”259  
In other words, he was advocating opening a door to reliable outsiders, those judged to be 
‘sincerely interested’ in South African affairs.  
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The South African Foundation, mentioned in chapter 1, was one of the bodies which played a 
key role in the propaganda initiative to try to tear down the so-called paper curtain. Its purpose  
was to publicise the opportunities that South Africa offered and to inform the wider world about 
the high standard of living, its vast market potential, and the tangible benefits awaiting tourists, 
investors and traders who embraced the country.260  
The SAF, as envisaged in the chapter entitled ‘Prognosis and Suggestions’, would have to be 
helped firstly by the local business community with financial assistance, and secondly, a book 
foundation could be established to sponsor pro-South African literature in key countries such as 
the US, Britain,, France and West Germany.  
Then, in a proposal somewhat reminiscent of official guided tours behind the Iron Curtain, the 
notion of an approved Speakers Foundation was floated, an agency through which to take picked 
people abroad, to “take speakers young and old to the United States, Britain and France.” 261 
There, through these non-governmental publicists, audiences would be able to understand for 
themselves what positive life and opportunities lay within the Republic.  
Such ventures, according to Rhoodie’s prescriptions, could greatly influence and improve the 
image of apartheid South Africa, and could sway the foreign crusade against it through positive 
counter-measures. He also suggested, lastly, that an educational foundation be created in order to 
assist South African universities in the exchange of professors and intellectuals from abroad. 
These and other more minor recommendations were meant to break through the wall, to fend off 
the wrongful accusations of the international community. Drawing on the myths and hopeful 
illusions of Verwoerd, Rhoodie declared:  
'the late Dr. Verwoerd predicted that if we could break through this barrier of hostility 
and misunderstanding and if we could convince the outside world of the bona fides of 
our intentions and achievements, we in South Africa will enter a golden century of 
prosperity.'262 
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Rhoodie’s volume was clearly the work of a man who was coming to the defence of the South 
African order and who believed deeply in that cause. It was meant to be read as a persuasive 
treatise, one which sought to make its readers feel, as if alongside the author, that the world was 
indeed unfairly prejudicial towards the Republic and that it ought to begin to 'stand up for itself' 
in a rightful way. The Paper Curtain was also very well written, and its facts and figures were 
represented in a skilful way to play upon both emotion and logic around questions of fairness and 
reasonableness. As a skilled exercise in manipulation, Rhoodie’s work can be seen as a fair 
precursor or unofficial ‘blueprint’ for later overt and covert government activities through its 
Department of Information. 
5.2: Maintenance and defence from behind the Paper Curtain 
By the era of 1960 to the early 1970s, the earlier, mild criticism of the Republic had become 
magnified, encapsulated in the image of a paper curtain being drawn across the country. In a 
post-colonial world, opinion had moved far beyond the kind of disapproval voiced by British 
papers like the London The Times which had already observed in 1948 that if apartheid was a 
system where one section of the population was to be subordinated for the power and success of 
another ‘it is contrary to the spirit of the Empire.’ Defenders of incoming apartheid at the end of 
the 1940s may have pointed to the hypocrisy of such assertions on behalf of a segregationist 
British Empire, but the tide was already turning against South Africa.    
What did the NP government and its Department of Information do to fight back in later decades 
and how was it projected as forming part of Afrikaner nationalism's struggle for survival.   
Selflessness was one claim. As C.P. Mulder, a pragmatic and patriotic Afrikaner nationalist 
pointed out in 1978, white South Africans virtually deserved a Nobel prize for all that they had 
done for other races in the Republic.263 Again, there was no shortage of publicly-proclaimed 
conviction.  
The other side of the coin was the regularly-repeated public message that the Republic was under  
growing threats, as could be seen in an October 1978 article in Die Burger, copied from a 
Broederbond appraisal which had been delivered to parliament earlier in that week, entitled Suid 
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Afrika se vyande het geen total-plan nie.264 The article stressed that as South Africa faced a wide 
array of critics and enemies with an equally wide array of strategies and motivations, foreign and 
domestic opponents, however uncoordinated, ought not to be underestimated.      
Les de Villiers, whom was at the time the right hand man of Eschel Rhoodie during the height of 
the Department of Information’s campaigns, recorded that he himself never doubted the 
ideological need for a propaganda offensive, such as the establishment of To the Point magazine 
or the morning newspaper, The Citizen:   
‘I did not question the ideological need for a secretly-backed magazine. Those among 
us who had some experience abroad of the devastating effect on the image of South 
Africa by endless reams of unfavourable copy in the world media knew that something 
drastic had to be done.’265 
After all, he had himself seen the reaction to apartheid and its laws when he was stationed abroad 
in both the United States as well as in Canada. It was in Canada where a man had rather 
sneeringly told him that, “Sir, I think your country stinks.”266  Similarly, in the United States, de 
Villiers described a situation where he and other government officials were faced with hostility 
when angry students protested against South Africa during a conference. Writing in 
contemptuous terms, for De Villiers: 
‘They presented a fearsome sight. An odd mixture of beardos and weardos, black and 
white, small and large – a seething headless swarm of killer insects seeking for revenge. 
The audience was caught between ourselves on stage and the murky flood of flotsam 
behind them.’267 
A propaganda offensive had begun in earnest after Eschel Rhoodie’s appointment as Secretary of 
the Department of Information early in the early 1970s, following groundwork for such 
programmes that had already been laid earlier in the rising era of Afrikaner Nationalist power. 
This all amounted to the construction of a favourable climate for the dissemination of the 
messages of an apartheid counter-offensive.  
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 Examples of overt and covert actions by the Department of Information included an indirect 
attempt to buy a major interest in the British publishing company, Morgan Grampian, in order to 
try to secure a foothold in the US where it owned a major publishing house.268 The Department 
ultimately failed in gaining a controlling share, although through its intermediary it managed to 
pick up a notable 28 per cent stake in the company.269 Perhaps one of the more successful 
programs was that To the Point magazine.  
To the Point  
A prime example of the Information Department’s secret dealings in trying to condition public 
opinion was the weekly news magazine titles, To the Point and To the Point International. This 
was one of the projects in which Rhoodie was involved even before he became Secretary of 
Information, as revealed in his supposedly tell-all-book, Die Ware Inligting Skandaal (1984) "To 
the Point was the first secret operation I was involved in, even before I was Secretary of 
Information".270  
This magazine was an example of the Department of Information's extensive reach into the 
international arena and it merits particular consideration, especially considering not only the 
number of copies printed and distributed, but also how long it lasted. It could be argued that up 
to the point where the Department of Information was found out, The Point project was one of 
the more successful endeavours of the Department’s hearts and minds strategies.     
Initially, Rhoodie was asked to return to South Africa from the Netherlands to become the 
magazine’s deputy editor. The magazine was spurred on by Herbert Jansen who had experience 
of directing and editing ‘national outlook’ publications, with such publications as Verenigde 
Nederlandse Uitgewery, De Telegraaf and Elseviers Weekblad to his name.271   
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Funding for the magazine was secured through the underwriting of large-scale subscriptions to 
approved opinion makers around the world by the government, an initiative endorsed by both 
Mulder as well as Prime Minister Vorster. 272  
When Rhoodie was first contacted by Mulder, the Minister of the Department of Information, he 
was told that he would play a vital and secret role in the new project. In 1971, one of the first 
things he had to see to was that the ideological character of the magazine's articles was properly 
crafted, as well as that the mass subscription drive was effectively implemented. 273 
In its ideal conception, the nature of the publication had to be ‘objective’ and ‘non-political’ in 
its representation of South Africa and should not engage itself with the politics of the NP, in 
relation both to the South African version of the magazine as well as to an international edition, a 
version which had to be abandoned in 1977 when British journalists refused to take overbearing 
instructions from editorial offices in Johannesburg.274 According to sources such as the Public 
Library of US Diplomacy, it was also suspected in North America at the time that To the Point 
International magazine had underhand financial backing in South Africa from both private 
groups and its government, due to its implicit pro-white minority bias and its negligible attention 
to apartheid in its articles and especially in editorials.275 
Key figures involved in this project included not only Mulder and Rhoodie, but also Vorster, 
Martin Dayzings who would be serving as chief editor, Gordon van der Merwe, the assistant 
editor, the influential security chief, General Hendrik van den Bergh, the foreign minister, Pik 
Botha.276 
The magazine described itself as 'South Africa's first international news magazine' with an 
independent opinion and a unique image for a discerning audience.277 De Villiers wrote that the 
purpose of the magazine would be not only to inform foreigners but also South Africans 
themselves ‘in a more sober and accurate fashion’, thus helping South Africa to finally move in 
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the same directions as so many other countries such as the USSR and the USA concerning their 
image in the global community. 278  
However, from a study of the slant of the articles, editorials, interviews and advertisements 
carried in Point issues, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that only small blemishes on the 
good ‘character’ of the the Republic were written about, and adverse news events from both 
Africa and the rest of the world were focused on in elaborate detail. Meanwhile, the whole 
publishing operation had to function under the gaze of a watchful, non-government press. This 
was, predictably, viewed as a worryingly disloyal factor.       
In the words of Rhoodie's former Deputy Secretary of Information, Les De Villiers: 
"It was clear that the whole edifice of lies on which  we had tried to launch South Africa 
back into the world was in imminent danger of demolished by the Press"279 
Concerning the position of the press, one New Year edition of the magazine carried a four-page 
long interview with ex-prime minister, B.J Vorster, about press freedom in South Africa. One of 
the topics was Vorster's insistence that South Africa enjoyed the most press freedom, considering 
its circumstances, in the world. On the issue of the banning of some literary works he conceded 
that, in principle, "No government has the right, in my opinion, to ban or condemn criticism of 
its actions". 280   
Nonetheless, action would be a necessity in any publication in which circumstances led to what 
in the view of his government concerned the provocation of feelings between the races, for 
"given the situation in South Africa...it is reckless, irresponsible and unpatriotic to incite feelings 
between colour groups or language groups in South Africa...then I protest".281 
In further emphasis on the idea of South African press freedom in the earlier 1970s, a Point 
editorial in a May 1973 edition of the magazine, Two Threats to Freedom, even advocated that 
the press should always be vigilant against interference because in the rest of the world, in the 
United Kingdom for example, the press was subject to being controlled.  
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Ironically, this appeared at a moment well before numerous restrictive laws had already been 
implemented in order to restrict the liberties of the domestic press. These included, for example, 
the Official Secrets act of 1956, the previously discussed Publications and Entertainment Act of 
1963, and the Newspaper and Imprint Act of 1971.282 
While the advertisements in To the Point magazine naturally centred on South Africa, the nature 
of the advertising stood out because they were explicitly educative and harmonious, underlining 
the legitimacy of the presence of foreign firms in apartheid society. For instance, an 
advertisement by the German Siemens electronics company, featured a group of African, white 
and coloured people smiling with the words, 'Siemens has a big stake in South Africa'.283  
On another level, an equally typical response to the international offensive against the Republic 
came from a To The Point editorial from August 1972, which was not only critical towards the 
spending habits of the UN, but also the biased manner in which it conducted its work: 
"The United Nations...have sent yet another team on a month-long field mission to 
investigate alleged violations of human rights in Southern Africa. The cost of the 
mission...is estimated at between $25 000 and $30 000. To an organization which is 
virtually bankrupt, this is no insignificant figure [to] those states that are footing the bill 
[whom] will expect a balanced and well -documented assessment. They are in for a 
disappointment." 284 
The reason for their disappointment lay in the UN’s lack of even-handedness, its disregard of 
deplorable circumstances in other states:  
"[the] the persistent failure of the UN to investigate the human state of affairs in the 
Sudan, in Burundi, in the Central African Republic (where thieves have their ears cut 
off), in Uganda and elsewhere...seal-clubbing in Canada last year evoked more reaction 
from the UN and protest amongst students in Holland, England and Germany...than the 
recent clubbing to death of human beings in the Central African Republic [and] after the 
massacre in Burundi...the UN did send a commission to Burundi, but only to find out 
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what sort of aid the government, which was largely responsible for the massacre - 
required from the UN." 285 
The above perspective provides a perfect example of the message that the magazine was trying 
to convey to the international world. A further instance was that of an earlier April 1972 Point 
editorial dealing with the UN’s approach to combatting discrimination. In being critical of the 
UN proposal to conduct a worldwide study of racial discrimination, the magazine’s argument 
was not that the investigation itself was a problem. The problem lay in the terms upon which the 
study would be conducted. Discrimination would only be examined in the form that it took 
against peoples deemed as 'black', instead of considering all types of racism or discrimination on 
the African continent and elsewhere. Therefore, for the General Assembly:  
"The resolution would have been of greater value and picked up more support had it 
also included all other races. The fact is that in Africa there is also discrimination 
against people of Indian, Chinese and European descent, and not necessarily in white 
citadels such as Rhodesia or South Africa"286  
Examples were then given of ethnic inequalities, racism and discrimination in other countries 
such as Tanzania, Liberia, Burma, Japan, Australia and Pakistan, where no ‘white man’ could be 
granted citizenship. Typically, To the Point made consistent use of attack – exposing the faults of 
the rest of the African continent as well those of Europe and North America – as a means of 
mounting a propagandist defence of South Africa.  
Rhoodie maintained that the magazine did good work in showing the rest of the world what was 
going on the African continent and, in particular, in enlightening an international readership 
which included cabinet ministers, businessmen and figures from the medical field. The magazine 
was trumpeted as a success, as it “was a window into the paper curtain other countries tried to 
close in front of South Africa ". 287 
We turn next to the formation of a pro-South Africa lobbying organisation which had a different 
reach from that of a public image magazine like To the Point.   
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The Club of Ten  
One of Rhoodie's first and perhaps most shadowy propaganda organisations was the 
establishment of The Club of Ten, based in both the United Kingdom and in the continental 
European spheres. Initially, the body was supposed to have been made up of sympathetic British, 
South African and US businessmen. At first glance it appears that the Club was mostly the 
initiative of a former International Court judge, Gerald Sparrow, although it becomes clear that 
above him – or behind him at the top – it was the Department of Information and Eschel Rhoodie 
that was in charge. 288  
The Club, according to Sparrow, was a private group of wealthy businessmen with a committed 
South African interest which was concerned with ensuring that positive views of South Africa 
received a proper airing in the Western press.289 This grouping, according to Rhoodie himself, 
cost approximately R 800 000 of government funding by 1978 to become established.290 
Sparrow himself had the past experience of having written many books on the topics of travel 
and tourism, and was treated to an extended tour of South Africa on his first visit, sponsored by 
the South African Tourism Corporation and the national airline, South African Airways. 
Supposedly, in 1972 he was then put together with both Rhoodie and Mulder to discuss ideas for 
a pro-South Africa Club, with the personal knowledge and consent of the prime minister. 
Subsequently, he also received $600 000 as a cash payment over a three year period from Vlok 
Delport who was then the ambassadorial director of information at South Africa House in 
London.291 With Rhoodie, plans were made to buy full-page advertisements in leading British 
broadsheet dailies which was considered to be 'the only way to counter negative publicity.’ 292	
According to hostile observers such as David Sibeko, an ANC representative in London, the 
Club was composed largely of pro-South African right-wingers, with Gerald Sparrow as the 
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group’s spokesman as he was the most respectable member of the English Conservative 
establishment among the Club’s members.293 
The official publically stated purpose of the club was to be:  
'…tackling the global media for their bias, and the United Nations and the British and 
American governments for double-dealing and hypocrisy in their treatment of South 
Africa.' 294 
The press advertisements and article inserts were overseen either by Rhoodie himself or by his 
deputy, Les de Villiers and were factually heavy in a crusading tone of exposing inaccuracies.  
The paper advertisements exposed graphic instances of violence, blatant racism and other human 
rights abuses in various parts of the world, and urged readers to send the advertisements 
themselves to their governments to encourage them to be just as censorious and righteous as they 
usually were in critical reaction to South African’s policies of which they disapproved.295  
When The Guardian published a series of articles condemning South African’s race policies and 
low wages for black workers, the Club took out advertisements in The New York Times, The 
Daily Telegraph as well as in The Guardian itself. These asked why the paper did not write 
critically of those British companies that were paying low wages in Hong Kong, Ceylon and 
India.296  
That line – of charging South Africa’s critics of hypocrisy - set the general tone of the Club of 
Ten's message, critical and defensive yet not necessarily untrue or factually incorrect in its 
assertion of examples of poor human rights conditions in many parts of the world. Its approach 
chimed with views to be found in Rhoodie's Paper Curtain, and their propagation in the 1970s 
would cost about $100,000 in one year alone.  
The Club of Ten was later publicly unmasked as a paid subsidiary of Pretoria, although the direct 
Pretoria link had been kept effectively under wraps for some years by the outward appearance of   
its seemingly independent identity – sympathetic to the apartheid order, but as an external 
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‘friend’ with a London postal address. It was only after Sparrow was legally obliged by British 
authorities to supply details of sourcing and membership that the true background to the Club of 
Ten began to emerge.297  
After this unravelling, and unfavourable reports of the South African government attempting to 
sway political views abroad by means of covertly-placed advertisements and press articles, 
Sparrow reportedly changed his mind about the policy of apartheid and claimed that he wanted 
to expose the underhand dealings of the South African government, but was by then too deeply 
implicated himself. Significantly, in one of its July 1979 issues, the British weekly periodical, 
The Spectator, reported that Sparrow’s wife, who happened to be Thai, had been less than 
impressed by what she encountered on a visit to the Republic.      
The following section, an exploration of the saga of The Citizen English daily newspaper was 
one of the last failing attempts by the Department of Information to prolong the ongoing 
propaganda push by the apartheid state.  
The Citizen  
The tangled story of The Citizen started with an Afrikaner business tycoon named Dr. Louis Luyt 
and the South African Associated Newspapers (SAAN) and ended with the establishment of a 
brand new conservative English-language newspaper. We will examine The Citizen within the 
context of its political function - that the newspaper was, in fact, a propagandising medium for 
the large scale dissemination of information which served the interests of the ruling party. This 
newspaper was not a blunt or crude apartheid propaganda tool but rather more mainstream in 
character. It built on material and approaches broadly similar to that of To The Point.   
In tandem with this, the writings of Aida Parker will also be examined here. Parker, a journalist 
for The Citizen was born in Britain and educated in South Africa and Australia. She wrote 
mainly political pieces, which invariably cast a positive light on the NP. Some of her Citizen 
pieces on an alleged ‘secret US War’ against South Africa were also published in booklet form,   
The Citizen, according to Rhoodie, was committed to the same editorial manifesto that made it as 
independent of the government as To the Point, and as such it served as a vital defensive agency 
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against the onslaught on the Republic. He also maintained, improbably, that if Prime Minister 
Vorster had decided to make their plans for such a press project known to the public, he would 
have been supported by a patriotic public and business community alike.298 
Birth of the Citizen  
The SAAN which was in the 1970s the leading newspaper publishing conglomerate held various 
papers, including The Rand Daily Mail, Sunday Express, and the Sunday Times. The Department 
of Information attempted to acquire or to gain some control of such titles to try to exercise 
influence over the position of liberal English newspapers within the Republic. It should be noted 
that it was not the SAAN stable as a whole which was seen as a hindrance by the NP but mostly 
The Rand Daily Mail specifically.   
Rhoodie claimed to have studied the writing and publishing patterns as well as the readership of 
the-above-named newspapers and came to the conclusion that 80 percent of the information used 
by foreign journalists and publishing outlets, came from the local daily English-language press. 
Supposedly, some of the journalists did not even attempt to scrutinise or to rewrite information in 
their own words.  
This, according to Rhoodie, meant that what was being read by millions of people in many 
countries was being based on a few anti-NP newspapers. What was needed was a ‘moderate’ 
English newspaper which would serve a Witwatersrand readership which was non-Afrikaans. as 
well as overseas journalists overseas seeking more accurate information.299   
Luyt, a millionaire who had made his money in the fertilizer business, was chosen by Vorster to 
lead this government project. Initially, his holding was provided with R2 million by the 
Department of Information to buy out the majority shares in the company300.  
Once it had got wind of what was envisaged, the SAAN rejected the bid for control of the 
company as what it represented- an attempted NP takeover- and the Department of Information 
was obliged to regroup in to get another contingency plan into action.  
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This was to be the establishment of a ‘respectable’ and independent-looking English newspaper 
which would not act blatantly as an openly propagandist mouthpiece of the National Party and its 
politics. As Mulder himself realised, 'If the newspaper is simply going to be an English version 
of Die Transvaler, then we are wasting our time, money and energy.'301 To be effective, a new 
paper would have to be free of any obvious display of Nationalist ties.   
It was estimated that it would take two to three years for a venture such as this to fully get off the 
ground, with the idea that once realised, it could be compared with a paper such as The Sunday 
Times, and would subsequently act as a countervailing press rival. The newspaper project would 
become known as 'Project Annemarie', which was the name of Rhoodie’s daughter.302 The title 
of the proposed morning paper, The Citizen, was also Luyt’s idea, squashing other proposed 
titles, such as The Morning News, The Guardian or The Republican. 303 
A brief editorial in the first 1976 edition of The Citizen by its chief editor, Martin Spring, 
entitled, 'What does The Citizen stand for?' declared that the new paper stood very simply for all 
that was best for and best about the Republic. Louis Luyt and others who had personally invested 
in the paper, had done so from high-minded motives, as there was a need for a publication that 
encouraged 'political reconciliation between English and Afrikaans, moderate whites and blacks' 
and that would serve as a catalyst for healthy reform and change.  
The grounds for this were encouraging for, after all, the white population was comprised mostly 
of 'decent, humane and Christian people - not racist ogres', and the vast majority of the black 
population was restrained and sober-minded, and did not want to be 'stampeded into disastrous 
confrontation.' 304 
Rhoodie created an editorial manifesto for The Citizen, and it is worth noting a few of its 
fundamental assertions as they sought to suggest that the paper and its correspondents would be 
independent of any government direction, but would at the same time uphold South African 
‘values’ and support the national interest.   
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The following points (1, 3 and 4) affirmed that the paper would be independent and objectively 
‘factual’ in all of its coverage. 305 
1: The Citizen is to offer an independent newspaper whose staff to the best of their 
ability will report to the public on the basis of established and reliable information 
sources as well as current and background facts in a proper context not under any bias. 
 
2: The Citizen and its staff rejects the manipulation of information in all forms and will 
not tolerate attempts to influence readers by offering regular news through personal bias 
or own opinions.  
 
4: Editorial staff will at all times uphold the traditional journalistic codes and maintain 
them, namely the truth, accuracy, thoroughness, balance, proper perspective, simplicity 
and efficiency of expression and distancing of reporting. 
Then further points (5, 7 and 8) proclaimed the purpose of the newspaper and announced what its 
code of conduct would be regarding South Africa's security and values: 306 
5: The publisher and the editor will uphold the editorial policy of the newspaper based 
on what is regarded as generally accepted values essential for the future survival and 
prosperity of South Africa and all its people. 
 
7: The Citizen will try to investigate and report on all matters in the public's interest, 
regardless of controversy, where it is not prohibited by the law, in the belief that a well-
informed community is the best defence against those who seek to undermine the 
country's fundamental values while at the same time being the assurance of competent, 
fair and responsible behaviour by public and private figures and institutions. However, 
no one who is employed by the Citizen will deliberately say or write something that 
does not promote the security of the Republic and its constitutional elected government 
or will cause disputes between the different national groups. 
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8: The Citizen opposes Communism, Fascism and Marxism as ideologically 
incompatible with a just government and its prosperity. The Citizen supports free 
enterprise. 
Any overview of a sample of the articles, editorials and advertisements from the paper reveals 
that the version of South Africa that was being portrayed by The Citizen was one that 
exemplified NP leadership as wise and just, the apartheid system as an effective and essential 
means of governing the Republic, that those critical of the country’s domestic political order 
were unpatriotic or virtually criminal, and that time was needed for NP policy to evolve 
positively in the face of the various threats to endangered white civilisation in Southern Africa.  
News reporting in practice 
Examples from two years of Citizen issues have been selected, from 1976 when it was started 
and in 1977 in order to secure an idea of the character of the magazine's articles, and also to 
consider it against the later years of the 1970s, a charged period marked by a change in white 
South African experience within a rapidly changing world. Regional war efforts around South 
Africa were intensifying, an armed struggle led by black liberation movements was gathering in 
momentum, and the issues of a potential majority-rule Rhodesia and a post-colonial Angola  
were looming in front of white-ruled South Africa.  
In terms of ‘op-ed’ advertising, the example of a full-page NP spread in the 19th November 1977 
issue, under the pen of F.W de Klerk, was a classic illustration of The Citizen at work. 
Emblazoned in large letters, 'English speakers it's time to let your conscience speak' and ‘below 
the words', it then quoted previous prominent Afrikaner leaders, such as D.F. Malan, J.G 
Strydom and H.F. Verwoerd about the desired relationship between the white groups in South 
Africa.  
Furthermore, it highlighted some of the socio-economic and political difficulties that the 
Republic was going through in the later 1970s, such as civil unrest and the threat of sanctions. 
One of the leading exclamations was, 'Black unrest is NOT the National Party’s fault' and asked 
the question whether the unrest in Black townships and the constant international barrage of 
criticism could all be blamed on the policies of the NP. The answer to such questions lay in the 
simple notion that the ‘Red menace’ was to blame, and that it was communist groups which were 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
118 
 
evoking violence and stirring up unlawful civil protest which was exposing the Republic to 
outside hostilities.307   
An earlier September 1976 article by Aida Parker, '10 years in Africa's hot seat', set a standard 
for The Citizen’s glowing view of NP leaders as anti-communist crusaders. Parker’s piece 
extolled Vorster’s achievements since coming to power in fighting communism and in keeping 
not only the Republic but the surrounding region safe. Almost heroically, he was 'probably one 
of the top enemies of the Kremlin...he holds in his hands the fate of some 30 million South 
Africans, Rhodesians and South West Africans.'  308 
Another instance of the near-glorification of Nationalist political leaders and their policies was 
another Aida Parker article in March 1977, 'The Voice of the Prophet'. In a far-fetched analogy, 
this was about how Verwoerd had introduced a balkanising system similar to the Swiss Canton 
structure over which the liberal author, Olive Schreiner, had pondered in the segregationist late-
nineteenth century, in her famous, Story of an African Farm (1883).  
Thus, Parker quoted from Schreiner’s book in defence of the Bantustan-minded Verwoerd and 
the NP that, 'If our people are so mingled that our states cannot become the foundation of healthy 
national life, would it not be possible in such a large and sparsely peopled country to redivide the 
races, giving each its own territory?'309  
One other article that stood out in March 1977 was particularly relevant to the scope of this 
present study, 'Minister defends press watchdog'. This documented Connie Mulder's defence of 
the press censorship bill of 1977. Mulder defended the Bill as a necessary safeguard against the 
spread of pornography, declaring, "In countries where there was virtually no restraint on the 
press it led to gross abuse of the press. It went and in hand with the spread of hardcore porn in a 
spirit of 'anything goes'. Therefore, lack of control was not press responsibility and an absence of 
accountability was irresponsible.310 
Furthermore, in Mulder’s reassurance, complete state regulation of the press would be 
unacceptable in South Africa because of its special Western tradition of freedoms, whereas by 
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contrast, in 'Africa, all but 5 countries' newspapers have been taken over to become instruments 
for propaganda purposes.' For its part, the Pretoria government rejected such extremes in favour 
of the desirability of 'press freedom with responsibility'.311 
The Press Bill created a considerable stir both nationally and internationally, and yet again in 
March 1977 Mulder’s voice was again out in The	Citizen, in defence of the intentions of the Bill:  
'I expect of the press to act like any loyal patriotic citizen, to make public what has 
happened...there is no restriction in reporting the truth. I think that it is necessary that 
the truth be reported for the sake of the public and also for those in authority...But at the 
same time my feeling is that the press must report but must also ensure that South 
Africa's image is not prejudged.' 312 
Other such pro-government material tended, invariably, to reflect the stance of The	 Citizen’s 
opening editorial manifesto – such as, to select just one random example, an early article by the 
Minister of Bantu Administration, Andries Treurnight, in 1976, 'Homelands are the Key':  
'To get separate development or national self determination of the different people in 
South Africa to succeed, there was no alternative to imaginative development of the 
homelands and the settling of large numbers of black citizens in their homeland...one 
could be thankful for all that has already taken place, but the pace would have to be 
quickened.'313 
We turn, next, to the work of the staff writer, Aida Parker, who published a series of articles on 
the so-called secret war against South Africa, touching directly on themes contained in The 
Paper Curtain. Interestingly, and revealingly, Parker on more than one occasion in The Citizen 
pointed to the need for the government to go on a major propaganda offensive against its 
adversaries in the very near future.  
 
The secret U.S war against South Africa 
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Aida Parker, as already mentioned, wrote not only a considerable series of polemical articles 
aimed at rectifying negative press views of the Republic from the United States, amongst other 
targets, but was also one of the few English-speaking journalists who enjoyed the privilege of  
regular interviews with government leaders such as Vorster, Mulder, and Pik Botha.   
At one level, the almost passionate drive of Parker’s journalism suggests that it was all the work 
of a fervent follower, the work of someone who truly believed in the NP and its policies. 
Equally, it was later established that Aida Parker was actually a government agent of the Bureau 
of State Security (BOSS), identified by Gordon Winter who was himself an agent of the South 
African authorities.314  
In October 1976, in the early aftermath of the outbreak of the Soweto crisis, in Aida Parker’s 
‘South Africa prepares for battle against propaganda', she wrote with a sense of relief and 
encouragement, 'It's happening at last. After years of being a sitting duck, in the world-wide 
barrage of words targeted at this country, South Africa is going to start girding itself to fight 
back'.315  
For Parker, a strong counter-offensive was long overdue, given what the Republic was 
increasingly having to confront. During that very week of writing and publication, the volume of  
anti-South African radio programmes alone, both from within Africa itself as well as from 
outside the continent, was reaching an intolerable level. According to Aida Parker’s obsessive 
counting, in radio-broadcasting certain words that had politically biased or simply negative 
South African connotations were being aired up to 500 times in certain instances. Those included 
words such as racist (250 times), imperialism (57), puppets and stooges (27), and Vorster 
(173).316 
The collection of articles that Parker wrote on the alleged secret war against South Africa was 
published in August 1977 by a grouping called the Americans Concerned about South Africa 
(ACSA) Foundation. Here, the ACSA goals were, obviously, of predictable note. This 
organization declared its role to be that of educating Americans about Southern Africa, of 
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providing continuous and unbiased information, and, lastly, of working to 'influence governing 
opinion, though public opinion, towards securing Western interests in Southern Africa'.317 
The US booklet consisted of ten Parker articles published in The Citizen during June 1977. In 
tone, it amounted to what might best be characterised as educational propaganda or 
propagandistic education, aimed at a general public readership. Much of the focus fell upon what 
were depicted as the misdemeanours or dirty dealings of the USA in its relations with South 
Africa  
The first excerpt started off by making three claims. These were that the Carter presidential 
administration was waging an undeclared war against South Africa in which opinion against the 
Republic was being mobilised, overseas companies and foreign nations were being pressurised 
by the U.S to withdraw or to reduce investments, and to reduce links, and, lastly, that the U.S 
government was attempting to destabilise the region by assisting the prospects for majority black 
leadership.318 
Parker declared, 'South Africa is now No 1 on the American liberal "hit list", ranking even higher 
than Rhodesia or Chile.’ The apparent agenda behind this was a strategy for ending white 
minority rule, so that the U.S would then be able to shape the political leanings of a Southern 
African ally in Africa:  
'These elements have decided that the Whites of South Africa are finished. The war now 
being waged is to ensure that the end of White rule, and the substitution of Black 
majority rule, is achieved as speedily as possible - and that when the Blacks take over, 
the U.S will have a special and friendly relationship with them, whether they are pro - 
or anti - Marxist.'319 
It was, according to her article, chiefly the underhand workings of the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) which was channelling funds from the US State Department into various ‘black 
power’ movements, unknown to their recipients. These organizations included the Black 
Peoples’ Convention (BPC), the South African Students Organization (SASO) and the Soweto 
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Students Representative Council (SSRC). The claim was even made that Robert Sobukwe's 
earlier Pan African Congress (PAC) had been created as part of this plan.320 By implication, in 
that respect, it was the US State Department and the CIA which were to blame for provoking the 
shooting at Sharpeville.  
Furthermore, Parker argued in her second article, that the Africa-America Institute (AAI) based 
in New York, was to blame for the spread of many of the delegations and movements against the 
Republic. For instance, in December 1976, the AAI had held a meeting in the Lesotho capital, 
Maseru, ostensibly to discuss problems in Southern Africa, but in reality behind closed doors the 
purpose was to consider plans to either violently or peacefully overthrow South Africa's 'white 
minority regime'. 321   
The AAI had also supposedly spent R20 million since 1962 on black educational programmes 
which helped refugees from liberation movements to further their education, whereas in reality 
the purpose was radical political socialisation and later military training. Citing a report issued 
after one of its educational workshops, Parker produced incriminating evidence: 
'It is of vital importance to provide education and training for refugees from Southern 
Africa...because they are symbols of the struggle against racism and for the majority 
rule in their countries, and because they will be needed in the fight for freedom and in 
the subsequent process of nation-building. The objectives of such training should be 
...to prepare students to participate effectively in the struggle for freedom.' 322 
A third article concentrated on the question of black consciousness and its growing influence in 
South Africa during the later 1970s. As Aida Parker concluded, 'Black power was being 
imported deliberately from the US'. Thus, Black Consciousness was not an authentic ideological 
construction born of the local need for radicalising black people to overcome feelings of racial 
inferiority and to realise ethnic pride and self-reliance, but was instead a   phenomenon imported 
from the US to stir up racial hostilities in the Republic:   
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'It was cynically introduced as a means of inflaming racialist passions and creating a 
Black-White polarization, to achieve social change in the present factual situation, in 
other words to bring about confrontation or 'Black Blitzkrieg' '323 
The American figure most implicated in this imported alien ideological construction, in Aida 
Parker’s eyes, was Stokely Carmichael, whose writings and oratory formed part of the centre of 
the American Black Power movement, not least his insistence that it was only through revolution 
that it would be possible for ‘the Black man’ to achieve full power.324 
In the final article of the set, Parker urged her readers, 'South Africans must now recognize the 
face of their true enemy, since their country's future may depend on their doing so.'325  
This series was then also published by the ‘sunshine’ colour organ, S.A. Today, and was later 
also printed by Perskor in the format of a book.326 
By the late 1970s’ The Citizen claimed to have a circulation of more than 70 000 copies, but by 
then, questions about its true strength and funding were increasingly spreading. When sceptical 
journalists from The Rand Daily Mail investigated its bold readership claim, as well as the 
stealthy links between the Department of Information and the paper, the nature of this press 
enterprise became exposed to public gaze. The financing of The Citizen was later one of the main 
topics of the string of legal enquiries and hearings and the subsequent local and international 
scandal popularly referred to as Rhoodie - or Muldergate, or as the Information Scandal.  
The Star project  
Having dipped into the world of the domestic print media, the Department of Information 
decided to try its hand abroad, by looking to an operation inside the United States. This project 
was deemed the 'Star Project', after the conservative Washington Star newspaper which had an 
established record of sympathy towards Pretoria and its policies.   
The South African government decided in the later 1970s to try to buy the Washington Star, in 
an effort to try to counter the negative publicity coming from the liberal Washington Post as well 
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as from the New York Times. This episode in the history of the Department of Information was 
not unlike the saga of the failed The Citizen – on that was full of controversy, and was to be later 
vigorously investigated by the 1978 judicial Erasmus Commission into ‘Muldergate’.   
For its foreign agent, Pretoria relied on a conservative American Republican entrepreneur and 
fund-raiser, John McGoff, who was friendly towards the South African authorities and had been 
suggesting they should esatablish a sympathetic contact in the USA independent of diplomatic 
channels and other official offices. This was to be the start of the Republic’s relationship with the 
publications firm, Sydney Baron. 327  It was the same individual, McGoff, who was to be 
entrusted with the task of attempting to purchase The Washington Star.  
McGoff had an established small press baron background, being a publisher of various medium-
sized newspapers in Michigan, and he reportedly frequently did favours for South Africa’s image 
in America without requesting payment, such as making sure that articles of a pro-South African 
nature were published in his mid-West daily papers.328 To such a conservative sympathiser, 
Pretoria’s doors were always wide open.     
Early in 1974, McGoff informed the Department of Information's Deputy Secretary, Les de 
Villiers, that the Washington Star was in financial trouble and that it would be a convenient 
moment to mount a buy-out of the title. With an injection of funding and stronger direction, it     
would make a useful acquisition for South Africa’s interests, as the Star had a national mark in 
the US and would provide an alternative to the critical coverage to be found in other large 
newwspapers:  
'According to witnesses, the influence of the Washington Star was not confined to 
Washington, but extended countrywide. In Washington itself, there was another big 
newspaper, viz The Washington Post, which was very unsympathetic towards the RSA. 
The New York Times, which is also in circulation in Washington is....basically anti- 
South Africa.' 329 
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The ownership and control of a paper at the heart of Washington itself would be useful in 
fighting the onslaught from the USA, and the case for exploring the possibility of buying it was 
compelling.   
The cost of buying the paper would be $ 25 Million, of which the South African government 
would supply $10 Million secretly from a Special Defence Account of the Department of 
Defence, while the remaining $15 Million would be raised by McGoff himself. 330 
The attempted takeover of The Washington Star was unsuccessful because of competition from a 
Texan multi-millionaire, Joe L. Allbritton, who was interested in buying not only the newspaper 
but also two television stations owned by its controlling families. McGoff claimed that his rival 
was trying to set up a news monopoly, and tried to prosecute a case against him with the aid of 
an expensive public relations company. But McGoff lost, and subsequently also lost the chance 
of getting hold of the Washington Star. 331 The fees of the public relations company amounted to 
$10 million, and as McGoff considered this action part of the takeover of the newspaper, he used 
the clandestine South African government funds made available to him to pay for his failed 
lobbying expenses.332 In the early 1980s, he faced court charges for having accepted millions of 
dollars from Pretoria for a buy-out of the Star without having registered himself as a foreign 
agent of the South African goverrnment – McGoff had, in effect, accepted payment illegally.    
 
Operation Blackwash 
The attempts at ‘conditioning’ a mass public, to use Rhoodie's terminology from The Paper 
Curtain, were scarcely successful in the long term, but propaganda projects persisted stubbornly 
for a few short years, during which time the Department of Information worked exhaustively to 
try to undo at least some of the damage inflicted by local civil unrest and the foreign criticism 
which it generated. Up to a point, flare-ups such as the mass wave of textile and other factory 
workers’ strikes in the earlier 1970s could be weathered – they may have worried some overseas 
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industrial investors, but they did not grip the political imagination of onlookers outside the 
country, nor did they foster mass popular hostility towards Pretoria’s governing conduct.      
This, however, changed dramatically after the explosive Soweto uprising of 1976. In a similar 
fashion to the Sharpeville massacre, the domestic situation immediately started to get away from 
the NP government’s apparent capability of restoring peace and stable order. Moreover, 
economic and social conditions were now far worse than had been the case in the growth decade 
of the 1960s. Externally, then, 'the apartheid government needed to counter, even more strongly 
than before.'333 
Once again, the Department of Information hired an outside firm to help it with the Republic’s 
image problem. The firm was from New York, called Sydney Baron as noted earlier. According 
to Rhoodie, Baron had excellent political contacts, including even the American president 
between 1977 and 1981, Jimmy Carter. By 1978, the Department of Information had already 
paid more than R1 million towards the polishing up of the Republic's image.334 
Sydney Baron hired an African-American named Andrew Hatcher, founder in 1963 of 100 Black 
Men of America, as vice-president of international operations and to serve as the face of the pro-
South African campaign. On the face of it, it was a tactically shrewd recruitment. Hatcher 
himself was a significant person in the African-American community as one of the first black 
staff members in the White House, and had been a former deputy press aide to President John F. 
Kennedy. His position in South Africa's campaign in the US was viewed as being vital - if the 
Department could get a black person to be positive about the NP government it would surely 
provide the boost that Pretoria urgently needed. 335  
Hatcher, as the leading face of the campaign, was assigned to set up various trips sponsored by 
the South African government for black journalists and legislators so that they could see the  
good conditions in the Republic for themselves and report back favourably to audiences at home. 
Another responsibility was press conferences on South African matters, as well as live 
appearances on morning television and radio talk shows. A key appearance by Andrew Hatcher 
as a spokesperson for the Republic was when he appeared on the NBC's 'Today Show', and 
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debated with the Methodist minister and civil rights activist, George Houser, a white activist for 
racial equality and integration, who had founded the American Committee on Africa.336  
During the progamme, Hatcher asssured the audience and his opponent that levels of violence in 
South Africa were dropping due to reforms in government policy, that these were being 
favourably received by the majority of South Africa’s peace-loving people, and that what he 
wanted more than anything was to protect the world against the views of misguided liberals such 
as Houser, who 'was one of those white liberals who knew what was best for blacks.' 337 
Hatcher also helped to check a Congressional investigation by the House of Representatives into 
the lobbying activities of the South African government, oversaw the monitoring of popular anti-
apartheid activities, such as rallies in New York, and and also monitored the content and views 
of the American press. With Baron’s Hatcher in place, the Department of Information also went 
on to engage various other public relations firms to help in trying to lift the image of South 
Africa, on these occasions using money channelled through the so-called ‘independent’ Transkei. 
Granted its ‘independence’ by Pretoria in 1976, the government tried to sell the idea to the rest of 
the world that the Transkei homeland had become an autonomous and independent black African 
state outside of the rule of the white government, but no country outside of the Republic 
recognised its legality, and it ended up all being to no avail. 338 
By then, in any event, it had already become ever more clear, as Ron Nixon has emphasised, that 
the 'overall propaganda war wasn't working either and although they did not know it, things were 
about to get worse for Rhoodie and the South African Government.' 339  For one thing, the 
pressures of the modern era were closing in on apartheid and its defenders, and the rearguard 
actions of the state and its Department of Information were proving to be ultimately unsuccessful 
in checking anti-apartheid hostilities. For another, within South Africa itself, the excesses of the 
country’s propaganda operations were about to land some of the key personalities involved in it, 
in serious trouble – an issue we will turn to next.    
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5. 3: The ‘true’ information scandal 
The information scandal of 1978-79 has, as we well know, been studied and written about in 
great depth and detail, especially by one of its key figures, Eschel Rhoodie, as well as by Les de 
Villiers, his dutiful deputy. This section will merely discuss the events surrounding the 
information scandal as well as the controversy surrounding it. Of documentary relevance is the 
Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Alleged Irregularities in the Former Department of 
Information (1979), commonly referred to as the Erasmus Commission as well as Eschel 
Rhoodie's book, Die Ware Informasie Skandaal (1984).  
The Information Scandal, or ‘Muldergate’, named after Connie Mulder as head of the 
Department of Information, was the exposure of the use of taxpayers’ money for purposes for 
which there had been no parliamentary authorisation, and on the basis of no public knowledge.340 
Initially, stories and speculation about government spending irregularities were brought to light 
by the press. An initial plan to evaluate and make remedial recommendations in the course of a 
month was prolonged due to mounting evidence of ever more irregularities that came to the fore 
during the investigation.341 These included, but were not limited to, the establishment of To The 
Point, The Citizen and the failed attempt to buy The Washington Star.   
The core charge was that the above-mentioned people, amongst others, had misused government 
funds to establish a secret slush fund to further the aims of the governing party’s interests within 
the borders of South Africa as well as outside those borders in the international world. These 
three culpable figures then very quickly became notorious and wanted men in South Africa. 
Later, in 1984, Rhoodie produced a ‘tell-tale’ volume entitled Die Ware Infligting Skandaal (The 
Real Information Scandal), in which he detailed all of the government’s secret programmes, as 
well as the ‘information scandal’ in which he, De Villiers and Mulder had been implicated. The 
fact that such a ‘confessional’ book was written by one of the insider figures of the National 
Party government of the 1970s spoke volumes of the government’s slide into clandestine 
dealings, starting well before the Soweto crisis and its fallout in the middle of the 1970s.   
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In February 1974, the Department of Information had had a crucial meeting with Prime Minister 
Vorster. During this meeting, Rhoodie sketched in great detail the pressure on South Africa from 
the outside world.342  
As already noted, Rhoodie’s feelings about the growing hostile pressures against South Africa 
had by then already been described in The Paper Curtain. Therein, he declared that, “not since 
WWII (perhaps never in peace time) has any country been subjected to such a barrage of 
vehemently hostile criticism and so many attempts to force change.”343 Indeed, he listed no fewer 
than seven factors which were joining together to culminate in something like a despicable ‘holy 
crusade’ against South Africa.  
These included the alleged anti-white racism of the United Nations, as could be judged by the 
reaction towards ‘Black’ Africa in the early 1960s USA-Belgian airlift in the Congo, the 
exploitation of complex race relations problems in the West by communists, the blatant 
communist propaganda campaign against the Southern end of Africa, and the efforts of hostile 
and radical dictatorial African states to mount a military campaign “to annex the riches of South 
Africa and drive the white man out of Africa”.344 
In an attempt to deal with these pressures and perceived threats, Rhoodie formulated a secret 
five-year plan to try to influence highly-placed individuals, and to create new channels though 
which positive information about South Africa could be disseminated routinely and 
independently without arousing suspicion – in other words, in a politically non-compromising 
manner. This could be achieved, for instance, by paying off journalists and editors to put out pro-
South Africa messages. To launch this nationally and internationally would cost approximately 
R75 Million .345 While mindful of the fact that such a clandestine ‘psychological’ propaganda 
war conducted externally was liable to flout the regulations or laws of foreign countries, the 
prime minister was, according to Rhoodie, in full agreement.346 
5.4: Post-Muldergate  
                                                            
342 Eschel Rhoodie, Die ware Inligting skandaal (RSA, OrbisSA, 1984), p. 65 
343 Eschel Rhoodie, The Paper Curtain (Johannesburg, Voortrekkerpers, 1969), p. 82 
344 Eschel Rhoodie, The Paper Curtain (Johannesburg, Voortrekkerpers, 1969), pp. 83 ‐ 84 
345 Eschel Rhoodie, Die ware Inligting skandaal (RSA, OrbisSA, 1984), p. 65  
346 Eschel Rhoodie, Die ware Inligting skandaal (RSA, OrbisSA, 1984), p. 66 
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Although it falls outside of the scope of this dissertation, the apartheid government did not end 
its attempts at propagandist outreach after the mess and political embarrassment of the 
Muldergate scandal. It simply took on a new form. For example, the Aida Parker Newsletter, 
was one of the later attempts by the Bureau of State Security (BOSS) and the Department of 
Information to cultivate a constituency of right-wing sympathisers.347 For the most part, the 
Newsletter was a continuation of the polemical rhetoric which characterised her articles for The 
Citizen and the later booklet compilation.348 It is noteworthy that material from the Aida Parker 
Newsletter can still be found on certain websites, such as dienuwesuidafrika.blogspot.co.za, 
which is a right-wing nationalist Afrikaner website, carrying her articles on Nelson Mandela 
from the late 1990s.349 
Another example of post-Muldergate propaganda activity was an effort to check the growing 
influence of the anti-apartheid movement in the United States. After its Muldergate debacle, the 
government set up the South African Bureau of Information to replace the previous Department 
of Information; its main task was the same as that which had been undertaken by Mulder and 
Rhoodie, improving the South African image.350 Its chief target audience was the United States, 
from where there were new and growing threats of sanctions and disinvestment.351 
William Keyes, a conservative African-American politician who had risen in Republican ranks 
under President Ronald Reagan, was engaged by the newly-formed Bureau of Information to 
spread goodwill in the name of South Africa, for which the initial rewards were free trips and 
lavish entertainment.  
Keyes was invited to South Africa under the ‘educational’ auspices of the South Africa 
Foundation, and while there met up with Louis Nel, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
the Director of the Bureau of Information. Thereafter, there were various further meetings 
involving Nel as well as Pik Botha, aimed at setting up an arrangement whereby Keyes would 
serve as a kind of informal South Africa lobbyist, primed by the South African embassy. In 
addition to his role as a Washington lobbyist, Keyes was also given the responsibility of 
                                                            
347 Ron Nixon, Selling apartheid: South Africa’s global propaganda war (Jacana, Johannesburg, 2015), p. 170 
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350 Ron Nixon, Selling apartheid: South Africa’s global propaganda war (Jakana media (Pty) Limited, 201), p. 130 
351 Ron Nixon, Selling apartheid: South Africa’s global propaganda war (Jakana media (Pty) Limited, 201), p. 130 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
131 
 
organising South African friendship tours for African Americans, and generally to act to 'stop the 
rise of black American opposition to the South African government.'352  
The deeply compromised basis on which these pro-South Africa activities were organised were, 
naturally, denied, and running on into the 1980s there were numerous stories and disputes over 
covert political arrangements. Ultimately, though, for all the paid energies of American 
sympathisers such as Keyes, with their insistence that the quality of life for black South Africans 
was improving and that positive change was in fact happening, the general crisis of the apartheid 
order, with its violence, repression, states of emergency and acts of daily disorder, could neither 
be concealed from critical observers nor be explained away.  
5.5: Concluding remarks 
What this chapter set out to suggest is that Eschel Rhoodie’s The Paper Curtain represented not 
merely an enthusiastic personal blueprint but also as a justification for later irregular actions by 
Pretoria’s Department of Information. In its tone, it perfectly captured the thought pattern of 
many Nationalists of the time, a view that the international world was being unreasonably critical 
of, and downright hostile towards, the apartheid order Republic.  
Given that uncomfortable premise, the remedy advocated by the book and its author was one of 
being pro-active and of hitting back by shifting the focus to the serious flaws in other societies 
and states. For South African was being singled out unfairly for condemnation by enemy forces 
which had no understanding of its best political and social interests. The menacing Paper 
Curtain being drawn across the face of Southern Africa to isolate the Republic was a clumsy 
attempt to force it to make drastic and wholly unreasonable and unrealistic domestic changes.  
For Rhoodie, the phenomenon of ‘world opinion’ was no more than a myth created for the sake 
of various American and British interests in Southern Africa. Moreover, the ‘world’s opinion’ 
was still something to which an appeal could be directed, for if what constituted world opinion 
could be changed, those particularly on an international front could be convinced of the 
Republic's sincerity. That mattered for the fate of South Africa, for its isolating ‘wall’ was being 
imposed externally – it was not a screen that was being erected from inside:  
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'the paper curtain differs in one important respect from that of the Russian "Iron 
Curtain", East Germany's infamous "wall" and Red China's "Bamboo Curtain" in that it 
is being drawn not by the people held responsible for all the "evil deeds" of “apartheid" 
but by the very people who claim that they wish to introduce sanity and reason into 
South Africa' 353 
In this perspective, blame lay with the international arena which was seemingly frustrating the 
Republic’s peaceable open dialogue with the rest of the civilised free world.  
For its author, the political treatise or programme embodied by The Paper Curtain and the direct 
and indirect consequences that flowed from its suggestions – The Citizen, the Aida Parker 
Newsletter, the Club of Ten, to take three examples - were arguably all a manifestation of a 
defensive spirit of nationalist altruism. The motives behind propaganda initiatives were those of 
defending and prolonging the way of life of the dominant Afrikaner, and of white people as a 
minority group in South Africa, as well securing the time and space for the working through of 
the apartheid ideas of separate development, including the development of the Republic’s 
traditional ethnic ‘national’ homelands into their eventual independence. Crucially, to secure and 
to protect a stable status quo, the Afrikaner people were rightfully in political control, and were 
governing by just conviction. For Rhoodie, it was a conviction that deserved to be acknowledged 
and respected by outsiders. Thus, as The Paper Curtain declared:  
One's message is quite simple. The great powers, the press and the United Nations have 
not - despite all that they have said and done - been able to deflect South Africa from 
her course or her conviction. Surely this conviction is worth the most careful, impartial 
and objective consideration.354 
For its part, the ideological defence mounted by the Nationalist Republic came to be inextricably 
bound up with the business of subterfuge as its propaganda efforts, especially after the 1960s,    
rested more on more on shadowy dealings and clandestine arrangements of various kinds. The 
following and concluding section will attempt to round off this study by returning to some of the 
questions which were raised in the introductory discussion.   
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
'The grave problem of our times cannot be solved by exorcising nationalism, but by patiently educating 
its more virulent varieties to live peacefully together in a world that has become too small for military 
conflicts. This is by no means a hopeless task...nationalism, observes Rupert Emerson, is not only a 
builder of unity within each of the peoples it has touched; it has also the potentiality of freeing peoples to 
join voluntarily for the salvation of all of us'.355 
 
6.1: The need and justification for propaganda  
As we have noted, historically propaganda appears in various forms. It is characterised by action 
in which “the expressions of opinions or actions carried out deliberately by individuals or groups 
with the view to influencing the opinions and actions of other individuals or groups for 
predetermined ends.”356 With the twentieth-century rise of Afrikaner nationalism to eventual 
ascendancy in resentful response to Anglo socio-political power and economic domination, and 
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the fear of black encroachment, the 'predetermined end' was to maintain, adapt and put over the 
fanciful claims of the apartheid system.    
Apartheid was purveyed, especially internationally, as a more positive and just ordering of race 
relations, an advance over the segregationist era, and a supplanting of European colonialism and 
imperial racism in Africa in favour of progressive political conditions which would allow for 
ethnically distinct ‘communities’ and ‘peoples’ to achieve self-realisation – even nationhood – 
and to exercise control of their ‘own affairs’. Such circumstances would, ultimately, be for the 
beneficial peaceful development and co-existence of both black and white populations of South 
Africa.  
When the ugly underbelly of apartheid was ripped open by angry resistance and state violence at 
the beginning of the 1960s and once again in the earlier 1970s, international opinion changed 
sharply and grew more intensely critical of conditions under apartheid. Internally, meanwhile, 
part of the white South African population feared a major black uprising backed by communist 
forces, and weapons sales jumped as many panicky white civilians armed themselves.  
Within the dominant laager itself, the 1960s community of white Afrikaans authors known as 
‘Die Sestigers’ grew increasingly tired of what they considered to be cramping cultural 
parochialism,  and looked outwards towards challenging social and political topics and radical 
literary styles to assert artistic freedom. This was met by banning and censorship, pushing some 
Sestigers, such as the novelist, Andre P. Brink, actively into the anti-apartheid activist. For the 
ruling National Party, some intellectual ‘hearts and minds’ were being lost from within the 
Afrikaner community itself.  
For the apartheid state, the need for defensive propaganda became increasingly inescapable and 
increasingly urgent. Warding off harsh criticism was an imperative, and if need be by any means 
necessary.  
Methods of manipulation  
The methods employed by the state to uphold and to try to promote a positive apartheid story 
were, as we have seen, both wide-ranging and many-layered. These included literary censorship 
as securing ‘lies of omission’, legislative acts to police what the populace would be permitted to 
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read, listen to and watch – like the 1963 Publication and Entertainment Act and the 1974 
Publication and Entertainment Act -  the highly controlled workings of the SABC, the stealthy 
operations of the Department of Information and its national and international propaganda 
campaigns, all designed for the purpose of taking the ideological fight to enemy critics, not 
merely passively standing up against the voices which were so critical of the Republic’s 
government.     
In essence then, the larger picture was one in which apartheid South Africa’s rulers went from 
‘defensively’ defending to a stage where they shifted position and ‘offensively’ defended their 
political order.   
As far as the question of the effectiveness or success of these costly ‘hearts and minds’ pushes is 
concerned, it is a clear enough argument that they were not. They did nothing to keep at bay the 
deepening international isolation and intensifying sanctions and other economic pressures which 
played their part through the 1980s in worsening the crisis of the apartheid order and in hastening 
the collapse of apartheid, so that today its inhabitants live in a multiracial, democratic South 
Africa. Even in the the short term, liberal American publications such as the New York Times and 
even conservative British publications like The Spectator labelled the Republic’s pro-apartheid 
system propaganda crude, unconvincing, and even laughable. That said, in a way it remains more 
surprising that the ‘opinion’ shaping and ‘opinion’ guarding endured in the way that they did. 
The bumbling propaganda campaigns of the Department of Information were only derailed due 
to the eventual outbreak of the ‘Information Scandal’, and South Africa’s censorship legislation 
remained in force on the statute books right through the end of the 1980s.     
Final remarks  
In chapter one, the notion of ‘integrated history’ is introduced to explain the manner in which 
some historians of WWII and the Nazi Holocaust have used various points of view, from both 
those who were in power as well as from those who were their victims, to create a wider context 
within which the history of Germany’s Nazi era could be more fully grasped.357   
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As Saul Dubow has suggested, it might still be too early for South Africa to completely distance 
itself from its forms of history – partisan of one or other kind - within its own writings.358 Does 
one nationalist history – overcome and condemned – simply have to give way to another version, 
now based on a post-apartheid political triumphalism?  One that might, in time, come to consign 
the unjust apartheid past to the proverbial ‘dustbin’ of history, or just recall the domestic 
harshness and repressiveness of apartheid laws and their enforcement.   
 Studies of this kind, might, however, might be a modest step in the direction of eventually 
creating a more integrated history, placed within a framework within which one might justifiably 
reflect upon the embattled mind of the apartheid government in relation to its Afrikaner 
nationalist convictions, and its determined resilience in the post-Sharpeville and later post-
Soweto battle to uphold its legitimacy. 
In the world of current secondary school education, within which the present writer works, South 
Africa’s apartheid era has become a topic which is touched upon repeatedly, but now rarely if 
ever in terms of getting to grips with its ‘mentality’ on its own terms, as projected by its assorted 
protaganists. The motives for the ‘hearts and minds’ propaganda drive – however murky its 
execution and however doomed its outcome – merit sober examination in order to understand 
everything that has gone into the making of South Africa’s twentieth-century historical and 
national consciousness.  
Perhaps then, at the risk of using a cliché, South Africans may learn from the past in a more 
dispassionate manner than is so often the case today, and reconcile on the basis of a fully shared 
collective understanding of South Africa’s troubled political development.      
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